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Lecture builds on the book, co-authored with Dennis Curtis and entitled REPRESENTING JUSTICE:
INVENTION, CONTROVERSY AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS
(2011), as well as on a related essay, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment AT&T v. Concepcion, WalMart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011). The many contributions of
Dean Richard J. Childress (see, e.g., Malcolm J. Harkins, III, Why “The Childress Lecture”?, 53
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 961 (2009)) make giving the Childress Lecture a special honor, as is being joined
by the panelists at the Symposium, many of whom have essays in this volume and all of whom
share commitments to enabling courts to flourish.
My understanding of the function and obligations of courts has been deepened by working
with my colleagues Hope Metcalf and Sia Sanneh and our students in Yale Law School’s Liman
Workshop, and by a remarkable group of engaged assistants—Laura Beavers, Edwina Clarke,
Elizabeth David, Samir Deger-Sen, Marissa Doran, Ruth-Anne French-Hodson, Jason Glick,
Gloria Gong, Matt Letten, Meghan McCormack, Ester Murdukhayeva, Jane Rosen, Brandon Trice,
and Charles Tyler. Longstanding thanks continue to flow to former students Adam Grogg, Elliot
Morrison, and Allison Tait. Thanks are also due to Joel Goldstein, who shaped the Symposium, to
the students at the Saint Louis University Law Journal, and to Denny Curtis, whose insights are
repeatedly invoked in discussion of our book.
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I. TAKING COURTS FOR GRANTED: UNPACKING THE “GIVEN”

Figure 1: LADY OF JUSTICE, WILLIAM EICHOLTZ, 2002,
VICTORIA COUNTY COURT, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA.
Photographer: Ken Irwin. Photograph reproduced with the permission of the sculptor and
the Liberty Group, owner and manager of the Victoria County Court Facility.
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This six-meter aluminum female form hangs on a building, opened in 2002,
on a busy street corner in Melbourne, Australia.1 Why did the designers assume
that passers-by would understand the figure as “Justice” and the building as a
court of law, rather than see the sculpture as a warrior princess, an opera singer,
or find it incomprehensible?
That question reflects one theme in Representing Justice: Invention,
Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms,2 in which
Dennis Curtis and I explored the relationship, over centuries, between courts and
democracy. The legibility of this oddly-garbed hulking female figure, with
scales, sword, and a blindfold, is a tribute to the political energies of diverse
governments that have valorized this shared referent. “Justice” serves as a sign
of courts, which provides a service so taken for granted that the novelty of its
contemporary import and its social welfarist implications are easily lost.
Representations of the female Virtue Justice date back to the European
Renaissance, when such figures were among many Virtues displayed in public
buildings. Yet, unlike imagery of her siblings, the Cardinal Virtues Prudence,
Temperance, and Fortitude, Justice is a remnant that remains accessible to a
diverse audience. We—onlookers—know her because governments of all
stripes have deployed her to bolster their legitimacy as they imposed the violence
of law—mandating property reallocation and limiting liberty in the name of the
state.
Imperial conquests and colonialism, democratic governments,
professional organizations, commercial entrepreneurs, and media have
interacted in the production of political, visual, literary, and social practices that
have formed a trans-temporal and transnational set of conventions for courts.
While not ubiquitous, Justice has had a remarkable run as political propaganda.
Yet, during the last three centuries, the courts that Justice has come to mark
have developed obligations radically disjunctive with the Renaissance traditions
from which the icon of Justice emerged. Social movements succeeded in many
countries in transforming adjudication into a democratic practice to which all
persons—regardless of gender, race, class, and nationality—have access to open

1. Figure 1 is a photograph by Ken Irwin of Lady of Justice, created by William Eicholtz in
2002 and set above the front entrance of the Victoria County Court, a building designed by Daryl
Jackson of SKM Lyons Architects, and which serves as an intermediate trial court with both civil
and criminal jurisdiction. See COUNTY COURT VICTORIA, http://www.countycourt.vic.gov.au (last
visited May 7, 2012). Thanks to Chief Judge Michael Rozenes of the County Court of Victoria for
assistance in obtaining permission to reproduce the image, to the Challenger Financial Services
Group and the Liberty Group, and to the sculptor, William Eicholtz, for permitting reproduction of
this figure. This image, as well as the others (aside from Figure 10) that are printed in conjunction
with this Lecture, are reproduced in relationship to the book REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION,
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011) that
Dennis Curtis and I co-authored and that formed the basis for aspects of my lecture.
2. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY,
AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011).
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and public courts in which independent and impartial judges are required to treat
disputants with dignity and respect. Egalitarian social movements not only
produced new rights to courts but also generated new rights in courts to reflect
new understandings of whose courts those institutions were. When rights to
adjudication expanded, demand curves soared. Purpose-built structures—
courthouses—became a signature marker not only of the work of adjudication
but of government more generally.
This Lecture addresses—and expands on—one facet of an argument set
forth in Representing Justice. Here, my focus is on courts in the United States
as a constitutionally-obliged substantive entitlement, a positive and regulated
service that the government subsidizes. During the twentieth century, this
entitlement became, at a formal level, universal in its availability, as are public
education and government benefits such as social security. Further, in the wake
of large numbers of indigent litigants (drawn into courts either as criminal
defendants or seeking to enter as plaintiffs), governments have come to offer
additional, targeted court-related services, such as fee waivers and subsidized
lawyers, for certain subsets of disputants.
This government service is deeply embedded in constitutional texts and
doctrines, explicitly recognizing obligations to provide courts. Given that this
Symposium is hosted by the Saint Louis University Law Journal, I use the 1820
Missouri Constitution as a first example.
That courts of justice ought to be open to every person, and certain remedy
afforded for every injury to person, property, or character; and that right and
justice ought to be administered without sale, denial, or delay; and that no private
property ought to be taken or applied to public use without just compensation.3

Before I turn to the import of such provisions, a sketch of the components
of the larger argument set forth in Representing Justice is in order. First,
adjudication is proto-democratic in that courts were an early site of constraint
on government. Government provision of dispute resolution can be traced from
Mesopotamia, Egypt, Palestine, Greece, and Rome4 to the formation of
Medieval European city-states.5 The content of what was entailed varied
dramatically, but the concept of adjudicatory power—that rulers had the power
to identify certain behavior as wrongful and to impose sanctions, and that some

3. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 7. See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text for
amendments and current interpretations.
4. See Kathryn E. Slanski, The Law of Hammurabi and Its Audience, 24 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 97 (2012); J.G. Manning, The Representation of Justice in Ancient Egypt, 24 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 111 (2012); Adriaan Lanni, Publicity and the Courts of Classical Athens, 24 YALE J.L.
& HUMAN. 119 (2012).
5. See Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Re-Presenting Justice: Visual Narratives of Judgment
and the Invention of Democratic Courts, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 19 (2012).
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sectors of a population had enforceable rights to property and relationships—
spans millennia.
Furthermore, even in eras when judges were obliged to be loyal servants of
monarchies and of republican states, judges were bound by rules dictating their
treatment of disputants. Instructions such as “hear the other side” date from the
fifth century C.E.6 By publicly resolving disputes and punishing violators, rulers
acknowledged through rituals of adjudication that something other than pure
power legitimated their authority. Because performance required an audience,
adjudication was an avenue for authority to shift away from rulers. Spectators
became active observers, able to see and, eventually, to assess and to stand in
judgment of a state’s provision of dispute resolution services and the laws that
were applied.
Second, democracy changed adjudication.
Aspects of modern
adjudication—obligatory public access, judicial independence, critical
appraisals of procedural fairness even if rules comported with ancient customs
and usage, and equal access of all persons—are the result of political and social
movements of the past three centuries that render today’s courts novel. During
the Renaissance, the public was invited to watch spectacles of judgment and of
punishment. While witnessing power, the public was not presumed to possess
the authority to contradict it. Yet unruly crowds were a possibility, serving as
one prompt for what Michel Foucault famously charted—the privatization of
punishment.7
In contrast to the shifting of state punishment into prisons closed to the
public, court-based proceedings became obligatorily public. Illustrative is the
1676 Charter of the English Colony of West New Jersey, which provided that
“in all publick courts of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal, any person
or persons . . . may freely come into, and attend . . . .”8 The practice of
“publicity,” to borrow Jeremy Bentham’s term, enabled what Bentham
imaginatively called the “Public-Opinion Tribunal”9 to assess government

6. According to John Kelly, although the concept is credited to St. Augustine, it predated
him; a fourth-century manuscript by a Sardinian bishop, Lucifer of Cagliari, argued that God had
interrogated Adam and Eve because they could not be “condemned by us unheard.” John M. Kelly,
Audi Alteram Partem, 9 NAT. L.F. 103, 109 & n.36 (1964).
7. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 73–74
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977).
8. Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, ch. XXIII (1677), reprinted in
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 184, 188 (Richard L. Perry ed., 1959) [hereinafter Concessions and
Agreements of West New Jersey].
9. See 9 JEREMY BENTHAM, Constitutional Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 41
(John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843). See generally FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY
BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE (1983).
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actors. As Bentham explained, while presiding at trial, a judge was also on
trial.10
By the eighteenth century, the new states in North America took this idea to
heart. The words “[a]ll courts shall be open,”11 often coupled (as Missouri’s
Constitution illustrates) with clauses promising remedies for harms to person’s
property and person, were reiterated in many state constitutions. From the
baseline of the Renaissance, the public’s new authority to use courts and to judge
judges (and, inferentially, the government) worked a radical transformation.
“Rites” turned into “rights,” as requirements proliferated to provide “open” and
“public” hearings and to respect the independence of judges. The more that
spectators were active participants (“auditors,” to borrow again from
Bentham12), the more courts could serve as one of many venues contributing to
what twentieth-century theorists termed the “public sphere”—disseminating
authoritative information that shaped popular opinion of governments’ output.13
Courts were not only contributors to the public sphere but were also
transformed by new ideas about the position of the judge and by a deepening
sense of equality before the law. Instead of subservience to rulers, judges gained
their status as independent actors, authorized to stand in judgment of the very
power that gave them their jurisdiction.14 The circle of those eligible to come to
court enlarged radically, and the kinds of harms recognized as legally cognizable
multiplied.
Yet only in the twentieth century did all persons become able to be in courts
in all roles—from litigants, witnesses, jurors, lawyers, and (yet more recently)

10. See 6 JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, in THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 355 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) [hereinafter
6 BENTHAM] (“Of Publicity and Privacy, as Applied to Judicature in General, and to the Evidence
in Particular”). See generally Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham: “Open Courts,” “Terror
Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 1 (2011); Frederick Schauer,
Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339.
11. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 12. See generally Judith Resnik, Fairness in
Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125
HARV. L. REV. 78, 80–81, 104–05 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness in Numbers].
12. 6 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 356.
13. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 236–37 (Thomas Burger & Frederick
Lawrence trans., MIT Press 1991) (1962); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 359 (William Rehg trans.,
MIT Press 1996) (1992). The degree to which courts can perform those functions depends on their
configuration, in both material and legal senses. For example, putting prisoners in “the dock” and
limiting space for the public reflect hierarchies of authority rather than egalitarian values. See
generally LINDA MULCAHY, LEGAL ARCHITECTURE: JUSTICE, DUE PROCESS AND THE PLACE OF
LAW (2011).
14. This development in England is mapped by PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL
DUTY 148−59 (2008).
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judges.15 Formal principles of equal treatment entitled a host of claimants to be
heard and treated with dignity, whatever their race, class, ethnicity, and gender.
Constitutions and transnational conventions insisted that such hearings be both
“public” and “fair,” permitting litigants and judges to assess whether a particular
process accorded with changing understandings of what the demands of justice
entailed. The transnational codification of the 1966 United Nations Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights summarizes these new tenets: “everyone shall be
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law.”16
A measure of the success of the expanded role for courts can be seen from
the rising number of filings in courts. The United States offers one example.
The federal courts, which each year handle some 400,000 civil and criminal
filings and a million-plus bankruptcy petitions, provide a window into twentiethcentury commitments to courts.17 Fewer than 30,000 cases were brought before
the federal courts in 1901; ten times that number were filed by 2001.18 Yet those

15. Nebraska and Delaware amended their constitutions in 1996 and 1999, respectively, to
make the point of gender equality explicit. Each added the words “him or her” to their
constitutional guarantees that all courts be open. See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual
Commitments to Rights to Remedies. In 1984, Indiana shifted its nomenclature from rights for
“every man” to “every person.” See IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 12, amended by IND. CONST.
amend. LXVIII. Rhode Island did so as well in 1986. See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions:
Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies (changing “he” and “his” to “person”).
16. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), art. 14, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). See generally THE
CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS AND PRACTICAL
CHALLENGES (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2012) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE]. In addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the U.N. in 1985 created the “Basic Principles on the
Independence of the Judiciary.” Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders, Milan, Aug. 26–Sep. 6, 1985, Basic Principles on the Independence
of the Judiciary, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1. In 1994, the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights authorized the post of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, OFF. HIGH
COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/issues/Judiciary/ Pages/IDPIndex.aspx
(last visited May 9, 2012).
17. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 2–3 (2010), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statis
tics/JudicialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf [hereinafter 2009 AO REPORT].
18. These data are drawn from Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics 6 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Judicial Caseload Statistics], and from the American Law
Institute’s 1934 study of the business of the U.S. Courts, American Law Institute, A Study of the
Business of the Federal Courts Part I: Criminal Cases 107 (1934), American Law Institute, A Study
of the Business of the Federal Courts Part II: Civil Cases 111 (1934). For additional details, see
generally Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally and Legally): The Monuments
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numbers are minute when viewed against the volume in state courts, where more
than forty million civil and criminal cases (traffic, juvenile, and domestic
relations cases aside) are filed annually.19 Figure 2—a chart offering a
comparison of the numbers of filings in state and federal courts in 2009—
provides a glimpse of the volume.20 Another marker is that more than two
million people are incarcerated21 and a total of more than seven million under
state supervision.22

COMPARING THE VOLUME OF FILINGS: STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 2009
45,000,000
40,000,000
35,000,000
30,000,000
25,000,000
20,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
‐

40,200,000

410,792

1,402,816

Federal civil and
criminal filings

Bankruptcy filings

State filings

Figure 2
Growing dockets beget judges. Again, the federal system offers a way to
track the changes. In the middle of the nineteenth century, fewer than forty

of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J. 823 (2012) [hereinafter Resnik, Building
the Federal Judiciary].
19. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN
ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS 3 (2011), available at http://www.courtstatis
tics.org/FlashMicrosites/CSP/images/CSP2009.pdf [hereinafter 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS].
20. 2009 AO REPORT, supra note 17, at 2–3 (federal and bankruptcy statistics); 2009 STATE
COURT CASELOADS, supra note 19, at 3. The state court data are composite estimates that do not
include traffic, juvenile, or domestic relations cases.
21. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, at 5 (2008),
available
at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_
FINAL_2-1-1_FORWEB.pdf.
22. THE PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN
CORRECTIONS 5 (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/PSPP_
1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf.
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federal trial judges sat in courtrooms around the entire United States. By 2001,
more than 650 authorized judgeships existed at the trial level. Judges and
cases—and money and politicians—beget courthouses. In 1850, virtually no
buildings owned by the federal government bore the name “courthouse” on their
doors. The occasional federal courtroom was tucked inside federal buildings
called custom houses or in spaces borrowed from states or private entities. In
contrast, by 2010, more than 550 federal courthouses—so named—had been
built.

Figure 3: THE UNITED STATES POST OFFICE, COURT HOUSE, AND
CUSTOM HOUSE, BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records
Administration.

In days of fewer filings, three-story federal courthouses sufficed. One
example is the 1908 federal building in Biloxi, Mississippi that was given the
name Post Office, Courthouse, and Custom House.23 By 1929, another new
federal building opened for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of

23. James Knox Taylor, who held the position of Supervising Architect from 1897 until 1912,
is credited with the three-story building, whose design has much in common with other of his
structures, “[n]early all . . . classical or colonial revival.” See ANTOINETTE J. LEE, ARCHITECTS TO
THE NATION: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE SUPERVISING ARCHITECT’S OFFICE 209 (2000).
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Iowa.24 The building could instead have had a title capturing its multiple
functions as a post office and federal office building for it also housed
administrators from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce as well as a
court.25 But the name chosen—the U.S. Court House—denoted the growing
importance of adjudication.

Figure 4: THE U.S. COURT HOUSE FOR THE SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF IOWA
Image reproduced courtesy of the National Archives and Records
Administration.

Today’s volume of court filings continues to produce purpose-built,
segregated facilities now routinely designated as “courthouses,” and their
dimensions have likewise grown. The state of Missouri is home to the tallest
federal courthouse in the country, the Thomas F. Eagleton Federal Courthouse

24. U.S. Courthouse, Des Moines, IA: Building Overview, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN.
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/ext/html/site/hb/category/25431/actionParameter/exploreByBuilding/
buildingId/444 (last visited May 8, 2012). Renovated and enlarged in 1995, the courthouse remains
in use. Id.
25. Id. The 1929 building joined several other “monumental public buildings” along the
riverfront, and their style and placement reflected the City Beautiful Movement efforts to create
important civic spaces. Id.
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(Figure 5), opened in 2000 in St. Louis.26 Standing 557 feet, it was, when built,
also the “largest Federal courthouse in the United States,”27 with more than one
million square feet that cost 200 million dollars to construct.28 That courthouse
provides space for seven hundred employees, of whom (as of 2012), twentythree were district, magistrate, bankruptcy, senior, or appellate judges.29
Courthouse construction marked the changing import and parameters of
rights. During the twentieth century, whole new bodies of law emerged,
restructuring family life, responding to domestic violence, reshaping employee
and consumer protections, and recognizing indigenous and civil rights.
Spanning borders, governments came together to create multi-national
adjudicatory bodies, from the “Mixed Courts of Egypt” and the Slave Trade
Commissions of the nineteenth century to the contemporary regional and
international courts, such as the European Court of Justice and the International
Criminal Court.
The first point (adjudication was proto-democratic) and the second
(democratic norms changed adjudication) are the predicates to a third claim in
Representing Justice—that the new equality of adjudication has put pressures of
various kinds on the work taking place within courthouses. As women and men
of all colors gained recognition as rights-holders, entitled to sue and be sued, to

26. Thomas F. Eagleton U.S. Courthouse, U.S. GEN. SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.gsa.
gov/portal/content/101471 (last visited May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Thomas F. Eagleton U.S.
Courthouse]; see also U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., THOMAS F. EAGLETON UNITED STATES
COURTHOUSE, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 12 (2001) [hereinafter GSA EAGLETON COURTHOUSE
BOOKLET].
27. GSA EAGLETON COURTHOUSE BOOKLET, supra note 26, at 12; Thomas F. Eagleton U.S.
Courthouse, supra note 26. The GSA website specifies that it is the largest single federal
courthouse built. The Eagleton Building is the third highest in St. Louis, designed to avoid
overshadowing the city’s logo, the Gateway Arch.
28. See Randy Gragg, Monuments to a Crime-Fearing Age, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 28, 1995,
at 36; City of St. Louis Development Activity: Eagleton Federal Courthouse, CITY OF ST. LOUIS,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070818174938/http://stlcin.missouri.org/devprojects/proj
Info.cfm?DevProjectID=47&isComGov=1 (last updated May 19, 2005); Thomas F. Eagleton U.S.
Courthouse, supra note 26. Some states have yet larger courthouses; a 2001 courthouse for the
Brooklyn Supreme and Family Courts houses more than eighty courtrooms in more than 1.1 million
square feet; that structure is thirty-two stories and 473 feet high. Brooklyn Supreme and Family
Courthouse, New York, United States of America, DESIGN BUILD NETWORK,
http://www.designbuild-network.com/projects/brooklyn-supreme (last visited May 8, 2012).
29. In 2012, the building provided chambers for eight district judges, Judges of the Court, U.S.
DISTRICT CT. FOR E. DISTRICT MO., http://www.moed.uscourts.gov/judges-court (last visited May
8, 2012), seven magistrate judges, id., four senior judges, id., three bankruptcy judges, Judge &
Courtroom Information, U.S. BANKR. CT. FOR E. DISTRICT MO., http://www.moeb.uscourts.
gov/judge_info.htm (last visited May 8, 2012), and one Eighth Circuit judge, Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR EIGHTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/
newcoa/judge.htm (last visited May 8, 2012). Twenty-five courtrooms were provided. GSA
EAGLETON COURTHOUSE BOOKLET, supra note 26, at 12.
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testify, and to judge, a female figure of Justice became less an abstraction and
more a representation of a person. Controversies erupted about what “she”—
Justice—should look like and whether such images captured the didactic
messages that democratic courts needed to convey.

Figure 5: THOMAS F. EAGLETON FEDERAL COURTHOUSE
Photographer: The Honorable David D. Noce, U.S. Magistrate Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri. Photograph courtesy of and reproduced with
the permission of the photographer.

Pressures of another kind are affecting the public, information-forcing
qualities of adjudication. Democracy has not only changed courts but also now
challenges them profoundly. Once a government became committed to showing
“equal concern for the fate of every person over whom it claims dominion” (to
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borrow Ronald Dworkin’s description of equality’s entailments),30 courts have
new tasks. Yet implementation of equal treatment obligations in courts becomes
difficult when individuals have disparate resources—or none at all. What forms
of access ought to be subsidized, and what costs imposed on users directly? How
should the activities of adjudication be funded?
The response in the United States has been a robust and entrenched
commitment of public financing of courts, albeit not at the level to meet all the
demands. Moreover, subsidies have been put into place for certain indigent
litigants, such as fee waivers for some kinds of litigants, free lawyers for
criminal defendants facing incarceration, and procedural mechanisms permitting
aggregation of claims through class actions. Courts are therefore a form of
positive provisioning not often associated with United States liberal theory,31
which has generally taken the vast supply of government dispute resolution
mechanisms for granted.
On occasion, the constitutional relationship to the court subsidy question
comes to the fore. Illustrative is Justice Harlan’s explanation in 1971 about why
filing fees for poor persons seeking divorce had to be waived as a matter of
constitutional right.32 “Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive
society is more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of
rules defining the various rights and duties of its members, enabling them to
govern their affairs and definitively settle their differences in an orderly,
predictable manner.”33 As Justice Harlan’s commentary reveals, justice services
are welfarist rights that are self-serving from the perspective of the state. While
rights to education and health enable individuals to contribute to and participate
in social ordering, the historical sweep sketched above makes plain that courts
are forms of government support of a special kind, on which the state (as well
as individuals) depends. States did not always supply education, nor roads, but
states always had mechanisms for enforcing rules of civil and criminal order
through courts. States need those resident within to participate in adjudicatory
processes, both to maintain peace and security as well as to generate and to
reinforce their own authority to do so. Adjudication, whether civil or criminal,
both confirms and produces the power to impose and enforce sanctions. Courts
in democracies do more, as their egalitarianism constrains and disciplines the
state through obligations of third-party access and dignified treatment of
disputants that circumscribe state authority.

30. RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 2 (2011). His other condition of equality
was that government had to respect “fully the responsibility and right of each person to decide . . .
how to make something valuable” out of his or her life. Id.
31. See Robin West, Rights, Capabilities, and the Good Society, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1901,
1906–12 (2001) [hereinafter West, Rights, Capabilities].
32. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 372–74 (1971).
33. Id. at 374.
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Justice services therefore offer another paradigm in which to explore the
import of constitutional rights and through which to move beyond the categories
of positive and negative rights and liberties. Courts partake of both, as they
forge and reflect the interconnections of government and its populace through
providing frameworks in which individuals and communities shape their
relationships. Courts are places in which to document and respond to conflicts
and deep disagreement, and, when working well, courts generate collective
narratives of identity and obligation. “Connective justice” is a phrase proffered
to describe the efforts of ancient Egypt to bridge the worlds of humans and the
gods,34 but those words could be transposed to capture aspirations for courts
operating in democratic political systems.
Given the ambitions of contemporary justice services, the political
unwillingness to commit all the resources needed to fund the adjudicatory
opportunities promised, and contemporary debates about state welfarist efforts,
the project of adjudication is filled with tensions. As the ranks of rights-holders
expanded and as states enlarged the aegis of their criminal laws, the numbers of
those seeking or drawn into courts swelled. Governments responded not only
by creating more judgeships, more courthouses, more prisons, and by waiving
some access fees or funding lawyers and other services for subsets of claimants,
but also by moving some forms of adjudication offsite, to administrative
tribunals and to procedures that have come to be known by the acronym ADR—
alternative dispute resolution.35 Inside court, rules encourage or mandate efforts
at private accommodations (settlements and plea bargaining).36 In addition,

34. Manning, supra note 4, at 114.
35. As Amalia Kessler explains, conciliatory efforts were part of judges’ repertoire long before
the twentieth century and hence have “remarkable staying power,” even as some of their forms may
be problematic for democratic governance. See Amalia D. Kessler, Delineating Between
Conciliation and Adjudication: A Comment on Resnik and Curtis’s Representing Justice, 56 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1099 (2012) [hereinafter Kessler, Conciliation and Adjudication]. Kessler’s
commendation to look toward aggregation is made complex by recent Supreme Court limitations
on that form of adjudication. See Myriam Gilles, Procedure in Eclipse: Group-Based Adjudication
in a Post–Concepcion Era, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1203 (2012); David Marcus, From “Cases” to
“Litigation” to “Contract”: A Comment on Procedural Legitimacy, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1231
(2012).
36. On the criminal side, see generally GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A
HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003), and WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2011). The civil litigation trends are reflected in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 16. See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593
(2005); see also Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) [hereinafter
Resnik, Managerial Judges]. The history of earlier eras’ use of conciliation is detailed in Kessler,
Conciliation and Adjudication, supra note 35, and in Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against
Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a
Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423
(2009).
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courts promote use of other decision makers, public and private. The resulting
fragmentation and privatization of adjudication has profound implications for
the democratic character of courts.
Once again, examples come from the U.S. federal system. In 2008, four
times more judges (often termed hearing officers or administrative judges) sat
in federal agencies than in federal courts, and these administrative judges
rendered tens of thousands of decisions in disputes brought by recipients of
government benefits, such as veterans, employees, and immigrants seeking
adjustment of their status.37 In some respects, this evolution has served to
increase the domain of adjudication, because agencies have modeled their own
decision-making processes after those of courts. Yet this work occurs with
judges less insulated from oversight by other branches of government and at
sites generally inaccessible to outside onlookers.
In addition to this devolution, a good many conflicts that would otherwise
have been eligible for courts are now, by law, outsourced. The U.S. Supreme
Court’s recent interpretations of the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act have
preempted state laws to enforce contracts requiring many consumers and
employees to use private providers,38 such as the Better Business Bureau and the
American Arbitration Association, where no rights of access for third parties
exist and where few obligations of transparent accounting are imposed.
Parallels can be found abroad. England led the way in the 1950s with its
legal aid programs, as it also fashioned forms of administrative or tribunal
adjudication to shape various “paths to justice.”39 Yet, in the 1990s, England
and Wales reformatted procedural rules to facilitate settlements.40 Moreover, in
the last few decades, England and Wales adopted a user-pay system for civil
litigation that aspires for courts to derive their funding through fees garnered for
each procedural step.41 In 2010, the English government mounted a campaign
37. See Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative
Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783 (2004).
38. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011), discussed in
Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 11, in Gilles, supra note 35, in Myriam Gilles & Gary
Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 623 (2012), and in Michael A. Wolff, Is There Life after Concepcion?: State Courts,
State Law, and the Mandate of Arbitration, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1269 (2012).
39. See generally HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT
GOING TO LAW (1999).
40. See LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: FINAL REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES §§ 1(7), 1(9) (1996). See generally Hazel
Genn, What is Civil Justice For? Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
397 (2012) [hereinafter Genn, What is Civil Justice For?]; Simon Roberts, ‘Listing Concentrates
the Mind’: The English Civil Court as an Arena for Structured Negotiation, 29 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 457 (2009).
41. The policy shifts over two centuries that helped reduce fees and has now returned the
system to one heavily dependent on user fees is tracked in a 2004 lecture, The Maintenance of Local
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against what it termed “unnecessary” litigation, as it pushed to close courthouses
and proposed significant retrenchment in legal aid.42 Crossing the channel,
Europe has expressed its enthusiasm for ADR through a 2008 directive that all
national courts promote mediation of cross-border disputes.43 Thus, social
movements across borders promote reformatting judging away from public acts
of adjudication toward more private managerial roles in which judges either
meet with lawyers and litigants to press for non-adjudicative conclusions of
cases or rules send disputants elsewhere.
Various and diverse arguments are made on behalf of ADR.44 One account
of ADR’s development is that it is a second-best response to systemic overload,
produced because governments cannot support all those who seek to use their
courts (or their roads, health systems, and the like). But another analysis comes
from a developing critique of the public process and redistributive impact of
courts. Not all celebrate the trajectory that has produced more rights, more
claimants knocking at courthouse doors, and more information pouring into the
public domain. The intersection of high demand for courts, the burdens of
procedures, the costs of lawyers, and the regulatory successes achieved by some
plaintiffs have prompted critiques, styling the civil justice system as
overburdened, overreaching, and overly adversarial.
Critics argue that courts can generate unwise policies and that the risk of
being sued chills productive economic exchanges and useful social interactions.
Too easy access, they charge, produces unnecessary social conflict. Alternative
forms of resolution, they assert, are more accurate, less expensive, more
generative, and more user-friendly. Energetic enthusiasts, sometimes gaining
funds from institutions identified with repeat-player defendants, have fueled

Justice, by Lord Justice Thomas, then senior presiding judge of England and Wales. See Lord
Justice Thomas, Senior Presiding Judge of Eng. & Wales, The Maintenance of Local Justice (Dec.
4, 2004), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Speeches/
speech_lj_thomas_maintenance_local_justice_04122004.pdf
[hereinafter
Thomas,
The
Maintenance of Local Justice].
42. The recent developments are tracked in Genn, What is Civil Justice For?, supra note 40,
at 412–15; see also Lady Brenda Hale, Justice, Supreme Court of the U.K., Sir Henry Hodge
Memorial Lecture 2011: Equal Access to Justice in the Big Society 5 (2011), available at
http://soundoffforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2011/07/Henry-Hodge-lectureFINAL.pdf.
43. Directive 2008/52/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on
Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 1, 2008 O.J. (L 136) 3, 6.
44. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement Is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165 (2003); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A
Philosophical and Democratic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995);
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995).
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movements to shape avenues outside courts for dispute resolution (becoming
known as “DR”) and to encourage judges to discourage parties from seeking the
proverbial day in court.45 These approaches entail policies that can be
understood as managerial, administrative, and rights-enabling. Alternatively,
this shift away from public courts can be read as a political backlash, in that
some “repeat players” found the glare of open courts disruptive to business
practices and governance policies and successfully “play for rules” by limiting
the reach of courts and by constricting access to public adjudication.46
With the devolution of adjudication to agencies, the outsourcing to private
providers, and the reconfiguration of court-based processes toward settlement
for both civil and criminal cases, the occasions for public observation of and
involvement in adjudication diminish. In the federal courts of the United States
for example, while filings increased, trial rates dropped over the last few
decades. By 2010, trials were completed in about one of every hundred federal
civil cases pending.47 The decline gained the moniker of the “vanishing trial.”48

45. See generally PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES (1988). For a critique of anti-litigation analyses, see Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike
in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998).
46. This concern was forecast in Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). Galanter has also
analyzed the interrelationship between the development of the access to justice movement and the
initial ADR movement. See Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social
Capability, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115 (2010).
47. The figure is drawn from ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2010 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, 168 tbl.C-4 (2011)
(Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action Taken), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2010/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf. Recorded are 309,361
civil cases pending, and 3,309, or approximately 1.1%, terminated “during or after trial.” Id. The
category of cases terminated “during or after trial” could include cases that settle during trial.
48. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); see also Stephen B. Burbank
& Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011).
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Figure 6: PHOTOGRAPH
GUANTÁNAMO BAY, 2009
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Photograph reproduced with the permission
photographer, Travis Crum (November 2009).

JUSTICE,
of

the

Dramatic evidence of the retreat from courts came from decisions by all
branches of the U.S. government responding to the terrorist destruction of the
World Trade Center’s Twin Towers in September of 2001. Eschewing both the
federal and the long-standing military court system, the Department of Defense
created a detention camp and a decision-making process at Guantánamo Bay, a
United States naval base in Cuba. “Camp Justice” is the makeshift name,
reflecting the ad hoc efforts that have pieced together rules of procedure and
evidence that mime aspects of adjudication, just as the flags that fly over the sign
(Figure 6) with the logo of the Office of Military Commissions (Figure 7)
appropriates the iconography of Justice’s scales.49 The eagle in this version

49. The photographs of Camp Justice, reproduced in Figures 6 and 7, were taken in the fall of
2009 by Travis Crum (Yale Law School, 2011), and are provided and reproduced with his
permission.
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becomes the balance, shown with the shield of red, white, and blue, three arrows,
thirteen stars, and the Department’s name.

Figure 7: PHOTOGRAPH OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE SEAL AT CAMP JUSTICE
Photograph reproduced with the permission of the
photographer, Travis Crum (November 2009).

The imagery is (unwittingly or not) revelatory; the effort to dress
Guantánamo Bay up as a court aims to bolster its legitimacy. Yet placing a bird
of prey with arrows at the center of the balance inside a pentagon reflects just
how enclosed those at Guantánamo are. The proceedings are located at a venue
to which the public does not have ready access, lawyers face challenges meeting
with clients, and at which military personnel designate the individuals who serve
as prosecutors and as judges.50 These detainees are not to be accorded the same
equal, public, and dignified treatment that became the rights of ordinary civil
and criminal litigants in the twentieth century. The words at the logo’s bottom

50. The process failures are the subject of several articles in this Symposium. See Janet
Alexander, Military Commissions: A Place Outside the Law’s Reach, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1115
(2012); Monica Eppinger, Military Tribunals: Assessing Actual Practice, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1153
(2012); Eugene R. Fidell, Charm Offensive in Lilliput: Military Commissions 3.1, 56 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 1177 (2012); Jonathan Hafetz, Reconceptualizing Federal Courts in the War on Terror, 56 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 1055 (2012).
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likewise underscore the distance; eschewed is the phrase ensconced in 1935 at
the top of the Supreme Court—”Equal Justice Under Law”—instead the words
are “Freedom through Justice.” Although one might be tempted to bracket the
rules for alleged terrorists as unique responses to horrific events, a close analysis
of other government regulations shows the continuum on which the decisionmaking regime at Guantánamo Bay sits. Ordinary prisoners confined in the
United States, ordinary claimants under various federal laws, and ordinary
individuals in administrative agencies also have few opportunities for
independent judges to decide claims of right in public.51
Amidst the high volume of filings, the demand for more services, and the
spate of courthouse building projects creating architecturally important
structures, the diminution in the aegis of adjudication and the incursions on
courts’ authority can be overlooked. But the turn towards alternatives puts the
new courthouses, built with cutting-edge technologies, at risk of being
anachronistic. Just as nineteenth century governing powers, eager to maintain
control, moved punishment practices from public streets into closed prisons,52
adjudication itself is at risk of being removed from public purview—rendering
the exercise and consequences of public and private power harder to ascertain.
Recall that a first claim of Representing Justice is that adjudication was
proto-democratic; the second was that democracy changed adjudication and the
third was that democracy challenges adjudication. A fourth argument in
Representing Justice is that the movement away from public adjudication is a
problem for democracies because adjudication has important contributions to
make to democracy. By democracy, I refer here not to majoritarian political
processes nor only to the role of juries in courts but to aspirations for lawmaking
through egalitarian methods that foster popular input into the development and
the revision of governing norms and that impose robust constraints on both
public and private power. In turn, the discussion of courts aims to put in focus
not only on the high level courts that garner a great deal of academic attention
but also on the quotidian activities of ordinary litigation.
The debate about courts and democracy tends to center on questions of the
legitimacy of judicial review, with concern directed at when and why judges
ought to dislodge legislative judgments that have a majoritarian pedigree.53
Courts are posited as the site of contestation about the lawfulness of actions of
the executive and the legislature, as mediating (legitimately or not) between
interest groups while not themselves part and parcel of social and political
forces. In contrast to the angst expressed in the name of democracy by some

51. See generally Judith Resnik, Detention, The War on Terror, and the Federal Courts: An
Essay in Honor of Henry Monaghan, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579 (2010).
52. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 8–11.
53. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
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constitutional scholars writing about courts, Dennis Curtis and I argue that
adjudication is itself a democratic process, which reconfigures power by
obliging disputants and judges to treat each other as equals, to provide
information to each other, and to offer public justifications for decisions based
on the interaction of fact and norm. Courts’ mandate to operate in public endows
the audience—the public—with the ability and the authority of critique.
Through such “participatory parity,” public processes both teach about
democratic practices of norm development and offer the opportunity for popular
input to produce changes in legal rights.54 The redundancy produced by litigants
raising parallel claims of rights enables debate about the underlying legal rules.
The particular structural obligations of trial level courts have advantages for
producing, redistributing, and curbing power in a fashion that is generative in
democracies.
On our account, courts are institutions constituted by and expressing—
enacting—political judgments about the allocation of authority and relationships
among individuals and institutions, public and private. Courts are thus an
amalgam of longstanding needs of states to do violence in the name of law, of
more recent centuries of commitments to “rights to remedies,” and of new ideas
about equality. The constitutive elements—open access, independent judges
authorized to sit in judgment of the state and to assess the fairness of their own
as well as other decision-making procedures, equal and dignified treatment of
all participants—are outgrowths of social movements that transformed the
meaning of “personhood,” the idea of justice, the entailments of equality, and
the obligations of government. Our book, Representing Justice, provides a
reconstruction of a many-century history of the idea of “courts,” and a normative
exploration of the utility of courts, so as to make plain the inventiveness and
achievements, as well as the fragility and contingency, of the twentieth-century
project for which the word “court” has become shorthand.
While monumental in ambition and often in physical girth, the durability of
courts as active sites of public exchange before independent jurists ought not to
be taken for granted. Like other venerable institutions of the eighteenth century
(such as the postal service and the press, which serve in parallel fashion to
disseminate information and which support democratic competency55), courts
are vulnerable. Current obligations of courts to provide services and subsidies
are exemplary of the success of egalitarian regulatory policies, just as the efforts
to limit these forms of government provisioning reflect widespread efforts to

54. Nancy Fraser invoked the term “participatory parity,” when arguing that the idea that the
public sphere was unitary missed the many dynamic sites of exchange in democracies. See Nancy
Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing
Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992).
55. See generally ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A
FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE (2012).
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restrict government efforts in favor of privatization. The continuation of
accessible court services for ordinary disputants seeking state-based dispute
resolution assistance is far from assured but requires, as it always has, political
commitments to sustaining the services that courts provide to the government
and its peoples.
II. COURTS AS OBLIGATORY AND REGULATED CONSTITUTIONAL SERVICES
“That every Freeman for every Injury done him in his Goods, Lands or Person,
by any other Person, ought to have Remedy by the Course of the Law of the
Land, and ought to have Justice and Right for the Injury done to him freely
without Sale, fully without any Denial, and speedily without Delay, according
to the Law of the Land.”
DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES of 1776, § 12
“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . . . .”
U.S. CONST. amend V (ratified in 1791)
“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his lands,
goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right
and justice administered, without sale, denial, or delay.”
ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 1456
“That courts of justice ought to be open to every person, and certain remedy
afforded for every injury to person, property, or character; and that right and
justice ought to be administered without sale, denial, or delay; and that no private
property ought to be taken or applied to public use without just compensation.”
MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 757
“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land,
goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and justice
administered without denial or delay.”
NEB. CONST. of 1866, art. I, § 958

56. The current Alabama Constitution, ratified in 1901, has an almost identical clause. See
infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies.
57. See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text, discussing amendments and judicial
interpretations of this provision, and infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments
to Rights to Remedies.
58. As discussed infra notes 275–82 and accompanying text, the current Nebraska
Constitution, passed in 1875, and amended in 1996, has a similar clause. See infra Appendix I,
State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies.
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The remainder of this Lecture explores the idea that rights to court are
positive entitlements, a form of social services universally provided and
subsidized by the state. As the epigrams opening this section make plain, my
interest is in constitutional commitments to courts—made expressly in most
state constitutions and implicitly in others, including the federal Constitution.
Texts such as Missouri’s 1820 Constitution—that “courts of justice ought to be
open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person,
property, or character”59—demonstrate a deeply-entrenched and widespread
constitutional norm that using courts is an ordinary opportunity that
governments provide.
Before turning to the excavation of those provisions, a reminder is in order.
The words “every person” then did not have the same meaning as they do today.
Missouri’s 1820 Constitution also protected slave owners by providing that the
general assembly had
[N]o power to pass laws; First, For the emancipation of slaves without the
consent of their owners, or without paying them, before such emancipation, a
full equivalent for such slaves so emancipated; and, Second, To prevent bona
fide emigrants to this state, or actual settlers therein, from bringing from any of
the United States, or from any of their territories, such persons as may there be
deemed to be slaves, so long as any persons of the same description are allowed
to be held as slaves by the laws of this state.60

Moreover, many rights-to-remedy clauses were inserted out of concern that
“renegade legislatures” would impair contract obligations and thereby
undermine creditors’ capacity to collect debts.61 Further, in 1946, Missouri’s
Supreme Court relied on its remedy clause when protecting patterns of
segregated housing by holding that racially-restrictive covenants were
enforceable, in part to avoid denying court access for enforcement of contractual
obligations.62 Courts were thus once institutions centered on the protection of
property and status-conventional relationships.
The idea of courts as sources of the recognition of all persons as equal rightsholders and as ready resources for the array of humanity is an artifact of both
the first and second Reconstruction. Not until well into the twentieth century
did the law and practice of the United States fully embrace the proposition that
race, gender, and class ought not preclude the use of courts.63 “Every person”

59. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 7.
60. MO. CONST. of 1820, art. III, § 26.
61. See Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 548 (Mo. 2000) (citing David Schuman, The Right to
a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1992)).
62. Kraemer v. Shelley, 198 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Mo. 1946), (famously) rev’d on other grounds
sub nom., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
63. In addition to doctrine elaborating that proposition, in the 1980s and thereafter, state and
federal courts charted “task forces” on gender, race, and ethnic bias in the courts so as to respond
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only came to reference all of “us” as a result of twentieth-century aspirations
that democratic orders provide “equal justice under law” (to borrow again from
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1935 facade). As a consequence, the content of the
phrase “every injury to person, property, or character” changed. New forms of
harm fell within the rubric of what constituted an injury. Rights to be free from
discrimination are an obvious example, and so are the developments of rights
for consumers, employees, household members, criminal defendants, and (if
“every person” retains its meaning) detainees at Guantánamo Bay.
It is the interaction between the constitutional obligations of earlier eras and
developing commitments to equality that turned courts into universal
entitlements and pressed them to be, on occasion, redistributive as well. The
promises of access and remedies become illusory when courts charge fees that
systematically exclude sets of claimants and when the resources of the disputants
are widely asymmetrical. But concerns about equal treatment are only one
aspect of what animated efforts to ease access. The other is the political
dependency of governments on courts. Polities—ancient and modern, autocratic
and democratic—rely on courts as one method to maintain peace and security
and to sustain commercial stability. Because enforcement of court orders rests
largely on voluntary compliance, courts need popular acceptance of the
legitimacy of the rulings.64 The coherence of adjudication comes under strain
when litigants are patently unable to participate. The doctrine in U.S. law that a
criminal prosecution cannot proceed unless a defendant is able to understand the
charges levied and assist in a defense65 is one acknowledgment of court
dependence on participants to function. Another is the development of
constitutional doctrine insistent on court fee waivers and other government
subsidies through adjustments based on indigency, on resource asymmetries
between parties, or the stakes of a proceeding. Further, in rare instances, courts
have also mandated legislative support for their own work.66
Below I explore the range of services that constitutions in the United States
direct courts to offer and how egalitarian movements of the twentieth century
changed the self-understanding of those who run and who use courts. I argue
that courts provide a model, an exemplum iustitiae (borrowing the Renaissance
phrase for exemplary lessons about justice67), of the ordinariness of government
to such problems. See generally Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952
(1996).
64. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW
(2010).
65. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 718–20 (1972).
66. Christine M. Durham, Open Courts/Remedies Guarantees and State Court Funding: An
Emerging Narrative, KEN. L.J. (forthcoming 2012).
67. See 1 ELIZABETH MCGRATH, RUBENS: SUBJECTS FROM HISTORY 7, 33–35 (13(1) Corpus
Rubenianum Ludwig Burchard, 1997). As McGrath explained, “history was principally valued for
the lessons it taught,” and a tradition of didacticism that lined the “walls of Renaissance palaces
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subsidies and of their propriety and feasibility as well as of the challenges and
conflicts that such provisioning produces in social orders. In the everyday
activities in courts and the battles over what courts, one finds a “progressive
realisation”68 of constitutional commitments to equal justice, redefinitions of the
entailments of equality, and counter-efforts to limit redistributive activities and
to shift authority toward private and less regulated ordering.
A.

Affirmative Provisioning

Constitutional lawyers in the United States often assume that, in contrast to
other political orders,69 the government has few obligations to provide services.
The federal Constitution is replete with instructions protecting the citizenry from
government (the negative rights produced by prohibitions, for example, on
“abridging the freedom of speech”70 and on “unreasonable searches and
seizures”71) but less by way of textual commitments expressly obliging the
government to ensure security and safety. Some constitutional scholars and
jurists do argue that constitutional references to “promote the general
Welfare,”72 coupled with the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, should
be read to impose affirmative obligations on the government,73 but the more
general view is that “negative” rather than “positive” liberties abound.74 Less
attention has been paid to the idea that structures of government—set forth in

and town halls” relied on “citation of some deed or saying of the past.” Id. at 33–34; see also Hugo
van der Velden, Cambyses for Example: The Origins and Function of an Exemplum Iustitiae in
Netherlandish Art of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, 23 SIMIOLUS: NETH. Q.
FOR HIST. ART 5 (1995).
68. See South Africa v. Grootboom 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at 57 para. 13 (quoting S. AFR.
CONST., 1996 ch. 1 § 26(2) (that the goal of the constitutional obligation to provide shelter will be
met through “progressive realisation”)).
69. See, e.g., SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE (Gráinne de Búrca & Bruno de Witte eds., 2005);
VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA (2010).
70. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
72. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
73. For example, Robin West argued that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equality and due
process guarantees ought to be read to include that the government support the “‘positive liberties’
of civic participation, meaningful work, and unthreatened intimacy.” See ROBIN WEST,
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 2–3
(1994); see also Stephen Reinhardt, Keynote Address, The Role of Social Justice in Judging Cases,
1 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 18 (2003). Such entitlements would not, however, necessarily result in courtbased enforcement. Rather, West called for congressional and state legislative action. West,
Rights, Capabilities, supra note 31.
74. How such categorization relates to Isaiah Berlin’s famous delineation of negative and
positive freedom and liberties is much debated. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in
FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969); JEREMY WALDRON, Liberal Rights: Two Sides of the Coin,
in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981–1991, at 1 (1993).
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both state and federal constitutions—are themselves a species of positive rights75
and, moreover, examples undermining the assumption that forms of services
deemed “social rights” impose obligations for government-provisioning that
political and civil rights do not.76
This categorization echoes international conventions and the discourse
associated with T.H. Marshall’s classic 1950 essay, Citizenship and Social
Class.77 Writing after World War II and on the cusp of British support for
various social services (legal aid included78), Marshall famously delineated what

75. A few scholars have noted that courts (providing a “taxpayer-salaried judge”) are a form
of entitlement, and argued the utility of subsidizing access to courts as “a highly visible gesture of
inclusion.” See STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY
DEPENDS ON TAXES 45, 219 (1999). Also detailed are “some numbers” on the costs, with the
federal judicial system as their exemplar. Id. app. at 234. Courts are the specific focus of a more
recent discussion that raised questions about the wisdom of the current subsidies to courts and
suggested instead that differential subsidies would protect the “social positives” produced by
litigation but reduce the government costs of providing the service. See Brendan S. Maher, The
Civil Justicial Subsidy, 85 IND. L. J. 1527, 1528 (2010).
Robin West’s analysis of the positive entitlement to “protection against private violence”
could also be linked to state enforcement mechanisms, courts included. See West, Rights,
Capabilities, supra note 31, at 1923–24; see also David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1230–32 (2002) [hereinafter Sklansky,
Quasi-Affirmative Rights]. Focused on criminal procedure, Sklansky characterizes these rights as
“quasi” in that they are artifacts of state efforts to limit liberty. In an earlier essay, Sklansky
addressed the “affirmative entitlement to policing” that the state owed its citizens. David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1999); see also PAUL BREST,
SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1606–16 (5th ed. 2006) (discussing
the “rights of indigents in the criminal justice system” in the context of an analysis of whether the
U.S. Constitution affirmatively guarantees any “welfare rights”). In addition, Sandra Fredman’s
analysis of human rights notes that effective access to courts is a right protected under the European
Convention on Human Rights and that, as a result, courts have provided judicial review of failures
to do so. SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND POSITIVE
DUTIES 77–79 (2008).
76. As Jeremy Waldron detailed, “[m]any first-generation rights (for example, the right to
vote) require the positive establishment and maintenance of certain frameworks,” and hence impose
costs. WALDRON, supra note 74, at 24.
77. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, was originally published in 1950; citations
here are to the edition, T.H. MARSHALL & TOM BOTTOMORE, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS
(1992) [hereinafter T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class].
78. See Joan Mahoney, Green Forms and Legal Aid Offices: A History of Publicly Funded
Legal Services in Britain and the United States, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 223 (1998).
England’s 1949 Legal Aid Program was remarkably ambitious, initially aiming to be responsive to
need. See ROSS CRANSTON, HOW LAW WORKS: THE MACHINERY AND IMPACT OF CIVIL JUSTICE
46–47 (2006). See generally RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND
STATE: THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM (2003). Major revisions came in 1999, in an act (“the
Access to Justice Act”) that abolished the Legal Aid Board and created a Legal Services
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he saw to be the progressive enhancement of three kinds of citizenship
entailments—civil rights (“liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and
faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to
justice”), political rights (“to participate in the exercise of political power” either
as a member of the legislature or as an “elector” of such a body), and “social
rights” (such as economic support, education, and housing).79 The United
Nation Conventions that separate “civil and political rights” from socioeconomic rights80 further embedded distinctions among the kinds of rights, even
as commentators have come to question the utility and wisdom of this
categorization that echoes Cold War divides.81
Redistribution obligations are typically associated with Marshall’s third
category, social rights,82 which some legal systems presume to be nonjusticiable; given the complex allocation issues involved, legislative decisionmaking can be seen as preferable to adjudication. But non-justiciability has not
prevented claims from being understood as rights and moreover, on occasion,
courts do find enforceable entitlements in arenas falling under the rubric of
“social rights.” In the United States, state constitutional guarantees of education
are often cited as an instance of a judicially-enforceable social rights
entitlement.83

Commission to work through decentralized groups charged with identifying local needs, eligible
lawyers, and requesting funding. Id. at 226–34; CRANSTON, supra, at 47–49.
79. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 8. Marshall also argued
their interconnectedness (e.g., that compulsory education, a social right, was requisite to civil and
political competencies) and moreover the relevance of collective rights (trade unionism being the
example) developed out of industrialization. See id. at 13–14, 44–49. Further, inequalities in civil
rights stemmed from the “lack of social rights . . . .” Id. at 21.
The categories that Marshall discussed echoed debates in the United States about the reach
of the Fourteenth Amendment, including whether the “privileges and immunities” clause
guaranteed federal protection against state-imposed impediments to earning a livelihood. See, e.g.,
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872).
80. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No.
16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
81. See FREDMAN, supra note 75, at 227–28.
82. See, e.g., Cécile Fabre, Social Rights in European Constitutions, in SOCIAL RIGHTS IN
EUROPE, supra note 69, at 15.
83. In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause rendered unconstitutional school financing predicated on local property
taxes. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). In contrast, dozens of
state courts have identified education rights based on specific provisions in state constitutions. See,
e.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971);
Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375
(N.H. 1993); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); see also Peter
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The obvious Marshallian category for courts is civil rights, for he located
the “right to justice” as a part of that description.84 (Indeed, “the institutions
most directly associated with civil rights are the courts of justice.”85) Given that
“the formal recognition of an equal capacity for rights was not enough,”
Marshall recognized access to courts as in need of welfarist support,86 akin to
those provided for health and education.87 Courts also come within his
discussion of the function of social rights, requisite to sharing “to the full in the
social heritage . . . .”88 Moreover, as I outlined above, courts in democracies
provide a venue for development of norms through iterative exchanges that bring
litigation within the category of “political” rights. This sense of the political
both expands on Marshall’s definition (focused on the electoral) and underscores
that full formal equality (i.e. women and men in all roles in courts from disputant
to juror and judge) came later in the twentieth century than did equality in the
franchise. Further, when guarantees of court rights for “every person” came
literally to mean all people, courts became another example of Marshall’s point
that enhanced citizenship rights puts pressure on governments to respond to
Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 VAND. L.
REV. 101 app. at 185–94 (1995). See generally Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting
“Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241 (2003).
Several articles address state constitutions as sources of rights beyond education. See, e.g.,
Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional Social
and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521 (2010); Helen Hershkoff, Foreword: Positive Rights
and the Evolution of State Constitutions, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 799 (2002); Burt Neuborne, Foreword:
State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989); Jeffrey Omar
Usman, Good Enough for Government Work: The Interpretation of Positive Constitutional Rights
in State Constitutions, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1459 (2010). Many credit Justice Brennan with launching
the focus on state courts, in part as an antidote to the U.S. Supreme Court’s retrenchment under
Chief Justice Warren Burger’s leadership. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
84. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 8.
85. Id. Marshall also distinguished “the right to justice” from the other civil rights of personal
liberty, free speech, and property and contract competencies on the grounds that rights to justice
protected the others through “the right to defend and assert all one’s rights on terms of equality
with others and by due process of law.” Id.
86. Id. at 24. He thought political rights were relatively inexpensive to distribute (“it costs
little or nothing to register a vote”) and that payment to legislators, coupled with access to funds
through parties and campaign contribution regulation diminished problems of inequality in politics.
Id. at 22–23. But “litigation, unlike voting, is very expensive.” Id. at 23. Further, because litigation
was also a “contest,” support of one litigant but not another produced another form of unfairness in
that a “measure of class-abatement” could “in some cases, create a form of class privilege.” Id. at
31. Universal support, coupled with price regulation, was one response, but not without difficulties.
Id.
87. Id. at 47. The development of legal aid in England as part of a network of social services
is detailed by Richard I. Morgan, The Introduction of Civil Legal Aid in England and Wales, 1914–
1949, 5 TWENTIETH CENTURY BRIT. HIST. 38 (1994).
88. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 8.
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economic inequality through forms of subsidies.89 Constitutional commitments
to courts thus encompass all three of the Marshallian kinds of rights, provide
examples of occasional judicial enforcement of such rights, and underscore the
redistributive entailments of each genre as well as the intersections of the
“social,” the “political,” and the “civil.”
Below, I detail the degree to which constitutions require the provision of and
regulate court services. Such positive law, coupled with natural and common
law traditions, generates what Jeremy Waldron has termed “waves of duty,”
instantiating rights over time and with variation rather than through a single
act.90 I examine facets of court services that are judicially enforceable, and I
sketch how courts responded to new entrants (“everyone”) by elaborating
constitutional obligations to be open to all; to waive fees for some and to equip
certain indigent litigants with counsel or experts; to reconfigure their own
processes; to limit legislative retraction on certain kinds of remedies, and, on
rare occasion, to order the political branches to comply with the mandate to
support the courts themselves.91
Three additional, prefatory comments are in order. First, the discussion
below of some constitutional case law should not obscure the centrality of
legislatures in the creation and support of courts. While often posited as critics
of courts, legislatures have been—and will continue to be—the primary sources
for supporting court functions. Second, this analysis is court-centric but falls
within a larger examination of American legal history that details longstanding
and diverse commitments to various forms of government regulation and
provisioning.92 The density over centuries of government regulation at local,
state, and national levels undermines the construction of a national identity
predicated on hostility to formal legal ordering.
Third, this positive legal account, sketching constitutional stipulations for
courts and government implementation, is the product of a series of normative
justifications for courts and regulation more generally. Several theories of
courts’ utilities and values sustain the project of courts and the law that
surrounds them. Now-classic explanations for adjudication’s contributions
come from Frank Michelman, who explained that access to litigation gives
individuals opportunities for participation, for efficacy, and for dignified
89. Id. at 45–47. See generally Earl Johnson, Jr., Equality Before the Law and the Social
Contract: When Will the United States Finally Guarantee its People the Equality Before the Law
the Social Contract Demands? 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 157 (2010).
90. Jeremy Waldron, Rights in Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 509–12 (1989).
91. See infra Parts II.B–III.C. As Sklansky noted in the context of constitutional criminal
procedure, courts have done less than they might to materialize (or as he puts it, to “honor”) some
guarantees. See Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights, supra note 75, at 1287–90.
92. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996); JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
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treatment from the state.93 Jerry Mashaw noted another value, that decisionmaking by governments needed to treat similarly-situated claimants equally.94
Both Justices Brennan and Powell invoked another value—accuracy—as they
linked forms of process to outcomes that accorded with facts and law,95 and a
law and economics literature debates the efficiencies that result and prompt
investments into judiciaries.96 The argument that Dennis Curtis and I proffer in
Representing Justice puts forth an additional, distinct value, focused on the
relationship and interactions among disputants, governments, and third parties
in adjudication. Litigation contributes to democracy through its public processes
in which the government is required to demonstrate its commitments to equal
and dignified treatment, to commit itself to forms of self-restraint and
explanation, and to reveal its exercise of authority in the face of conflicting
claims of right. The argument is not that litigation (or other forms of democratic
practices) generates optimal rules but rather that the iterative participatory
practices in courts are one method of giving practical expression to democratic
values.
B.

Specifying Services

Dozens of state and federal provisions (both constitutional and statutory)
require governments to provide judges, who are obliged to perform in
accordance with variously-detailed requirements. The obvious (and taken for
granted) specifications include selection of judges, the number of justices
required for decisions, tenure in office and other mechanisms for protecting
independence,97 and the parameters of jurisdiction. In addition, constitutions
provide directions to judges, specify some procedures for criminal defendants
and civil plaintiffs, and build in roles for jurors, witnesses, and the public.
93. Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One’s Rights—Part I, 1973 DUKE L. J. 1153, 1172–77 [hereinafter Michelman, Part I].
94. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L.
REV. 28, 52–54 (1976). For Mashaw, these values that animate a theory of due process do not
necessarily result in the public format of adjudicatory procedures, whereas for Michelman, these
values support fee waivers for indigent litigants to enable effective access to courts, but not to
require necessarily free lawyers for all indigent civil litigants. Compare Mashaw, supra, at 57–59,
with Michelman, Part I, supra note 93, at 1172–77.
95. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (Justice Brennan); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976) (Justice Powell).
96. Classic commentary includes J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial
Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997),
and William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875 (1975).
97. Article III is often the standard bearer, but the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the
Massachusetts Constitution offered earlier guarantees of judicial independence. MD. CONST. of
1776, pt. 1, art. XXX; MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XXIX.
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For example, the early constitutions of both Idaho and Illinois called on their
judges to “report” to the legislature or governor on “defects and omissions” in
the laws.98 Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island instruct justices
to reply when their governors or legislatures ask for their opinions.99 Some state
constitutions direct their Supreme Courts to write or to publish opinions, to make
them freely available, to let anyone publish them, and to explain reasons for
dissent. For example, Kentucky’s 1792 Constitution imposed the “duty of each
judge of the Supreme Court, present at the hearing of such cause, and differing
from a majority of the court, to deliver his opinion in writing.”100 West Virginia
directed judges in its 1872 Constitution to “prepare a syllabus of the points

98. Idaho’s 1890 constitutional requirement (that its judges report to the legislature “such
defects and omissions in the Constitution and laws as they may find to exist”) remains in place.
See IDAHO CONST. of 1890, art. V, § 25 (same as of 2012). The current version of the Illinois
requirement is that the Illinois Supreme Court “shall report” to the general assembly, in writing,
“improvements in the administration of justice.” ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 17 (in effect 2012).
This instruction, which did not appear in the Illinois Constitutions of 1818 or of 1848, was put into
the 1870 Constitution in a form akin to that of Idaho—that all judges of inferior courts “report in
writing” each year, to the supreme court, who would report to the governor, “such defects and
omissions in the constitution and laws as they may find to exist, together with appropriate forms of
bills to cure such defects and omissions in the laws.” ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. VI, § 31.
99. This mandate, dating from each state’s first constitution, continued, and is found variously
placed in these states’ current constitutions. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 3, art. II (“Each
branch of the Legislature, as well as the Governor and Council, shall have authority to require the
opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, upon important questions of law, and upon
solemn occasions.”) (substantially the same as of 2012); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 2, art. 74 (“Each
branch of the legislature, as well as the president and council, shall have authority to require the
opinions of the justices of the superior court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn
occasions.”) (substantially the same as of 2012); R.I. CONST. of 1986, art. X, § 3 (“The judges of
the supreme court shall give their written opinion upon any question of law whenever requested by
the governor or by either house of the general assembly.”) (taken in substantially the same form
from R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. X, § 3, replacing its 1663 charter).
100. KY. CONST. of 1792, art. V, § 4. The section continues,
And the said court shall have power, on the determination of any such case, to award the
legal costs against either party or to divide the same among the different parties, as to them
shall seem just and right. And the said court shall have full power to take such steps as they
may judge proper, to perpetuate testimony in all cases concerning such titles: Provided,
That a jury shall always be empaneled for the finding of such facts as are not agreed by the
parties; unless the parties or their attorneys, shall waive their right of trial by jury, and refer
the matter of fact to the decision of the court: Provided also, That the Legislature may,
whenever they may judge it expedient, pass an act or acts to regulate the mode of
proceedings in such cases, or to take away entirely the original jurisdiction hereby given to
the said court in such cases.
Id. (superseded by the KY. CONST. of 1891 and no such provision appears in the version in place
as of 2012).
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adjudicated” in those cases with written opinions.101 Arizona, California, and
Michigan insisted that opinions “shall be free for publication by any person.”102
Moreover, both Illinois’s current Constitution, adopted in 1970, and Kentucky’s
current Constitution, adopted in 1891, require that courts create rules for
“expeditious and inexpensive appeals.”103 Utah’s Constitution guarantees the
right of appeal itself.104
Turning to disputants, the epigrams with which this section opens illustrate
that state constitutions endow civil litigants with entitlements to use courts.
“Right-to-remedy” clauses are traced to the Magna Carta,105 as it was invoked

101. W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. VIII, § 5. West Virginia’s current Constitution is an amended
version of its 1872 Constitution, and includes the same requirement at article eight, section four.
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4.
102. ARIZ. CONST. of 1910, art. VI, § 16 (“Provisions for the speedy publication of the opinions
of the supreme court shall be made by law, and they shall be free for publication by any person.”)
(the current provision, which is substantially similar, is at ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 8); CAL. CONST.
of 1849, art. VI, § 12 (“The Legislature shall provide for the speedy publication of all statute laws,
and of such judicial decisions as it may deem expedient; and all laws and judicial decisions shall
be free for publication by any person.”) (superseded by the California Constitution of 1879, which
had a similar provision at art. 6, § 16; following a 1966 amendment, article six, section fourteen
now reads, “The Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such opinions of the
Supreme Court and courts of appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, and those opinions
shall be available for publication by any person. Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of
appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.”); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 35
(“All laws and judicial decisions shall be free for publication by any person.”). The same provision
existed in Michigan’s 1850 Constitution, MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. IV, § 36, but not in Michigan’s
initial 1835 Constitution. The current Michigan Constitution also provides: “Decisions of the
supreme court, including all decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing and shall contain a
concise statement of the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons for each denial of leave to
appeal. When a judge dissents in whole or in part he shall give in writing the reasons for his dissent.”
MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
Maryland’s Constitution provides similarly that “Provision shall be made by Law for
publishing Reports of all causes, argued and determined in the Court of Appeals and in the
intermediate courts of appeal, which the judges thereof, respectively, shall designate as proper for
publication.” MD. CONST. of 1867, art. IV, pt. 2, § 16 (current as of 2102). In addition, New
Jersey’s 1844 Constitution required judges to provide “reasons” “in writing,” N.J. CONST. of 1844,
art. VI, § II, para. 5, but neither New Jersey’s original 1776 Constitution nor its current Constitution,
in place since 1947, contain a similar provision.
103. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 16 (current as of 2012) (similar provision did not appear in
the previous 1870 Constitution); KY. CONST. of 1891, § 115 (applies to both civil and criminal
cases, and includes “as a matter of right at least one appeal to another court, except that the
Commonwealth may not appeal from a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, other than for the
purpose of securing a certification of law”) (current as of 2012) (this provision did not exist in the
original 1891 Kentucky Constitution, but was added in 1975).
104. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 12.
105. Chapter 29 of the 1225 Magna Carta provided: “No Freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned,
or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other
wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his
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and extrapolated by Lord Coke and by Blackstone106 and filtered through natural
and common law customs. New Americans were heirs to an English tradition

Peers, or by the Law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
either Justice or Right.” MAGNA CHARTA, ch. 29 (1225), translated and reprinted in EDWARD
COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1, 45 (London, E. & R.
Brooke 1797). Chapter 40 of King John’s 1215 Magna Carta reads: “To none will we sell, to none
will we deny, to none will we delay right or justice.” MAGNA CHARTA, ch. 40 (1215), reprinted in
BOYD C. BARRINGTON, THE MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND 228,
239 (1900).
106. An account of the development is provided Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right
to a Remedy, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1309, 1319–24 (2003), and in William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening
Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the
Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333, 357–63 (1997). Koch focused on the state
constitutional drafters’ use of Lord Coke’s explanation of Chapter 29, with its promise that “[t]o
no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice,” Koch, supra, at 356 (quoting
chapter twenty-nine of the Magna Carta), to which Lord Coke added:
This is spoken in the person of the king, who in judgement of law, in all his courts of
justice is present, and repeating these words, nulli vendemus, etc.
And therefore, every subject of this realme, for injury done to him in bonis, terris, vel
persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiasticall, or temporall, free, or bond, man, or
woman, old, or young, or be he outlawed, excommunicated, or any other without exception,
may take his remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and right for the injury done
to him, freely without sale, fully without any deniall, and speedily without delay.
Hereby it appeareth, that justice must have three qualities, it must be libra, quia nehil
iniquius venali justitia; plena, quia justitia non debit claudicare; et celeris, quia dilation
est quaedam negatio; and then it is both justice and right.
Koch, supra, at 359–60 (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND, A PROEME TO THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES *55–56 (London, E. &
R. Brooke 1797)).
“Much of this language survives intact as the remedies guarantees of some state
constitutions.” Phillips, supra, at 1321. “The constitutions in six of the original thirteen states
contained ‘open courts’ or ‘right to remedy’ provisions derived from Chapter 40 of King John’s
Magna Carta and Chapter 29 of the 1225 Magna Carta.” Koch, supra, at 367. “Four of these states
paraphrased Lord Coke’s explanation of Chapter 29.” Id.
As Koch recounts, Blackstone likewise insisted on the importance of Magna Carta to
English liberties, and identified as one of three central rights “that of applying to the courts of
justice for redress of injuries. Since the law is in England the supreme arbiter of every man’s life,
liberty, and property, courts of justice must at all times be open to the subject, and the law be duly
administered therein.”
Koch, supra, at 362–63 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *141). Blackstone continues:
The emphatical words of magna carta, spoken in the person of the king, who in judgment
of law (says Sir Edward Coke) is ever present and repeating them in all his courts, are these:
nulli vendemus, nulli negabimus, aut differemus restum vel justitiam: “and therefore every
subject,” continues the same learned author, “for injury done to him in bonis, in terris, vel
persona, by any other subject, be he ecclesiastical or temporal, without any exception, may
take his remedy by the course of law, and have justice and right for the injury done him,
freely without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without delay.”
Id. (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra, at *141).
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in which judges owed a duty to law itself, and to decide disputes “in accord with
the law of the land.”107 That tradition imposed constraints on the exercise of
both public and private power. Yet such entitlements to courts and to judicial
remedies did not include then—nor need they now—judicial authority to
overturn legislation.108 Whether individuals can enforce these rights in courts is
a discrete question to which many jurisdictions respond negatively.109
Parliamentary supremacy was understood then as ordinary, and remains a form
of constitutionalism today.
The epigrams also make plain that constitutions in North America built on
“custom and usage” when making court services constitutional obligations. As
quoted at the outset of this section, the 1776 Delaware Declaration of Rights
provided for “every freeman” to have remedy “speedily without delay” against
any “other person” for “every injury done him in his goods, lands or person,” in
accordance with “the law of the land.”110 The first constitutions of Maryland
(1776) and Massachusetts (1780), and the second of New Hampshire (1784),
had similar iterations.111 Pennsylvania’s 1776 version instructed that all “courts
shall be open, and justice shall be impartially administered without corruption
or unnecessary delay,”112 and North Carolina’s 1776 provision limited remedies
to those “restrained of [their] liberty.”113

107. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 17–18, 103–06. And as Hamburger accounts,
judges therefore found at times that “some of the king’s acts [were] contrary to the king’s own
law.” Id. at 113; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Natural Law Influences on the First Generation
of American Constitutional Law: Reflections on Philip Hamburger’s Law and Judicial Duty (Jan.
19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
108. See Epstein, supra note 107, at 31.
109. See id. at 30–32.
110. DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES of 1776, § 12; see also Dan
Friedman, Tracing the Lineage: Textual and Conceptual Similarities in the Revolutionary-Era
State Declarations of Rights of Virginia, Maryland and Delaware, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 929, 944
(2002) (suggesting that Maryland’s Declaration served as a model for Delaware).
111. See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies.
112. PA. CONST. of 1776, pt. 2, § 26. Pennsylvania’s current constitutional provision is similar:
“All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial or delay.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 11 (current in 2012).
113. N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XIII. North Carolina’s second Constitution, adopted in
1868, retained this provision, N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 18, but also added a broader provision:
“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale,
denial, or delay.” N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 35. North Carolina’s current Constitution, adopted
in 1970, includes both the narrow and broader provisions, in nearly identical form to those in the
1868 Constitution. N.C. CONST. art. I, §§ 18, 21 (current in 2012).
Of the original thirteen colonies, states including due process language were Connecticut,
Delaware, Massachusetts, Maryland, North Carolina, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Virginia. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 9 (“[N]or be deprived
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In contrast, the United States’ 1776 Constitution did not include such a
clause. During ratification, Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island all
suggested the addition of a right-to-remedy clause and proffered language
reminiscent of the provisions quoted above.114 The proposals were not adopted,
nor did such terms, when again proffered for inclusion, become a part of the
1791 Bill of Rights.115
Yet one could read the 1789 creation of the federal court system that
inscribed a Supreme Court and gave Congress authority to “from time to time

of life, liberty, or property, but by due course of law.”); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I., § 7 (“[N]or
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers or the law of the
land.”); MD. CONST. of 1851, art. 21 (“That no freeman ought to be . . . deprived of his life, liberty,
or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land . . . .”); MASS. CONST. of
1780, pt. 1, art. XII (“[N]o subject shall be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the
judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XV (“And no
subject shall be . . . deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of
the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers or the law
of the land.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1821, art. VII, § 7 (“[N]or be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XII (“That no freeman ought to
be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.”); PA. CONST. of 1776,
pt. 1, art. IX (“[N]or can any man be justly deprived of his liberty except by the laws of the land,
or the judgment of his peers.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 10 (“[N]or shall he be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.”); S.C. CONST. of
1778, art. XLI (“That no freeman of this State be . . . deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but
by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”); VA. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, § 8 (“that no
man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers”). Those
without any such provisions were Georgia and New Jersey. One of the earliest uses of the phrase
“due process” comes in a 1354 statute protecting against loss of property or life “without being
brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.” 28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354) (Eng.).
114. North Carolina and Virginia proposed that the amendment read:
That every freeman ought to find a certain remedy by recourse to the laws for all injuries
and wrongs he may receive in his person, property, or character. He ought to obtain right
and justice freely without sale, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay,
and that all establishments, or regulations contravening these rights, are oppressive and
unjust.
2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 268, 379
(Washington, Dep’t of State 1894).
Rhode Island’s proposed amendment stated:
That every freeman ought to obtain right and justice, freely and without sale, completely
and without denial, promptly and without delay, and that all establishments or regulations
contravening these rights, are oppressive and unjust.
Id. at 313. On September 8, 1789, the Senate rejected an amendment based on Virginia and North
Carolina’s proposals. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 76 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (reporting that
“[s]everal amendments were proposed, but none of them were agreed to”); HISTORY OF CONGRESS;
EXHIBITING A CLASSIFICATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, FROM MARCH 4, 1789, TO MARCH 3, 1793, at 165 (Philadelphia, Lea &
Blanchard 1843).
115. See Koch, supra note 106, at 372–75.
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ordain and establish” inferior courts,116 coupled with the limitation on
congressional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus117 and the reference
in the Supremacy Clause that federal law “bound” judges in every state,118 to
reflect the assumption of access rights for common law remedies. Philip
Hamburger’s analysis about “inexplicit ideals” may provide an explanation—
that although the content of “the ideals of law and judicial duty were never a
matter of consensus, they were sufficiently conventional that they did not
ordinarily have to be explained.”119
The federal Bill of Rights provides further support for a pervasive
understanding of functioning and (by then obligatory) public courts systems,
including the fledging federal one. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments not only
detail rights for criminal defendants (including the right to public trials) but also
that “private property” cannot be taken without “just compensation.”120 And in
1791, the federal Constitution embedded the phrase “due process of law” into
constitutional discourse.121 Moreover, the Seventh Amendment “preserved” the
rights to jury trials in “[s]uits at common law,” and limited the reexamination of
jury fact-finding.122 Even the Eleventh Amendment’s divesture of some form
of authority over claims against states123 could be read as an implicit
endorsement of judicial power otherwise extending to civil litigants coming
within the federal jurisdictional parameters.
In addition, the First Amendment protects the “right of the people . . . to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”124 In the North American

116. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. For further discussion of the suspension clause and its
limitation upon Congress, see Trevor W. Morrison, Hamdi’s Habeas Puzzle: Suspension as
Authorization?, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 411 (2006) and Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an
Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009).
118. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. Hamburger argued that it was “taken for granted” that state
judges had to decide in accord with state law and that the Constitution was needed to clarify that
state judges had a “federal role” requiring them to decide in accord with federal law. HAMBURGER,
supra note 14, at 596–97.
119. HAMBURGER, supra note 14, at 575–77.
120. U.S. CONST. amends. V–VI.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Due process was referenced along with other rights, such as the
prohibition of the deprivation of private property without “just compensation.” Id. The lineage of
the phrase “due process” is explained by Charles A. Miller in The Forest of Due Process of Law:
The American Constitutional Tradition, in 18 NOMOS: DUE PROCESS 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1977). Hans Linde argued that due process provisions ought not to be equated
with open court/remedy clauses. See Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional
Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125, 136–38 (1970).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
124. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The use of the term “government” instead of the word “legislature”
(as proposed by James Madison in the June 8, 1789 draft, 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (Joseph
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colonies, petitioning included the filing of grievances that today would be
understood as lawsuits, as legislatures exercised a mix of powers, including
adjudicating claims involving both public and private parties.125 In the midtwentieth century, the right to petition came to be understood as protecting
access to all branches of government, courts included.126 Federal rights to
remedies also stem from twentieth-century interpretations of the Due Process
Clause that recognized legal claims as a species of property that constrained
government’s ability to extinguish them.127 Although debate is had among the
justices about whether government has affirmative obligations to facilitate
access to courts,128 modern federal constitutional court doctrines identify the
First Amendment’s petition rights as well as the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment as sources of court access for both litigants and their audience—the
public.

Gales ed., 1834)), has been advanced as support for the reading that the Clause referenced all
branches of government.
125. See Stephen A. Higginson, A Short History of the Right to Petition Government for the
Redress of Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142, 144–46 (1986); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First
Amendment Right to Petition Government for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth,
21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 17, 27–29 (1993). For example, in 1770, the Connecticut General
Assembly acted on “150 causes, in law and equity, brought by petitioners.” Higginson, supra, at
146. Private disputes included the lawfulness of a deed, debt actions, and estate conflicts. Id.
Moreover, people who were otherwise disenfranchised and might have lacked juridical authority
in courts, such as “women, felons, Indians, and, in some cases, slaves,” brought petitions. Id. at
153. The lack of nineteenth century doctrinal development of the law of petitioning is generally
attributed to the conflict over the use of petitions in abolition; Congress rebuffed petitions during
that era—making plain that the text of a right to petition was not, for many decades, understood as
equal to the right to be heard or have responses, including judgments. Id. at 163–65.
126. During the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court invoked this First Amendment right
as protecting litigation, in the context of identifying the NAACP’s right to litigate as a “form of
political expression.” NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963); see also Bhd. of R.R.
Trainman v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court reiterated that access to
courts fell under the protection of the Petition Clause in the context of prisoners, as well as other
civil litigants in their pursuit of remedies, both in courts and in other branches of government. See,
e.g., Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.
508 (1972). The contribution that litigation makes was recognized in 2011 in Borough of Duryea
v. Guarnieri when the Court described litigation as protected by the Petition Clause for facilitating
“informed public participation that is a cornerstone of democratic society.” Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2500 (2011). The ruling, however, narrowed the grounds on which
public employees can bring Petition Clause claims based on alleged retaliation. Id. at 2501.
127. See Sprint Commc’ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269 (2008); Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306 (1950).
128. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996),
discussed infra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.
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Returning to the founding era, early constitutions gave civil as well as
criminal litigants rights to jury trials and protected jury fact-finding itself.129

129. See Friedman, supra note 110, at 960–67, 992–93. Of the first thirteen states, eleven
drafted and ratified state constitutions between 1776 and 1780. Connecticut and Rhode Island
relied on their colonial charters until 1818 and 1842, respectively, when each state drafted its first
constitutions. CONN. CHARTER of 1662; CHARTER OF R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS of 1663.
Ten of the eleven states who adopted constitutions implicitly or expressly provided for a trial by
jury. For example, the phrase in Article Twenty-five of Delaware’s 1776 Constitution, that the
“common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law as has been heretofore adopted in
practice in this State, shall remain in force,” has been interpreted as an implicit adoption of
common law rights to trial by jury) DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 25; see also DEL. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES of 1776, § 13 (“That trial by jury of facts where they arise is
one of the greatest securities of the lives, liberties and estates of the people.”); GA. CONST. of 1777,
art. LXI (“trial by jury to remain inviolate forever.”); GA. CONST. of 1777, arts. XL–XLIII
(regarding jury’s fact-finding authority and the powers of the special jury); MD. CONST. of 1776,
pt. 1, art. III (“That the inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the common law of England, and the
trial by jury . . . .”); MD. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XIX (“That, in all criminal prosecutions, every
man hath a right to . . . a speedy trial by an impartial jury, without whose unanimous consent he
ought not to be found guilty.”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XII (“the legislature shall not
make any law that shall subject any person to a capital or infamous punishment, excepting for the
government of the army and navy, without trial by jury”); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XV
(“In all controversies concerning property, and in all suits between two or more persons, except in
cases in which it has heretofore been otherways used and practised, the parties have a right to a trial
by jury; and this method of procedure shall be held sacred, unless, in causes arising on the high
seas, and such as relate to mariners’ wages, the legislature shall hereafter find it necessary to alter
it.”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII (“the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed
as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI (“trial
by jury, in all cases in which it hath heretofore been used in the colony of New York, shall be
established and remain inviolate forever.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. IX (“That no freeman
shall be convicted of any crime, but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men, in
open court, as heretofore used.”); N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XIV (“That in all controversies
at law, respecting property, the ancient mode of trial, by jury, is one of the best securities of the
rights of the people, and ought to remain sacred and inviolable.”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX
(“That in all prosecutions for criminal offences, a man hath a right to . . . a speedy public trial, by
an impartial jury of the country, without the unanimous consent of which jury he cannot be found
guilty . . . .”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XI (“That in controversies respecting property, and in suits
between man and man, the parties have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred.”);
S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XVIII (“the judges of the courts of law shall cause jury-lists to be made,
and juries to be summoned, as near as may be, according to the directions of the acts of the general
assembly in such cases provided.”); VA. CONST. of 1776, § 8 (“That in all capital or criminal
prosecutions a man hath a right to . . . a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his
vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found guilty . . . .”); VA. CONST. of 1776,
§ 11 (“That in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the ancient
trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.”).
New Hampshire did not provide for a jury right in its initial 1776 Constitution but did so
in its second constitution. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XV (“no subject shall be arrested,
imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his
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As Appendix Three details, criminal defendants had a variety of additional
specified protections, such as rights to disclosure of charges, representation,
confrontation, speedy trials, and jurors pulled specifically from their vicinity.130
In addition, several constitutions rejected the English common law prohibition
on counsel for felony defendants and concluded that counsel could be present.131
peers or the law of the land.”). While neither Connecticut nor Rhode Island included an express
right to trial by jury in their colonial charters, both included general language about the application
of English common law to the territories, which was taken to include the right to trial by jury.
CONN. CHARTER of 1662 (providing authority to “Make, Ordain, and Establish all manner of
wholesome, and reasonable Laws, Statutes, Ordinances, Directions, and Instructions, not Contrary
to the Laws of this Realm of England”); CHARTER OF R.I. & PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS of 1663
(providing for the same legal rights and protections “as other our liege people of this our realme of
England”). Both states include the right in their first state constitutions. CONN. CONST. of 1818,
art. I, § 7 (“In all prosecutions or indictments for libels, the truth may be given in evidence, and the
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court.”);
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 9 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to
. . . a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”); CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 21 (“The right of
trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I., § 10 (“In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . .
.”); R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I., § 15 (“The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.”); see also
R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. X, § 3 (imposing duty on judges to instruct juries on the law). Vermont,
which was admitted as the fourteenth state in 1791, wrote its first constitution in 1777 and included
the right to a trial by jury. VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1, art. X (“That, in all prosecutions for criminal
offences, a man hath a right to . . . a speedy public trial, by an impartial jury of the country; without
the unanimous consent of which jury, he cannot be found guilty . . . .”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 1,
art. XIII (“That, in controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties
have a right to a trial by jury; which ought to be held sacred.”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 2, § XXII
(“Trials shall be by jury; and it is recommended to the legislature of this State to provide by law,
against every corruption or partiality in the choice, and return, or appointment, of juries.”).
130. A summary of the various rights identified is provided infra Appendix 3, State
Constitutions: Criminal Defendants’ Rights in the Thirteen Original States.
131. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 109 (1951); see also WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN AMERICAN COURTS 21, 25 (1955); DAVID J. BODENHAMER, FAIR TRIAL: RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3–66 (1992). A formal account of the early constitutional
provisions follows, along with a caveat about the distinction between texts and practices before or
after adoption. See, e.g., Alan Rogers, “A Sacred Duty”: Court Appointed Attorneys in
Massachusetts Capital Cases, 1780–1980, 41 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 440 (1997).
Four of the thirteen original colonies—Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New
York—guaranteed defendants a right to counsel when enacting their first independent governing
statements. Provisions varied somewhat, either by the nature of the offense or the capacities of the
prosecutor. Maryland’s Constitution provided: “[I]n all criminal prosecutions, every man hath a
right to be informed of the accusation against him; to have a copy of the indictment or charge in
due time (if required) to prepare for his defence; to be allowed counsel; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . . .” MD. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XIX. Similarly, Massachusetts
provided:
No subject shall be held to answer for any crimes or offence, until the same is fully and
plainly, substantially, and formally, described to him; or be compelled to accuse, or furnish
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(The distinct question of whether those unable to pay for their own lawyers
should receive state subsidies is discussed below). Some constitutions offer yet
more detail. For example, in the little-read Treason Clause of Article III of the
U.S. Constitution, convictions require either the “Testimony of two Witnesses”
or “Confession in open Court.”132

evidence against himself. And every subject shall have a right to produce all proofs that
may be favorable to him; to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and to be fully
heard in his defence by himself, or his counsel, at his election.
MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XII. In contrast, New York’s Constitution of 1777 granted
counsel for impeachment or misdemeanors “as in civil actions.” N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIV.
New Jersey guaranteed “all criminals” the same “counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be
entitled to.” N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XVI.
Thereafter, six states adopted right-to-counsel provisions in two successive waves, the first
immediately following the Revolutionary War and the second following the Civil War. New
Hampshire, Delaware, and Pennsylvania added a right-to-counsel provision in 1784, 1792, and
1790, respectively. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 7; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XV; PA.
CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9. These states followed the model of Maryland and Massachusetts,
lumping the right to counsel with other procedural protections, most of which echoed rights
guaranteed in the newly established federal Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; DEL.
CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 7; N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. I, art. XV; PA. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 9.
Connecticut and Rhode Island adopted right-to-counsel provisions in their first state constitutions,
enacted to replace the charters under which they had operated. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 9;
R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 10. Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina adopted similar
provisions during Reconstruction. GA. CONST. of 1798, art. III, § 8; N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, §
11; S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 13. Although Virginia adopted a similar provision that protected
many of these same procedural rights in 1864, no mention then (or now) is made in the text of a
right to counsel. See VA. CONST. of 1971, art. I, § 8 (“That in criminal prosecutions a man hath a
right to demand the cause and nature of his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and
witnesses, and to call for evidence in his favor, and he shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of his vicinage, without whose unanimous consent he cannot be found
guilty. He shall not be deprived of life or liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of
his peers, nor be compelled in any criminal proceeding to give evidence against himself, nor be put
twice in jeopardy for the same offense.”) (current as of 2012); VA. CONST. of 1864, art. I, § 8
(“That, in all capital or criminal prosecutions, a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of
his accusation, to be confronted with the accusers and witnesses, to call for evidence in his favor,
and to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose unanimous
consent he cannot be found guilty; nor can he be compelled to give evidence against himself; that
no man be deprived of his liberty, except by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.”).
In sum, of the thirteen colonies originally forming the United States, four (Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York) adopted a right to counsel with their first independent
governments, eight had added the right by the end of the nineteenth century, and one (Virginia) did
not, and does not, have a guarantee of a right to counsel in its state constitution. See 50 STATE
STATUTORY SURVEYS: CRIMINAL LAWS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL
(2011) 0030 SURVEYS 22 (Westlaw).
132. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
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Rights of the public are also specified. Remedy clauses were often in
tandem with the words, “all courts shall be open.”133 Those words, found in the
Delaware Constitution of 1792,134 were reproduced in several other states,135 and
as of 2012, twenty-seven state constitutions require that “all courts shall be
open” or that justice shall be “openly” administered,136 while a few others call
for “public” courts,137 prohibit “secret” proceedings,138 or otherwise protect
attendance through jury trial (guaranteed in all the original states’
constitutions)139 and, in two instances, coupled with protection of the press.140
Amendments to constitutions in the late twentieth century identified another
set of entitled participants—”victims”—who gained express status in the texts

133. For examples of constitutions in which the phrases were in tandem, see DEL. CONST. of
1792, art. I, § 9, and KY. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 13. For an example of a constitution where
they were not in tandem, see VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § XXIII (“All courts shall be open, and
justice shall be impartially administered, without corruption or unnecessary delay; all their officers
shall be paid an adequate, but moderate, compensation for their services; and if any officer shall
take greater or other fees than the laws allow him, either directly or indirectly, it shall ever after
disqualify him from holding any office in this State.”).
134. DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 9. But how much access this provision protects has been
debated, and Delaware courts have declined to provide access to various records, such as those
related to divorces or jury lists, under its provisions. See Gannet Co. v. State, 571 A.2d 735, 736–
37 (Del. 1989); C v. C, 320 A.2d 717, 728 (Del. 1974); see also In re Trust for Gore, No. 1165VCN, 2010 WL 5644675, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 6, 2011).
135. See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies,
and Appendix 2, State Constitutions without Express Remedy Clauses and with Due Process or
Open/Public Courts Provisions.
136. 1 JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS,
CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES 6-91 to 6-92 app. 6 (4th ed. 2006). The number included varies depending
on which language is in focus. See, e.g., Koch, supra note 106, at 435 & n.599 (identifying twentytwo states with such provisions).
137. For example, South Carolina proclaims that all “courts shall be public . . . .” See S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 9.
138. Oregon specifies both that courts are open and that no court shall be “secret.” See OR.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
139. See, e.g., N.C. CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. IX (“That no freeman shall be convicted of any
crime, but by the unanimous verdict of a jury of good and lawful men, in open court, as heretofore
used.”); see also infra Appendix 3, State Constitutions: Criminal Defendants’ Rights in the Thirteen
Original States.
140. See, e.g., GA. CONST. of 1777, art. LXI (“Freedom of the press and trial by jury to remain
inviolate forever”); S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 6 (“The trial by jury, as heretofore used in this
State, and the liberty of the press, shall be forever inviolably preserved.”). The original
Declarations of Rights of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia all included protection of the liberty
of the press, DEL. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL RULES of 1776, § 23; MD.
CONST. of 1776, pt. 1, art. XXXVIII; VA. CONST. of 1776, § 12, and similar provisions remain in
place today, DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. I, § 5 (current in 2012); MD. CONST. of 1867, Declaration
of Rights, art. 40 (current in 2012); VA. CONST. of 1971, pt. 1, art. 40; VA. CONST. art. I, § 12
(current in 2012).
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of thirty-three state constitutions.141 For example, the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution provides that any “person who is a victim of crime shall be treated
with fairness, dignity, and respect” and given rights to information and
participation.142 More generally, such provisions accord crime victims with
rights of notification of hearings and trial dates, of presence and an opportunity
to be heard at certain proceedings, of submission of written victim impact
statements at sentencing, and of restitution.143 Statutes in many jurisdictions

141. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.01 (added in 1994, current in 2012); ALASKA CONST. art. I, §
24 (added in 1994, current in 2012); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 2.1 (added in 1990, current in 2012);
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28 (added in 1982, amended in 2008, current in 2012); COLO. CONST. art. II,
§ 16a (added in 1992, current in 2012); CONN. CONST. art. XXIX (added in 1996, current in 2012);
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16(b) (added in 1988, current in 2012); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 22 (added in
1994, current in 2012); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1 (added in 1992, current in 2012); IND. CONST. art.
I, § 13(b) (added in 1996, current in 2012); KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15 (added in 1992, current in
2012); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (added in 1998, current in 2012); MD., pt. 1, art. XLVII (added in
1994, current in 2012); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 24 (added in 1988, current in 2012); MISS. CONST.
art. III, § 26-A (added in 1998, current in 2012); MO. CONST. art. I, § 32 (added in 1992, current in
2012); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28 (added in 1998, current in 2012); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 28 (added
in 1996, current in 2012); NEV. CONST. art. I, § 8 (added in 1996, current in 2012); N.J. CONST.
art. I, para. 22 (added in 1991, current in 2012); N.M. CONST. art. II, § 24 (added in 1992, current
in 2012); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 37 (added in 1995, current in 2012); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10a
(added in 1994, current in 2012); OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 34 (added in 1996, current in 2012); OR.
CONST. art. I, §§ 42, 43 (the original version of § 42 was ratified in 1996, but was subsequently
declared unconstitutional by the Oregon Supreme Court in Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 959 P.2d 49, 71–
72 (Or. 1998); the current version of § 42 was ratified in 1999 and § 43 was added in 2008); R.I.
CONST. art. I, § 23 (added in 1986, current in 2012); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24 (added in 1998, current
in 2012); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35 (added in 1998, current in 2012); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30
(added in 1989, current in 2012); UTAH CONST. art. I, § 28 (added in 1994, current in 2012); VA.
CONST. art. I, §8-A (added in 1996, current in 2012); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 35 (added in 1989,
current in 2012); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (added in 1993, current in 2012).
142. LA. CONST. art I, § 25. This provision was added in 1997, and is current in 2012.
143. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1; LA. CONST. art I, § 25.
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implement these rights,144 and a few reported cases reflect victims’ enforcement
of such protections.145
In sum, courts are not only constitutionally-stipulated branches of
government; they are also regulated environments that endow various
participants with entitlements that necessitate some government funding.
Furthermore, this skim of constitutional provisions is but a small fraction of the
legislative and court-made rules that structure interactions among participants
inside courthouses and that invite disputants to bring claims to courthouses.
Twentieth-century egalitarian norms come on top of these pre-existing
commitments to and reliance on courts. Below, I examine strands of federal
constitutional law that delineated new duties on courts to subsidize litigants and
take criminal defendants’ poverty into account, including by reshaping penalties
imposing monetary fines. I then turn to state court analyses to sketch occasions
on which judges insisted on funding for their activities and, at times, held
unlawful legislative limits on access rights.

144. For example, several jurisdictions authorize victims to participate in criminal proceedings.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3711(d)(3) (2006) (“The district court shall take up and decide any motion
asserting a victim’s right forthwith. If the district court denies the relief sought, the movant may
petition the court of appeals for a writ of mandamus.”); see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 30; 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)–(b)(1); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4437 (2010); FLA.
STAT. §§ 960.001(1)(a)(5), 960.001(7) (2011); IND. CODE § 35-40-2-1 (Supp. 2002); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 77-38-11(1) (LexisNexis 2008). See generally ROBERT C. DAVIS, JAMES M. ANDERSON,
JULIE WHITMAN & SUSAN HOWLEY, SECURING RIGHTS FOR VICTIMS: A PROCESS EVALUATION
OF THE NATIONAL CRIME VICTIM LAW INSTITUTE’S VICTIMS’ RIGHTS CLINICS 52–71 (2009).
Many states, including Idaho, Kansas, and South Carolina, specify that crime victims’ provisions
do not permit reopening of final convictions nor provide causes of action. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST.
art. I, § 22; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(b)–(c); S.C. CONST. art I, § 24(B)–(C).
145. See, e.g., State ex rel. Hance v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 875 P.2d 824 (Ariz. 1993)
(setting aside a parole release date for an offender because state officials had failed to notify the
victim of rights to request notice and be present at the hearing); People v. Stringham, 253 Cal. Rptr.
484 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding a trial judge’s decision to set aside a plea bargain to which the
victim objected); Myers v. Daley, 521 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (awarding costs to a crime
victim who brought suit to compel a prosecutor to provide information). But see State v. Means,
926 A.2d 328 (N.J. 2007) (holding that failure to notify the victim is insufficient grounds to vacate
a plea agreement). California’s provision, added by a ballot initiative in 2008, Proposition 9,
authorizes “[a] victim, the retained attorney of a victim, a lawful representative of the victim, or the
prosecuting attorney upon request of the victim, [to] enforce the rights enumerated [in the
constitutional provision] . . . in any trial or appellate court with jurisdiction over the case as a matter
of right,” but explicitly bars a cause of action for damages against the state. CAL. CONST. art. I, §
28(c). Likewise, most states that have victims’ rights provisions also preclude civil damage actions
for alleged violations. KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 15(b). Arizona is an exception. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-4437(B) (2010).
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III. WHOSE RIGHT TO WHAT REMEDIES? DEMOCRATIC EGALITARIANISM,
JUDICIAL REVIEW, AND THE SUBSTANCE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
A.

Subsidizing Litigants in Response to Economic and Information
Asymmetries

A lack of resources, both individual and institutional, to pursue and to
entertain claims of right is not a new problem. Requests of fees for services—
by judges, clerks, and sheriffs—have a long tradition.146 Historians trace back
some form of modifications for the poor to Henry I of England who, in the
twelfth century, permitted impoverished litigants to “pledge their faith” (rather
than immediately to pay) the required court fees.147 Yet, in the eighteenth
century, many fees were still imposed, rendering “the value of proceedings in
forma pauperis . . . little or nothing when the [provisions] were repealed in
1883.”148
In 1793, Jeremy Bentham (who had a host of complaints against the
common law and its judges and lawyers149) inveighed against a “law tax,” which
he termed a “tax upon distress.”150 A part of Bentham’s proposed solution was
146. See Lee Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for Poor Persons
in Civil Cases, 2 VAL. U. L. REV. 21, 27 (1967). Judges received salaries as well as fees, and when
fee payments for judges were abolished in 1826, salaries were increased. Id. In the 1920s, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that judges could not, as a matter of due process, receive funds from fines
levied. See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 514–15, 531–32 (1927). The costs of running for
judgeships raise related problems. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009).
147. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361
(1923). In 1495, during the reign of Henry VII, England enacted an in forma pauperis act. Id. at
363, 370. Its application was, however, highly discretionary. Id. at 374.
148. Id. at 377.
149. 6 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 22–24.
150. 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, A Protest Against Law-Taxes: Showing the Peculiar
Mischievousness of All Such Impositions as Add to the Expense of Appeal to Justice, in THE WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 573, 582 (John Bowring ed., Edinburgh, William Tait 1843) [hereinafter
Bentham, A Protest Against Law-Taxes]. Bentham argued that what he termed “factitious” barriers
to access through fees and taxes were not required, for “natural checks” included the “pain of
disappointment” of losing, the time entailed, and the inevitable other expenses of pursuit—
rendering extra assessments both an over-deterrent of those who could not afford them and an
under-deterrent for those who could. Id. at 578. Bentham has not been the only one to call for
abolition of initiation fees in either England or the United States. A series of reports in England
followed in Bentham’s wake, debating whether courts should be self-supporting through user fees
or funded by taxpayers. See Thomas, The Maintenance of Local Justice, supra note 41.
In the United States, the fee issue gained scrutiny, as discussed infra, in the 1960s. Fee
abolition or reduction proposals can be found in AM. BAR FOUND., PUBLIC PROVISION FOR COSTS
AND EXPENSES OF CIVIL LITIGATION 4 (1966) [hereinafter ABF PUBLIC PROVISION 1966]; Thomas
E. Willging, Financial Barriers and the Access of Indigents to the Courts, 57 GEO. L.J. 253 (1968);
Michelman, Part I, supra note 93; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access
Fees: The Right to Protect One’s Rights–Part II, 1974 DUKE L.J. 527 [hereinafter Michelman, Part
II].
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to create an “Equal Justice Fund” that would be supported by “the fines imposed
on wrongdoers” as well as by government and by charities.151 Bentham wanted
to subsidize “not only the costs of legal assistance but also the costs of
transporting witnesses” and of producing other evidence.152 Moreover, to lower
the expenses of litigation, Bentham suggested that a judge be available “every
hour on every day of the year,” and that courts be put on a “budget” to produce
one-day trials and immediate decisions.153
In the United States, many jurisdictions made provisions to proceed “in
forma pauperis.” In New York, for example, a statute of 1788 gave the
chancellor discretion to waive fees for “every . . . poor person.”154 Further,
sometimes jurisdictions insisted that lawyers provide free services, for example
to capital defendants.155 During the nineteenth century, state courts made
accommodations for contingency fees, again as a way for some litigants to get
into court.156
The challenges of impoverished litigants came to the fore in the U.S. courts
during the twentieth century, as the ranks of rights-holders swelled.
Legislatures—creating civil causes of action and criminal sanctions—were
central to the upsurge in poor litigants. On the civil side, state and federal
legislatures crafted new statutory rights, ranging from consumer protection to

When Bentham wrote, in 1795, fees attendant to courts were substantial. He reported that
to complete an action at law required the plaintiff to spend at least £24 and that the average plaintiff
costs for civil suits was £48, which he described as three and six times (respectively) the average
annual expenditure of an Englishman or woman at the time. See Bentham, A Protest Against LawTaxes, supra, at 575 n.*. In American 2005 dollars, those figures would be approximately $2,165
and $4,330. Conversion computed using the calculator available at Currency Converter, NAT’L
ARCHIVES, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/currency/default0. asp#mid (last visited Aug. 27,
2012), and by multiplying by the dollar/euro exchange rate.
151. See PHILIP SCHOFIELD, UTILITY AND DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 310 (2006); see also ROSEN, supra note 9, at 154.
152. ROSEN, supra note 9, at 153–54.
153. Thomas P. Peardon, Bentham’s Ideal Republic, 17 CANADIAN J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 184,
196 (1951). Bentham’s goals included enabling all persons, on foot, to be able to reach a local
judicial officer and return home, within a day. ROSEN, supra note 9, at 149.
154. Act of Feb. 27, 1788, ch. 46, 1788 N.Y. Laws 99.
155. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 131, at 440; see also Maguire, supra note 147, at 384–89.
See generally James A. Brundage, Legal Aid for the Poor and the Professionalization of Law in the
Middle Ages, 9 J. LEGAL HIST. 169 (1988) (considering the rise of legal aid in the Middle Ages and
the role the Christian Church played in requiring such aid).
156. Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning of
Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 231 (1998). Karsten identified
the method of judicial selection as one source of the law that enabled plaintiffs access to court. See
id. at 247–48. State adoption of judicial elections produced judges, he argued, that had “moral and
religious perspectives” supportive of claimants. Id. Therefore, those jurists sanctioned the use of
contingency fee contracts that enabled lawyers to advance filing, jury, and other fees and hence
subsidize their clients’ access.
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the environment, from family life to employment. (Court-based constitutional
rights are a smaller slice of the civil docket.) On the criminal side, the dramatic
rise in prosecutions in the last third of the twentieth century produced a vast
number of defendants, almost all of whom were indigent.
Legal rules shifted in an effort to accommodate the surge in claimants
hailing from the lower and middle income ranges. The contingency fee system
provided no relief for civil litigants in family disputes or with modest economic
claims. Contingent fees were (and are) prohibited in criminal cases. Similarly,
legal aid societies served but a small subset of claimants.157 Some relief came
by way of channeling claimants to small claims courts and workers’
compensation regimes that charged low or no fees.158
Yet access to courts remained an issue that generated questions about
whether the state should waive fees, provide subsidies for one side of a case
faced with a powerful opponent (typically the state), require fee-shifting from
the loser to the winner, and find other means to support individuals not otherwise
able to bring cases.159 Knowing what litigation cost was (and is) itself a
challenge, and in the 1960s, the American Bar Foundation surveyed 450 state
court judges to learn more about “official charges” imposed by courts, requisite
“auxiliary charges” such as fees for service, and lawyers’ fees and costs.160 That
study concluded that court costs and fees were both “substantial” and in some
instances constituted a “substantial deterrent” to poor individuals and proposed
a model statute as well as consideration of abolition of fees.161 Legislative
initiatives—such as the creation of the Legal Services Corporation in 1974162—

157. See REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR: A STUDY OF THE PRESENT
DENIAL OF JUSTICE TO THE POOR AND OF THE AGENCIES MAKING MORE EQUAL THEIR POSITION
BEFORE THE LAW WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO LEGAL AID WORK IN THE UNITED STATES
(1919); see also DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (2004); Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short
History of Poverty Lawyers in the United States, 5 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 11 (2003).
158. Silverstein, supra note 146, at 23–24, 32–33; see also George E. Brand, The Impact of the
Increased Cost of Litigation, 35 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 102 (1951); Legislation: Small Claims
Courts, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 932 (1934).
159. See, e.g., Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717 (2010).
160. See ABF PUBLIC PROVISION 1966, supra note 150, at 2. For example, a filing fee in 1966
of twelve dollars would, in 2011 dollars, cost $83.20. See id.; Seven Ways to Compute the Relative
Value of a U.S. Dollar Amount—1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH.COM,
http://www.measuringworth.com/uscompare/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2012) (converting 1966 fee to
2011 value). And, as of 2011, the federal government imposed a fee of $350 for the filing of a civil
complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (2006). For information on the states, see NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, CIVIL FILING FEES IN STATE TRIAL COURTS, APRIL 2012 (2012), available at
http://www.ncsc.org/information-and-resources/budget-resource-center/~/media/Files/PDF/Infor
mation%20and%20Resources/Budget%20Resource%20Center/Civil%20Filing%20Fees%20A
pril%202012.ashx.
161. See ABF PUBLIC PROVISION 1966, supra note 150, at 2–6.
162. Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996–2996l (2006).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

964

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:917

intersected with explorations of constitutional claims that the U.S. Constitution
demanded opening up courts. During the 1960s and 1970s, commentators and
litigators focused on federal court litigation to enshrine constitutional rights of
access and to mitigate the problems of poverty.163 State right-to-remedy clauses
were not much discussed; instead, rights were extrapolated from the Sixth
Amendment,164 the Petitioning Clause,165 and the Due Process166 and Equal
Protection Clauses.167 The factors on which claims were advanced included the
stakes of a court’s decision, asymmetrical access of disputants to resources or to
information, and the needs of society to provide fair and equal treatment to
litigants who were similarly situated, save for their resources.
In a series of decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court issued judgments requiring
fee waivers or subsidized lawyers or experts for specified populations, often
identified by a mix of means-testing and the subject matter in dispute.168 The
doctrines that resulted were hailed by some commentators as central to the
functioning of courts in egalitarian constitutional democracies,169 and criticized
by others as illicit judicial extrapolation of substantive due process rights.170
A classic example is the 1963 decision of Gideon v. Wainwright,171 which
read the Sixth Amendment “right to counsel” to require that states provide
lawyers for indigent criminal defendants facing prosecutors seeking felony
convictions.172 Federal constitutional law also relied on the Due Process Clause

163. See, e.g., Lester Brickman, Of Arterial Passageways Through the Legal Process: The
Right of Universal Access to Courts and Lawyering Services, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 595, 597, 624–28
(1973) (advocating that the bar be seen as a public utility and so regulated); Michelman, Part I,
supra note 93.
164. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
165. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
166. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
167. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
168. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (requiring an indigent defendant who
demonstrates “his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial” be provided
a competent psychiatrist); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (mandating counsel be
provided for indigent criminal defendants).
169. See, e.g., JONATHAN LIPPMAN, STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 2011: PURSUING JUSTICE 4–5
(2011), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/CTAPPS/news/SOJ-2011.pdf [hereinafter
LIPPMAN, 2011 STATE OF THE JUDICIARY].
170. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 85.
171. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
172. Id. at 344–45. The development of criminal defendants’ rights (to witnesses, to see the
indictment, as well as to counsel) and their relationship to private and state prosecutorial powers in
England, are sketched in HELLER, supra note 131, at 3–12. The provisions for counsel in capital
cases in Massachusetts traced to 1780, and the obligation initially rested with the state, and then
moved “to the bar, to the court, and, finally, to the defendant.” See Rogers, supra note 131, at 441,
465. Rogers attributed the decline in a high standard of such lawyering to the “democratization of
the procedure for appointing counsel in 1911 and the Supreme Judicial Court’s insistence from
1923” on that, instead of high quality, a defendant had to prove ineffective assistance. Id.
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as the basis of constitutional obligations to give indigent criminal defendants
other resources, such as experts and translators necessary to mount a defense.173
That idea is not completely confined to the criminal context. Indigent men
defending lawsuits by private parties alleging that they had fathered children
gained the constitutional right to state-funded testing to rebut that claim.174 As
Chief Justice Burger explained for a unanimous Court in 1981, the “requirement
of ‘fundamental fairness’ expressed by the Due Process Clause” would not
otherwise be “satisfied.”175
In addition to income inequalities, concerns about power asymmetries have
driven efforts to rectify differing abilities to obtain information. Courts have

In the federal system, Section 35 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 permitted litigants to
“plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel or attorneys at
law as by the rules of the said courts . . . .” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92. In
the Act of April 30, 1790, Congress provided that “every person so accused and indicted for
[treason or other capital crime], shall also be allowed and admitted to make his full defense by
counsel learned in the law; and the court before whom such person shall be tried, or some judge
thereof, shall . . . immediately upon his request assign to such person such counsel, not exceeding
two, as such person shall desire, to whom such counsel shall have free access at all seasonable
hours . . . .” Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118. This statute was modeled after the
English Treason Act of 1695, and a Massachusetts statute of 1777. The federal statute expanded
the scope from treason to all capital crimes, and incorporated the provision for appointed counsel,
albeit individuals who were generally not compensated.
The current federal statute attempts to ensure quality through requiring the appointment
of two lawyers. See 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (2006) (“Whoever is indicted for treason or other capital
crime shall be allowed to make his full defense by counsel; and the court before which the defendant
is to be tried, or a judge thereof, shall promptly, upon the defendant’s request, assign 2 such counsel,
of whom at least 1 shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases, and who shall have free
access to the accused at all reasonable hours.”).
Between 1791 and 1938, when the Court decided Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938),
“the right conferred on the accused by the Sixth Amendment . . . was generally understood as
meaning” an entitlement to retain counsel in the federal courts and not the right to appointment of
counsel for those unable to afford a lawyer. See WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN AMERICAN COURTS (1955); Alexander Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth
Amendment, 20 N.Y.U. L. Q. REV. 1, 7–8 (1944). Thereafter, judges had the “duty” to inquire and
to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in federal courts. Holtzoff, supra, at 9. In 1944, the
federal criminal rules codified the practice. Id. at 16–19 (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 46,
Assignment of Counsel, discussing the burden of volunteering on lawyers, and advocating for the
creation of a public defender office). Again, compensation was a distinct question, and appointed
lawyers were not guaranteed payment until the enactment in 1964 of the Criminal Justice Act. See
David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer’s Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735, 751 n.69
(1980).
173. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985). But see Dist. Attorney’s Office v.
Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2319–20, 2323 (2009) (holding that due process did not oblige Alaska
to provide a DNA test to a convicted defendant alleging innocence).
174. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
175. Id. at 16. (quoting Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981)); see also id.
at 9 (describing the “constitutional duty” a man had to support a child he fathered).
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concluded that governments must, as a matter of due process, provide
exculpatory, material information to all criminal defendants—whether rich or
poor.176 The underlying rationale is courts’ dependency on litigants to generate
knowledge sufficient to legitimate judgment. In the words of the 1963 decision
of Brady v. Maryland, mandating that exchange: “Society wins not only when
the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair . . . .”177 That lack of
access to information may also undermine the legitimacy of civil judgments has
prompted the development of a host of sub-constitutional discovery rights in
both civil and criminal cases.
Asymmetrical power and high stakes have also been the predicate for civil
litigants in certain family conflicts to be accorded equipage rights based on the
Due Process Clause, sometimes interacting with equal protection analyses. In
1981, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the right to counsel in the context of
a person faced with termination of her right to be a child’s parent.178 The Court
fashioned a presumption against counsel in civil cases; while a person facing the
loss of that status had no per se right to counsel, if a sufficient showing was made
in an individual case, due process required that counsel be provided.179 Rights
to state-paid transcripts, if needed for appeals of terminations of parental rights,
followed in 1996.180 Moreover, state courts have relied on their own
constitutions to find counsel-rights in other circumstances, such as child custody
determinations and civil contempt detentions.181
Another line of cases focused on the constitutionality of criminal fines that
could result in individuals spending longer periods of time in jail for failure to
pay.182 In Williams v. Illinois, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote for the Court
that the state could not extend a person’s time of incarceration “beyond the
maximum duration fixed by statute” based solely on the fact that a defendant
was “financially unable to pay a fine.”183 Thereafter, the Court concluded that
176. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Enforcement is, however, limited. See Connick
v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).
177. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
178. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 20–21.
179. Id. at 31–33. But see Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), discussed infra notes 208–
09 and accompanying text.
180. See M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996).
181. For cases holding that counsel is required in child custody determinations, see, for
example, In re K.L.J., 813 P.2d 276 (Alaska 1991); In re Jay R., 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (Cal. Ct. App.
1983); O.A.H. v. R.L.A., 712 So. 2d 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998); and In re application to adopt
H.B.S.C., 12 P.3d 916 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). For cases holding that counsel is required in certain
civil contempt/detention proceedings, see, for example, Parcus v. Parcus, 615 So. 2d 75 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1992); Black v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement, 686 A.2d 164 (Del. 1996); and May v.
Coleman, 945 S.W.2d 426, 427 (Ky. 1997).
182. See Richard Ford, Imprisonment for Debt, 25 MICH. L. REV. 24, 32–33 (1926); see also,
e.g., Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970).
183. Williams, 399 U.S. at 243.
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once a state decided that an “appropriate and adequate penalty” for a crime was
a fine or restitution, it could not “imprison a person solely because” of inability
to pay.184 Rather, imprisonment can only take place after determining a willful
refusal to pay and that “alternative measures are not adequate to meet the State’s
interest in punishment and deterrence.”185
The variegated constitutional case law documents both the development of
aspirations to provide equal treatment for disparately-situated disputants and the
difficulty of doing so.186 The results are eclectic and uneven, including a few
constitutionally-mandated subsidies for criminal and civil litigation, and a host
of legislative efforts to implement those obligations as well as, in some
instances, to provide more.187 A widespread consensus is that states have yet to
fund Gideon’s mandate to provide adequate legal services for criminal
defendants.188 Further, states have begun to impose additional fees, fines, and
special assessments (as states seek to augment limited budgets) that have
resulted in a resurgence of “debtors’ prisons,” populated by individuals held in
contempt for failure to comply with court payment orders.189
Asymmetrical access across sets of litigants reveals another quandary for
courts’ legitimacy and rights to remedies. The differential resources and
capacities of similarly- situated litigants can result in “like” cases not being
treated “alike.” Constitutional adjudication on intra-litigant equity initially
focused on criminal defendants. For example, in 1956, the Court concluded that
unfairness resulted if some defendants could afford to pay for transcripts for
appeals and for lawyers while others could not, or if some could afford appellate

184. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 667–68.
185. Id. at 672.
186. See generally THE COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (Christopher Hodges, Stefan Vogenauer & Magdalena Tulibacka eds., 2010);
Geoffrey Davies, Can Dispute Resolution Be Made Generally Available?, 12 OTAGO L. REV. 305
(2010); Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A Comparative Assessment of the
Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 129 (2010).
187. See, e.g., Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006); Legal Services Corporation
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (2006); Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE tit. 8, ch. 2.1
(West 2012) (creating a pilot program for poor litigants to obtain counsel).
188. AM. BAR ASSOC., GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE 8 (2004) (“Throughout the [2003 Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent
Defendants] hearings, witnesses from each of the twenty-two states examined reported grave
inadequacies in the available funds and resources for indigent defense.”), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_
sclaid_def_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf.
189. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011), discussed infra notes 208–09; see also
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW DEBTORS’ PRISONS
5 (2010); ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 4–5 (2010).
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counsel and others could not.190 In the 1970s, in Bounds v. Smith, the Court
recognized that prisoners’ rights to “petition for redress” required prisons to
provide access to lawyers or resources such as law libraries.191 In addition,
various forms of aggregation—from class actions to statutory regimes such as
the Fair Labor Standards Act—enable groups of litigants to share the costs of
pursuing remedies and to obtain relief across a set of similarly-situated
individuals.192
Rules and statutes permitting aggregation reflect efforts to deal with those
hoping to get into court, rather than those (such as Clarence Gideon) who have
been commanded to appear. While a “hodge-podge” of state statutes sometimes
permitted filing “in forma pauperis” and hence, without prepaying fees, many
limitations existed.193 In response, some states concluded that courts had the
inherent power to waive fees. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court identified a
constitutional obligation, in a small slice of cases, to waive fees for those too
poor to pay.194 The central federal ruling, Boddie v. Connecticut, responded to

190. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (“There can be no equal justice where the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.”). In 1963, the Court held that,
although the Constitution did not require appeal as a matter of fair process, states had to subsidize
appellate lawyers for indigent criminal defendants if appeals were generally available. Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–57 (1963) (announced the same day as Gideon).
191. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977). As discussed infra notes 203–05 and
accompanying text, Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), limited the application of Bounds, which
had required prison officials to permit either access to legal assistance or law libraries for prisoners.
Moreover, Congress can impose significant restrictions on access opportunities. See Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, tit. VIII, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
192. Many statutory regimes reflect efforts to make decisions fair across a set of individuals
proceeding single file. Sentencing guidelines are one such example, and the implementation
reflects the complexity of determining when persons are enough alike to be treated the same.
Congress and the courts have struggled with mandates that judges punish similarly those persons
whose crimes and backgrounds are comparable and justify the differentiations (“departures”) made.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005); U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. K (2010). See generally Judith Resnik, Compared
to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting Contours of Due Process and Lawyers’ Powers, 79
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628 (2011).
193. Maguire, supra note 147, at 385–86. As he noted, in 1923, the federal statute applied only
to “citizens” with an additional provision for “all seaman, irrespective of nationality.” Id. at 386.
As of the 1960s, the federal government and twenty-one states had “provisions for poor persons to
file suit without payment of fees in courts of general jurisdiction.” See ABF PUBLIC PROVISION
1966, supra note 150, at 3. “The report characterized the provisions as ‘fragmentary, inadequate,
and inconsistent from state to state.’” Id.
194. See generally Michelman, Part I, supra note 93 (discussing the Supreme Court’s access
fee decisions in Boddie v. Connecticut, United States v. Kras, and Ortwein v. Schwab); Michelman,
Part II, supra note 150. Michelman argued that all exclusionary filing fees were unconstitutional
burdens on what he termed “effective” access rights to courts. Michelman, Part I, supra note 93,
at 1161–68. The parallels between effective access to courts and to voting that he drew (see
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a class of “welfare recipients residing in the State of Connecticut” who argued
that state-imposed fees of sixty dollars for filing and service, coupled with no
mechanism to waive that requirement, precluded them from filing for divorce.195
In 1971, Justice Harlan wrote for the Court that the combination of “the basic
position of the marriage relationship in this society’s hierarchy of values and
the . . . state monopolization” of lawful dissolution resulted in a due process
obligation by the state to provide access.196
The concurring opinions filed in Boddie illuminate the constitutional
complexities of elaborating what forms of access are compelled, and the
subsequent retreat from obligations of prisons to provide legal assistance
delineates the resistance that some justices have expressed to affirmative rights
of assistance. In Boddie, Justice Douglas argued that the majority’s reliance on
the Due Process Clause was unwise, as too “subjective.”197 Instead, he read the
Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition of “invidious discrimination . . . based
on . . . poverty” to require subsidizing access.198 Justice Brennan agreed that
Boddie presented a “classic problem of equal protection”199 on top of due
process; the state’s legal monopoly required access for all attempting to
“vindicate any . . . right arising under federal or state law.”200 (Two years later
Michelman, Part II, supra note 150, at 534–40) were evident in two decisions in 2011, when the
same five-person majority rejected claims that economic barriers to litigation and to politics
required regulation. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011); Ariz.
Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2813 (2011). In Arizona Free
Enterprise, the Court held that states lacked “a compelling state interest in ‘leveling the playing
field’” and that a public election financing law violated free speech rights. Id. at 2825–26.
195. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Unlike the practice challenged in
Connecticut in Boddie, many jurisdictions had provisions for fee waivers, such that individuals
could file in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The federal statute, first enacted in 1892, applied (as noted
above) only to citizens. See Act of July 20, 1892, ch. 209, 27 Stat. 252. The standards for
permitting such filing, in the context of appeals, was the topic of Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438 (1962). Chief Justice Warren required that leave to appeal be granted without unduly
exacting standards that would undermine “equality of consideration for all litigants.” Id. at 447.
Subsequently, the Court authorized screening to assess facts under congressional revisions of the
“IFP” statute that permits more dismissals based on a review of the papers. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d), (e)(2) (2006); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
196. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374. See infra notes 262–66 and accompanying text for discussion of
fee waivers under state law. In May of 2012, a trial judge in British Columbia issued a parallel
decision, holding unconstitutional the provincial government’s failure to provide fee waivers in a
system, imposed in 1998, of much higher fees—including $500 a day for trial days after the third
day, and $800 a day for trial days after the tenth. See Vilardell v. Dunham, 2012 BCSC 748 (Can.).
197. Boddie, 401 U.S. at 384–85. (Douglas, J., concurring) (raising the specter of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
198. Id. at 386.
199. Id.at 388 (Brennan, J., concurring).
200. Id. at 387. The sole dissenter, Justice Black, thought the Court had invaded state
prerogatives. Id. at 393–94 (Black, J., dissenting). Yet, in dissenting from the denial of certiorari
in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 166 S.E.2d 88 (Ga. 1969), Justice Black argued that the
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in the context of equalizing access to quality schooling for children, the Court
rejected poverty as a suspect classification for purposes of the federal equal
protection guarantee.201)
The breadth of Brennan’s approach, coupled with limited resources, has not
garnered wide judicial support, even in the case of other poor civil litigants
seeking fee waivers.202 Furthermore, in 1996, in Lewis v. Casey, the Court
rejected imposing expectations on prison officials to assist prisoners in accessing
courts and described instead a right to be free from “officials . . . actively
interfering with inmates’ attempts to prepare legal documents.”203 Justice
Thomas’s concurrence went further, questioning the basis of a federal
constitutional right of access and of any affirmative obligations imposed (“our
transcript and fee cases did not establish a freestanding right of access to the
courts, meaningful or otherwise,”204 and the states had no obligations “to finance
and support prisoner litigation.”205). Furthermore, in 2002, the Court (with
Justice Souter writing the opinion) described the prior law as recognizing access
rights only as “ancillary to the underlying claim” rather than as freestanding.206
Thus, despite several calls for abolishing fees or mandating waivers,207 as
well as for providing other forms of equipage (such as lawyers) for impoverished
civil litigants, the U.S. Supreme Court has to date identified only a narrow band
(largely in family conflicts) eligible for constitutional entitlements to
government subsidies to use courts. Moreover, by 2011, in Turner v. Rogers,
the Supreme Court concluded that the Due Process Clause did not require a
lawyer for an indigent person facing detention (in that instance for a year) as a
civil contemnor for failure to pay child support to a private opponent.208 The
Court reserved the question of right to counsel if the opponent were the state.209

rationale of Boddie required that no person be denied access “because he cannot pay a fee, finance
a bond, risk a penalty, or afford to hire an attorney.” Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S.
954, 595–56 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
201. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18, 28 (1973).
202. See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (rejecting a constitutional challenge
to the lack of fee waivers for bankruptcy petitions); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973)
(rejecting a constitutional challenge to an appellate filing fee of twenty-five dollars applied to
indigents seeking to appeal an adverse welfare decisions).
203. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996).
204. Id. at 365, 369 (Thomas, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 384–85 (Thomas, J., concurring).
206. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002). The majority put the prison-litigation
line of cases into a set of “systemic official action” that frustrated access, and the fee and transcript
cases as also putting up impediments to claims that otherwise would have been brought. Id. at 413–
14.
207. See, e.g., Michelman, Part I, supra note 93, at 1165; Michelman, Part II, supra note 150,
at 530–31; Willging, supra note 150, at 300–02.
208. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011).
209. Id. at 2520.
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In the same term, in two cases implicating due process concerns but turning
on statutes and rules, the Court limited the ability to rely on lawyers providing
services to a group as a way to mitigate the challenges of small-value claims or
well-heeled opponents. In A.T.&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Court
enforced consumer cell-phone provisions that prohibited purchasers for bringing
class claims in either courts or arbitration—and thereby made unavailable the
aggregation of small-value claims as a means of reducing access barriers.210
Similarly, in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court imposed more stringent
requirements on class actions, and again made more difficult the pooling of
resources by groups sharing lawyers.211
But the question of the relationship of due process to litigation is not limited
to equipage of litigants. Another facet probes the quality of the decision-making
process itself and imposes a layer of constitutional regulation over court (and
administrative) adjudication. For example, although Turner v. Rogers did not
require lawyers for all civil contemnors opposing private plaintiffs, the Court
did hold that, in the absence of a lawyer, “fundamental fairness” required that a
judge make findings that a potential contemnor had the ability to comply with
the court order and was willfully disobedient.212 The Turner assessment is part
of a series of “fair hearing” cases in which the Court has concluded that, when
individuals are at risk of losing certain forms of property and liberty (such as
statutory entitlements to government benefits, jobs, or licenses213), process is
due. Depending on the context, constitutionally fair decision-making entails
various attributes, including opportunities to be heard,214 in-person hearings in
certain circumstances,215 specific allocations of burdens of proof,216 reasons for
the decisions rendered by impartial decision-makers,217 oversight of whether
evidence supports a criminal verdict and of the quality of eyewitness
identification,218 and review of the award of punitive damages.219
210. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744–45, 1753 (2011).
211. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550–52 (2011). See generally Judith
Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating Subsidies and Awarding Fees and
Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119 (2000).
212. See Turner, 131 S. Ct. at 2512, 2520.
213. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734–37, 751–55 (1964).
214. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
215. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
216. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
217. See, e.g., Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009); Goldberg, 397 U.S.
at 271.
218. See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98
(1977). But constitutional oversight of evidentiary rules is constrained. See Perry v. New
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
219. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
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In short, the U.S. Supreme Court has developed distinct lines of
constitutional analyses that—depending on the context—mandate subsidies to
address resource asymmetries between adversaries, shape processes to reduce
intra-litigant disparities, facilitate access to courts, and regulate decision-making
procedures. Underlying the doctrinal mélange of fairness and equal protection
are different normative theories, themselves doing work in more than one arena.
Some of the inquiry into the quality of procedure, for example, is justified
through utilitarian concerns for accuracy, as well as by interests in guarding
against non-arbitrary treatment by the government. Given that the linguistic
lineage of rights to remedies and due process traces back to traditions around the
Magna Carta, non-arbitrary treatment has a historical pedigree independent of
democracy.220
But democratic values have come to provide new understandings of the
purposes of non-arbitrary treatment, sounding today in terms of dignity,
equality, and in the sovereignty of the people. Similarly, the demand for
subsidizing and equalizing opportunities to participate, like the insistence on
publicity, comes in service of democratic values that recognize the contribution
of and need for diverse voices and participants being heard in social orders and
that aspire (per Dworkin) to treat all with equal respect. But the support for
litigants to use courts does not stem from efforts focused solely on individual
need. The state (in the personage of the judge) is a self-interested actor.
Undergirding the attention to individuals and concerns about the fairness of
outcomes in particular cases is a pervasive concern that courts, as structures of
governance themselves, need the participatory parity of litigants to legitimate
the judgments rendered. “Connective justice” becomes an apt phrase to cover
the interdependencies expressed through court action.
B.

Resources for Courts—Provided and (on Rare Occasions) Compelled

Turn from mandates to courts about litigant subsidies and the procedures
offered to direct funding for courts. Federal and state governments take for
granted their obligations to support courts. That point is not surprising, given
that judiciaries do a great deal of work for legislatures by enforcing criminal and
civil laws.
Federal budgetary allotments (which can be specified more readily than the
allocations in each of the states) show continual legislative investments in
adjudication.221 For example, between 1971 and 2005, the U.S. judiciary budget

220. Koch, supra note 106, at 367; Miller, supra note 121, at 4.
221. Article III of the U.S. Constitution protects judges from the diminution of their salaries
but does not directly protect court budgets. See Russell R. Wheeler, Chief Justice Rehnquist as
Third Branch Leader, 89 JUDICATURE 116, 120 tbl.1 (2005); Todd D. Peterson, Controlling the
Federal Courts Through the Appropriations Process, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 993; Judith Resnik,
Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 657 (1999).
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grew from under one-tenth of a percent of the federal budget to two-tenths;222 in
1971, the federal judiciary was allotted $145 million and, by 2005, $5.7 billion
dollars.223 During that interval, staff doubled from about 15,000 to more than
32,000.224 Further, as other government agencies have had cuts in funding in
the last two years, the federal judiciary has been able to maintain its fiscal
allocations (about seven billion dollars, in 2011), even if not successful in
obtaining salary increases for judges.225
State legislatures have likewise consistently funded their judicial systems,
although given the mix of state and local sources of funding, identifying the total
amount invested is difficult. (Estimates are that most states devote from about
one to almost four percent of their budgets to courts.226) State courts provide
vastly more services and do so with relatively less resources (when measured by
judges’ salaries, caseload, and support staff) than does the federal bench.227
Court leaders are thus acutely conscious of the high demand for the services
provided, and a sequence of reports written under the auspices of the American
Bar Association have warned that courts are at risk because of a lack of
resources.228 Moreover, the contemporary landscape is awash with grave
concerns about the ability of governments to meet fiscal obligations of all kinds.
222. Wheeler, supra note 221, at 120 & tbl.1.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 120.
225. For fiscal year 2012, “the Judiciary received $6.97 billion, about a 1 percent increase above
the fiscal year 2011 enacted level, and $206 million above the House bill and $36 million above
the Senate bill funding levels.” FY2012 Funding Approved, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, Office of Pub. Affairs, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 2011, at 1, 1, 7, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/TTBViewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/news/ttb/ar
chive/2011-12%20Dec.pdf.
226. William T. (Bill) Robinson, III, Rising to Historic Challenge: Funding for State Courts,
Preserving Justice, JUDGES’ J., Winter 2012, at 8, 9. The complexity of determining what funds
go to courts comes in part from different services coming within court budgets in various
jurisdictions. Some states allocate resources for criminal justice services—such as probation
officials and public defenders through court budgets—and other jurisdictions have county as well
as state-wide funding for courts. See generally COSCA Budget Survey Responses, NAT’L CENTER
FOR ST. CTS. (Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Information%20
and%20Resources/Budget%20Resource%20Center/budget_survey_121811.ashx
(compiling
states’ cost-saving measures, detailing their funding sources, and outlining their justice services).
227. Robinson, supra note 226, at 10 (noting that approximately ninety-five percent of cases
are filed in state courts); see also Margaret H. Marshall, Chief Justice, Mass. Supreme Judicial
Court, Address at the New York Bar Association’s Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture: At the Tipping
Point: State Courts and the Balance of Power 3, 7–12 (Nov. 10, 2009), available at http://www.ab
cny.org/pdf/Cardozo_post_final.pdf [hereinafter M. Marshall, Cardozo Lecture].
228. See CRISIS IN THE COURTS: DEFINING THE PROBLEM (A Report to the American Bar
Association, Aug. 8-9, 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/
public_education/pub-ed-lawday_abaresolution_crisiscourtsdec2011.pdf; AM. BAR ASS’N,
FUNDING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A CALL TO ACTION: A Report to the American Bar Association
(Aug. 1992).
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Efforts by state courts to diversify services are matched by evidence of
retrenchment in services. In 2009, New Hampshire, lacking funds, episodically
suspended civil jury trials.229 Forty states cut funding for courts in 2010, and
some states reported a ten percent decline in their budgets.230 Six states closed
courthouses a day a week; and nine sent judges on unpaid furloughs.231 By July
2011, California budget cuts resulted in a proposed layoff of forty percent of
staff and the closing of many courtrooms in the San Francisco Superior Court.232
The court’s presiding judge described the “civil justice system in San Francisco
[as] collapsing.”233 Moreover, in 2009, California tallied 4.3 million people in
civil litigation without the assistance of lawyers.234 In 2010, New York counted
2.3 million civil litigants without lawyers—including almost all tenants in
eviction cases, debtors in consumer credit cases, and ninety-five percent of
parents in child support matters.235 Furthermore, a national assessment used the
phrase “geography as destiny” for one of its findings—that legal services for
those in need are not distributed by need but by place; while civil legal assistance
had succeeded in responding to a diverse set of groups and their needs,
coordination was poor, and individuals faced great challenges in gaining access
to what was available.236
The responses to these data include calls for financial assistance from the
federal government237 as well as many state-based initiatives to expand as well
as to reconfigure court and legal services. One focus is on the rights of civil
litigants to have lawyers; a national “Civil Gideon” effort, championed by bench
and bar leaders, aims to guarantee counsel rights for certain categories of

229. James Podgers, Witnesses Describe State and Local Courts Reeling from Budget
Cutbacks, ABA J. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/beggaring_jus
tice_witnesses_describe_state_and_local_courts_reeling_aba/.
230. Robinson, supra note 226, at 9.
231. Id.
232. California: Huge Cuts for Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2011, at A15 (quoting Judge
Katherine Feinstein).
233. Id. See generally Robinson, supra note 226, at 9–10.
234. This figure was cited in support of the Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act, creating a pilot
program for poor litigants to obtain counsel. See Act of Oct. 11, 2009, ch. 457, § 1(b), 2009 Cal.
Stat. 2498, 2499.
235. LIPPMAN, 2011 STATE OF THE JUDICIARY, supra note 169, at 4; see also TASK FORCE TO
EXPAND ACCESS TO CIVIL LEGAL SERVS. IN N.Y., REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 1 (2010) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], available at http://www.courts.state.
ny.us/ip/access-civil-legal-services/PDF/CLS-TaskForceREPORT.pdf.
236. See REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & AARON C. SMYTH, ACCESS ACROSS AMERICA: FIRST
REPORT OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE INFRASTRUCTURE MAPPING PROJECT, at v, ix, (American Bar
Foundation, Oct. 7, 2011), available at http://www.americanbarfoundation.org/uploads/cms/
documents/access_across_america_first_report_of_the_civil_justice_infrastructure_mapping_
project.pdf.
237. See M. Marshall, Cardozo Lecture, supra note 227, at 11–13.
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impoverished litigants.238 As Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman of New York put
it,
efforts and more around the country reinforce the idea that legal representation
in cases involving the basic necessities of life is fundamental to the delivery of
justice. Equal justice for all under the law is inextricably linked to court funding
levels. However, increasing court funding without ensuring access to justice is
a hollow victory. The state courts must have the resources they need, not just as
an end in itself, but to support their constitutional and ethical role as the protector
of the legal rights of all Americans. Every person, regardless of means, is
entitled to their day in court.
The rule of law—the very bedrock of our society—loses its meaning when
the protection of our laws is available only to those who can afford it. We might
as well close the courthouse doors if we are not able to provide equal justice for
all—our very reason for being. This is the fundamental challenge facing the
justice system today.239

Another trajectory is to augment assistance for self-represented litigants,240
and a third is to reformulate methods of dispute resolution to be less expensive,
more attractive, and, in some instances, less lawyer dependent. During the last
few decades, for example, state courts have expanded their repertoire through
the “problem-solving courts” that include drug courts, re-entry courts, juvenile
courts, mental health courts, and business courts.241
These developments reflect not only contemporary difficulties stemming
from the high number of criminal prosecutions and the many rights-holders who
238. Evocative of Justice Brennan’s Boddie analysis, the American Bar Association resolved
that counsel should be provided “as a matter of right at public expense to low-income persons in
those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake, such as those
involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child custody . . . .” AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA BASIC
PRINCIPLES FOR A RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN CIVIL LEGAL PROCEEDINGS 1 (2010); see also AM. BAR
ASSOC., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 64 (3d ed.
1992) (also noting that counsel rights should apply to “extradition, mental competency, postconviction relief, and probation and parole revocation, regardless of the designation of the tribunal
in which they occur or classification of the proceedings as civil in nature”); Jonathan Lippman,
Chief Judge, N.Y. Court of Appeals, Remarks at 2010 Law Day Ceremony, Law in the 21st
Century: Enduring Traditions, Emerging Challenges 3–4 (May 3, 2010), available
at http://www.nycourts.gov/whatsnew/pdf/Law Day 2010.pdf.
239. Jonathan Lippman, Speech at the Midyear Meeting of the National Association of Women
Judges at Harvard Law School, Courts in Times of Fiscal Crisis—Who Needs Courts? 10–11 (Mar.
9, 2012) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Lippman, Courts in Times of Fiscal Crisis]. See
generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT
UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS (2009), http://dev.law
help.org/documents/501631LSC-justicegap.pdf.
240. See Randall T. Shepard, The Self-Represented Litigant: Implications for the Bench and
Bar, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 607, 617 (2010).
241. See ROBERT V. WOLF, CALIFORNIA’S COLLABORATIVE JUSTICE COURTS: BUILDING A
PROBLEM-SOLVING JUDICIARY 2 (2005).
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cannot afford to pay all that litigation entails. Court leaders have also become
concerned that litigants with resources may choose to turn to alternative private
providers whom they pay directly for their services.242 Further, current legal
doctrine puts some would-be plaintiffs into alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms (such as mandatory arbitration), whether desired or not. Because
courts have—by law and practice—let go of their monopoly over services and
opened entry to other institutions, courts have become competitors for high-end
investors with private providers.243
Having provided a glimpse at the diversification of services courts now
struggle to “scale-up” to reach more claimants, a word is in order about a small
line of cases that recognize court authority (often as a matter of inherent powers
and other times under the rubric of separation of powers) to compel provision of
resources when legislatures fail to do so.244 Recent and high-visibility examples
include a lawsuit by the Chief Judge of the State of New York for increases in
judicial salaries245 and rulings by state courts that resources for state public
defenders are inadequate.246 In addition, an odd-lot set of judgments insist that
courts can, as a matter of “self-preservation” (to borrow a term from a 1930

242. See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through ADR,
11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 262 (1996).
243. Bryant Garth identified this risk in the 1990s, as he analyzed court promotion of ADR.
See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the
Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 945–49 (1993).
244. See, e.g., Cnty. of Barnstable v. Commonwealth (Barnstable II), 661 N.E.2d 47 (Mass.
1996); Cnty. of Barnstable v. Commonwealth (Barnstable I), 572 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1991);
Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193 (Pa. 1971); see also Michael L. Buenger, Of
Money and Judicial Independence: Can Inherent Powers Protect State Courts in Tough Fiscal
Times?, 92 KY. L.J. 979 (2003–04); Jeffrey Jackson, Judicial Independence, Adequate Court
Funding, and Inherent Judicial Powers, 52 MD. L. REV. 217 (1993). The court in Commonwealth
ex rel. Carroll v. Tate posited that the judiciary “must possess the inherent power to determine and
compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its
mandated responsibilities, and its powers and duties to administer Justice, if it is to be in reality a
co-equal, independent Branch of our Government.” Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll, 274 A.2d at
197. Analysis of the bases in state constitutions for courts to function as well as the difficulties of
judges ordering that their co-branches of government fund courts is provided in Durham, supra
note 66.
245. See Chief Judge of N.Y. v. Governor of N.Y., 887 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773–74 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2009). In the early 1990s, then Chief Judge Sol Wachtler sued New York State Governor Mario
Cuomo for the failure to provide budgetary funds as requested by the judiciary. The litigation and
its denouement are detailed in Jackson, supra note 244, at 217–18, 249.
246. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870 (Mo. 2009);
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217 (N.Y. 2010).
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California decision) order specific payments of small sums due individuals such
as employees and to require repairs of its facilities.247
This brief account is aimed as a reminder of another aspect of the taken-forgrantedness of court services, even as their availability may be outstripped by
demand. Efforts to force funding through litigation are relatively scarce, not
only because of various doctrinal impediments (such as justiciability) but more
importantly because legislatures regularly supply significant resources to their
coordinate branches, on which they depend. Courts are a central method by
which states secure their own peace and security and stabilize commercial
activities. The struggle is not over whether but rather how much a state can
afford, and how to allocate investments in a portfolio of services, ranging from
criminal prosecution, defense, and detention to family conflicts, traffic cases,
and general civil litigation.
C. Reading Rights to Remedies
I have argued that governmental reliance on courts, coupled with
constitutional recognition of their centrality through open-courts and right-toremedy clauses atop interpretations of due process, equal protection, petition,
jury, and other constitutional rights, have generated and sustained government
support over centuries for courts. During the second half of the twentieth
century, legislatures and courts expanded the bases for calling on courts, the
services provided, and subsidized subsets of users.
In this section, I explore the degree to which open-courts and right-toremedy clauses have been read to create judicially-enforceable claims. An
obvious touchstone is Marbury v. Madison; although the U.S. Constitution has
no express remedial texts, the Court’s interpretation included the iconic
statement in that a person “who considers himself injured, has a right to resort
to the laws of his country for a remedy.”248 That idea laces case law in state
courts, many of which rely on the express terms of their constitutions, as the
epigrams that opened this section illustrate. All told, forty-one states have

247. See Millholen v. Riley, 293 P. 69, 70, 71 (1930); see also Ted Z. Robertson & Christa
Brown, The Judiciary’s Inherent Power to Compel Funding: A Tale of Heating Stoves and Air
Conditioning, 20 ST. MARY’S L.J. 863 (1989).
248. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803). See generally Richard H. Fallon,
Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1731 (1991); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review,
and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1993). Theories of due process entitlements
to judicial review are augmented by specific clauses of the Constitution, such as those protecting
against the takings of property and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. amend.
V; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Further, the Supreme Court has also recognized the right to litigate
a claim as a form of property not to be extinguished without procedural protections. See, e.g.,
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
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express guarantees, detailed in Appendix 1.249 Depending on the formulation,
these provisions could be read to protect discrete rights, such as access to courts
for disputants and third-party observers, as well as funding for courts, and as
constraints on new legislation limiting pursuit of remedies in court.250
Constitutional statements—that rights must be decided according to the “Law of
the Land”251 or by “due course of law”252—can be equated with substantive “due
process” limitations on government action, as well as with entitlements to
procedural opportunities to contest a judgment. Terms directed at the
administration of justice without “sale” or “delay”253 could also be read, akin to
the “speedy trial” provisions for criminal defendants, to impose time frames on
when justice needs to be provided, to protect against bribery, excessive costs or
assessments, or even as obligations to waive fees.

249. See infra Appendix 1, State Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies.
One count, by Koch, supra note 106, at 434, identified thirty-eight such provisions. As categorized
by Friesen and Phillips, forty states have express constitutional rights-to-remedies clauses.
FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-91 to 6-92 app. 6 (2006), and 2011 Supp, at 132; Phillips, supra note
106, at 1310 & n.6. I would add Michigan to those lists as its 1963 Constitution provides that “[a]
suitor in any court of this state has the right to prosecute or defend his suit, either in his own proper
person or by an attorney,” MICH. CONST. 1963, art. I, § 13, which is similar to Georgia’s 1983
Constitution: “No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either in person or
by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.” GA. CONST. of 1983, art.
I, § 1, para. 12. Further, as Appendix 1 details, the remedies/access clauses have occasionally been
amended, sometimes to make the language inclusive and in other times to clarify the mandate (from
“ought” to “shall” for example as in amendments to the Missouri Constitution), and in other
instances to respond to a particular legislative or court decisions. See infra Appendix 1, State
Constitutions: Textual Commitments to Rights to Remedies (detailing such changes).
As Appendix 2 (State Constitutions without Express Remedies Clauses and with Due
Process or Open/Public Courts Provisions), infra details, the remaining nine states have texts
referencing other court-based rights, and some but not all of their courts have interpreted their
provisions to provide enforceable rights of access to courts. As a New York court in 1902
explained: “In view of the great purposes of government, and the understanding of the framers of
our constitutional system, there can be no doubt [of the] . . . guaranty to every member of this state
free access to the courts, and a full opportunity to have a judicial determination of all controversies
which might involve his rights, whether such rights were the outgrowth of contracts or of violated
duty.” Williams v. Vill. of Port Chester, 76 N.Y.S. 631, 634 (App. Div. 1902).
250. See, e.g., Cent. Appraisal Dist. of Rockwell Cnty. v. Lall, 924 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tex.
1996) (identifying Texas’s open courts provision to block “unreasonable financial barriers”
imposed by legislatures). The court held that Texas’s requirement that taxpayers pay portions of
the tax admittedly due before contesting disputed portions was permissible, but requiring
prepayment of disputed assessments violated the “opens courts guarantee.” Id. at 690–91.
251. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
252. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13.
253. See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17. The term sale appears in twenty-seven constitutions;
the term “delay” appears in thirty-six constitutions. FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-92 app. 6. As
Maguire pointed out, the reference to “sale,” dating from the Magna Carta, likely did not mean no
fees but rather required they be set at a “reasonable level.” Maguire, supra note 147, at 364–65.
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These analytic distinctions, the longevity of the constitutional statements,
and the scope of legislative elaboration of causes of action, remedies, and of
courts have prompted a vast number of decisions over two hundred years. Lines
of cases, using shorthand such as the “Remedy by Due Course of Law” Clause
or the “Justice Without Purchase” Clause,254 address specific facets of the
provisions, and a number of law review articles have likewise puzzled about
their history and contemporary import.255 Here I sketch the contours.
First, a few state courts have held that legislative support of their services is
obligatory, even as the implications of such pronouncements are wide-ranging.
The legal bases have generally been a mix of separation of powers and courts’
inherent authority.256 A very few of these cases also rest their judgments on state
open courts/remedies clauses. The Texas Supreme Court put it simply—that the
state’s open-court clause required that “courts must actually be open and
operating.”257 Likewise, an Alabama decision explained that courts had a
“constitutional duty . . . [to] be available for the delivery of justice . . . . Absent
adequate and reasonable judicial resources, the people of our State are denied
their constitutional rights.”258
254. See, e.g., Allen v. Emp’t Dep’t, 57 P.3d 903, 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2002).
255. See, e.g., FRIESEN, supra note 136, ch. 6 (considering the history and contemporary
meaning of access-to-courts and right-to-remedy clauses); Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of
the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279 (1995);
Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing Search to Understand the Origins
of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 1005 (2001); Koch, supra note 106; Linde, supra note
121, at 136–38; Phillips, supra note 106; Schuman, supra note 61. As Schuman, explained, several
articles hone in on particular state constitutions. Schuman, supra note 61, at 1203 n.40. Further,
some commentators delineate certain protections as “substantive” or “procedural,” as they also
delineate the types of state court approaches, in terms of levels of scrutiny of legislative action and
modes of reasoning. Id. at 1202–05. This literature has not focused on the word “everyone” in the
clauses and the import of changing definitions of who falls within those parameters.
256. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274 A.2d 193, 197 (Pa. 1971) (holding
that the Judiciary “must possess the inherent power to determine and compel payment” of money
necessary to carry out its constitutional duties because it is a co-equal and independent branch,
which must protect itself from the impairment of its duties).
257. See Cent. Appraisal Dist. of Rockwell Cnty. v. Lall, 924 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1996).
258. See Folsom v. Wynn, 631 So. 2d 890 (Ala. 1993). The court held the governor’s cuts of
the judiciary budget unconstitutional. Id. at 895–96, 902. The court relied not only on Alabama’s
provision on open courts and remedies, ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13, on which enforcement of other
state and federal constitutional rights also depended, but also on another constitutional obligation,
added in 1973 as part of a major reform of the court system, that the legislature provide “adequate
and reasonable financing” to courts, ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.10. Folsom, 631 So. 2d at 893–
902.
A North Carolina opinion involving the adequacy of court facilities also relied on that
state’s open courts/remedy clause. A superior court judge challenged the state’s failure to provide
adequate county court facilities. In re Alamance Cnty. Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d 125 (N.C.
1991). The Supreme Court of North Carolina noted the array of duties dependent on the capacity
to do the work (such as statutory obligations to preserve documents, to protect the secrecy of grand
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Second, a substantial body of law understands open or public court
provisions, coupled with First Amendment, due process, rights to jury trials, and
common law practices, to ensure that the public (and the press) can observe court
proceedings.259 Jeremy Bentham’s call for “publicity” in courts is now read to
be entrenched in both federal and state constitutions. The general rule is that
neither the Constitution nor the common law tolerates blanket closures of
criminal or civil proceedings.260 In addition to preliminary hearings and trials,
many courts have insisted that the voir dire in jury selection and court documents
are presumptively open, and that the burden rests on the state to explain any
closures.261
Third, state courts have reached widely different conclusions (sometimes
within the same jurisdiction in different eras) about whether litigants can rely on
open courts/remedy clauses as support for, or as a shield against, limitations on
access and on the kinds of cases that can be pursued. One series of decisions
related to filing fees, assessments, and taxes that parse charges, their amounts,
and their purposes. For example, in 1917, the California Supreme Court
concluded that courts had the inherent capacity to waive fees so that poor people
could bring cases.262 Further, judges have decided that some forms of charges
were illicit “taxes” that violated either “open court” or “no sale” provisions.263

jury proceedings, and to establish courtrooms and judicial facilities) as well as the state
Constitution’s open courts provision. Id. at 127. In Noble County Council v. State ex rel. Fifer,
the issue was an obligation of a county council to pay a probation officer hired by a court. Noble
Cnty. Council v. State ex rel. Fifer, 125 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1955). The Supreme Court of Indiana
invoked both the open court provision and the requirement for public criminal trial as obliging
support for adequate staffing. Id. at 713–14; see also Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 274
A.2d 193, 204 (Pa. 1971) (Roberts, J., concurring and dissenting) (commenting that “the clear
mandate of Article 1, Section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution . . . provides: ‘All courts shall be
open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay . . . .’
It is evident that these fundamental guarantees could not be honored if the Judiciary were without
reasonably adequate resources.”).
259. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7–15 (1986); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569–80 (1980). See generally Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public
Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987).
260. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. 555.
261. See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 130 S. Ct. 721, 722, 724–25 (2010) (reversing a conviction
because a “lone courtroom observer” was excluded from voir dire); see also Doe v. Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 280 P.3d 377 (Or. 2012). State
constitutional interpretations of the scope of public access rights varies somewhat. See Koch, supra
note 106, at 446.
262. See Martin v. Superior Court, 168 P. 135, 137–38 (Cal. 1917); see also Isrin v. Superior
Court, 403 P.2d 728, 736 (Cal. 1965).
263. See, e.g., Flood v. State ex rel. Homeland Co., 117 So. 385, 386–87 (Fla. 1928)
(concluding that imposing a ten dollar fee to be used for county purposes was a “tax” that violated
the state’s open court clause); State ex rel. Davidson v. Gorman, 41 N.W. 948, 949 (Minn. 1889)
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As a 1910 Missouri court explained when banning a three-dollar surcharge
imposed by one county, compelling litigants to “purchase justice” was illegal
because “the constitution[] . . . provides [that justice] shall not be sold.”264 Some
decisions turn on whether filing fees go to court-related services and are
therefore licit, or instead to “fund general welfare programs,” rendering them
unconstitutional.265 Fees that are court-focused have generally been upheld,
especially when judges have the discretion to waive them in particular cases.266

(holding that probate charges keyed to the value of the estate were unconstitutional, as taxes rather
than “reasonable . . . fees or costs”). In 2010, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that court fees
used for general revenues were permissible because the legislature appropriated more funds to
courts than those the courts took in through fees. See Crist v. Ervin, 56 So. 3d 745 (Fla. 2010).
One high-profile example of fees as barriers comes from Texas. For a time, Texas required
that an appellant post a supersedeas bond in an amount related to the judgment won below.
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (citing then-current TEX. R. CIV. P. 364). Large
judgments can result in pressures to settle or not to appeal. See id. at 7. Current Texas law no
longer requires bonds as a condition for perfecting an appeal but does so for a stay of the execution
of a judgment. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1–.2, 25.1. Texas rules provide that alternate security may be
used in appropriate circumstances; judgment debtors must only post a supersedeas bond in the
amount of compensatory (and not punitive) damages, interest and costs; this amount must not
exceed the lesser of fifty percent of the judgment debtor’s current net worth or 25 million dollars;
and that the trial court may reduce the amount of supersedeas upon a showing of substantial
economic harm. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1, 24.2(a)–(b). Some decisions have suggested that the earlier
mandatory supersedeas requirement, absent proper accommodations for those who are unable to
post, was unconstitutional. See, e.g., State v. Flag-Redfern Oil Co., 852 S.W.2d 480, 481–82, 484–
85 (Tex. 1993) (holding that a requirement that state mineral lessees pay disputed royalties before
seeking judicial review of an audit by the General Land Office violated the open courts provision);
see also Elaine A. Carlson, Reshuffling the Deck: Enforcing and Superseding Civil Judgments on
Appeal After House Bill 4, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 1035, 1079 (2005).
264. Hays v. C. C. & H. Mining & Milling Co., 126 S.W. 1051, 1054 (Mo. 1910) (holding that
a 1901 act imposing a three dollar extra fee to file in Jasper County was unconstitutional as a “tax”
before its courts would be “opened” and violated the right that justice be “administered . . . without
sale, denial or delay”).
265. LeCroy v. Hanlon, 713 S.W.2d 335 (Tex. 1986). See, e.g., Harrison v. Monroe Cnty., 716
S.W.2d 263 (Mo. 1986) (prohibiting fees if not “reasonably related to the expense of the
administration of justice”); LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 341 (citing cases in Illinois, Florida, Missouri,
and Minnesota to support its holding that “filing fees that go to fund general welfare programs, and
not court-related services, are unconstitutional”). The court in LeCroy v. Hanlon held that “filing
fees that go to state general revenues—in other words taxes on the right to litigate that pay for other
programs besides the judiciary—are unreasonable impositions on the state constitutional right of
access to the courts.” LeCroy, 713 S.W.2d at 342. But see Marshall v. Holland, 270 S.W. 609
(Ark. 1925) (upholding filing fees that included sums for general revenues). What activities are
“court-related” is another question. Illinois courts have concluded that a five-dollar assessment on
divorce filers to use for domestic-violence shelters was not permissible but a one-dollar assessment
to go to a nonprofit dispute resolution center was. Compare Wenger v. Finley, 541 N.E.2d 1220
(Ill. App. Ct. 1989), with Crocker v. Finley, 459 N.E.2d 1346 (Ill. 1984).
266. See, e.g., Allen v. Emp’t Dep’t, 57 P.3d 903 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); see also Bailey v. Frush,
5 Or. 136, 137–38 (Or. 1873). In contemporary discussions, some jurists argue that courts should
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Fiscal stresses are placing new pressures on courts to fund their own work
and “related services” or state programs more generally. Objecting to that trend,
a 2011 “policy paper” for the Conference of State Court Administrators insisted
that courts ought not to be used by states as “revenue centers.”267 Less mention
is made of the fact that courts gain a good deal of their revenue from “noncontentious” matters, such as probate in state systems and bankruptcy filings in
the federal system that produce a steady stream of income for courts.268 For
example, more than a million bankruptcy petitions are filed annually in the
federal courts, and the filing fee for one subset—those seeking a discharge under
Chapters 11—was as of November of 2012, $1167.269
Another genre of claims stems from legislative limitations placed on specific
subsets of substantive claims, often enacted as part of administrative or
alternative dispute resolution efforts or as “tort reform.” While some
administrative schemes mitigate the costs of litigation, they may be
accompanied by parallel caps on the recoveries.270 Waves of litigation thus
challenge enactment of statutes that authorize the enforcement of arbitration
contracts, Workers’ Compensation, the repeal of certain common law causes of
action, or the imposition, for certain kinds of plaintiffs, of restrictive statutes of
limitations and caps on damages.271
Depending on the state, a particular right-to-remedy clause has been read as
aspirational only and therefore as not providing litigants with a cause of action
or defense to new rules imposed by either the legislature or the judiciary.272 In
contrast, other courts have read their state clauses to limit legislative changes to
rights extant (sometimes characterized as “vested”) before that state’s
constitution, or to limit legislative alterations of common law rights, or to
prevent the imposition of barriers to courts without a “quid pro quo”—the

be supported by general revenues rather than court-based fees. See, e.g., Lippman, Courts in Times
of Fiscal Crisis, supra note 239, at 5.
267. CARL REYNOLDS & JEFF HALL, 2011–2012 POLICY PAPER: COURTS ARE NOT REVENUE
CENTERS (2011), available at http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/WhitePapers/CourtsAreNotRevenue
Centers-Final.pdf.
268. The degree to which localities rely on such filings in England and Wales is noted by Lord
Justice Thomas. Thomas, The Maintenance of Local Justice, supra note 41, at 23.
269. See Temporary Bankruptcy Judgeships Extension Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-121, §
3(a), 126 Stat. 346, 348 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(3)). Judges may waive fees but only
if the filer’s income is 150 percent or less of federal poverty guidelines. 28 U.S.C. § 1930(f) (2006).
270. As Silverstein noted, some administrative systems such as workers’ compensation did not
impose filing fees, while courts did. Silverstein, supra note 146, at 24.
271. Phillips, supra note 106, at 1326–37, summarized these iterations. He identified the
earliest state court opinions, one upholding a legislative abolition of a common-law claim in
Massachusetts in 1814, and the other rejecting a limitation in Tennessee in 1821. Id. at 1326.
272. See Phillips, supra note 106, at 1338–39; Schuman, supra note 61, at 1205–06.
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creation of an alternative remedy, often in an administrative forum.273 While
some commentators have sought to rationalize the case law, others see
“inexplicable” disparities of outcomes, incapable of being correlated to the text
or history of particular state provisions.274
An example of a robust invocation of the right-to-remedy clause comes from
Nebraska. That state’s supreme court has twice—in 1889 and in 1991—refused
to enforce contracts calling for arbitration in lieu of litigation.275 As explained
more than a century ago, in 1902, to enforce contracts to arbitrate would “open
a leak in the dike of constitutional guaranties which might some day carry all
away.”276 Many decades later, in 1987, Nebraska’s legislature enacted a version
of the Uniform Arbitration Act whose words track parts of the Federal
Arbitration Act, albeit with more constraints (such as that contracts be “entered
into voluntarily and willingly”) and more exemptions (such as those arising
under the state’s Fair Employment Practice Act). In 1991, the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the Act violated the state constitution’s open
court/rights-to-remedy clause.277
In response, various businesses, the state’s Chamber of Commerce, and
others proposed amending the constitution to authorize such legislation.
Although opposed by a group including trial lawyers,278 Nebraska’s Constitution
changed in 1996. Added to the mandates that courts be open and “every
person . . . shall have a remedy” was the proviso that the legislature could
“provide for the enforcement of mediation, binding arbitration agreements, and
273. Phillips, supra note 106, at 1335–39; see also FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-9 to 6-11;
2011 Supp. at 105–32; Schuman, supra note 61, at 1206–17. Friesen also noted that state courts
have also relied on other parts of their constitutions (such as rights to jury trials and due process)
when evaluating legislative limitations on common law rights. FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-3,
and at 2011 Supp. at 105 (discussing the few constitutions that also forbid “legislative abrogation
and diminution of traditional damage remedies”).
274. Phillips, supra note 106, at 1314. Phillips argued, however, that state courts ought to
provide enforcement of a “narrow but potent protection” against legislative encroachment of basic
rights, and that the primary rights Blackstone considered absolute—”personal security, personal
liberty, and property”—provided guidance on which rights were appropriately within that “narrow”
band. Id. at 1344–45.
275. State v. Neb. Ass’n of Pub. Emps., 477 N.W.2d 577 (Neb. 1991); German-Am. Ins. Co.
v. Etherton, 41 N.W. 406 (Neb. 1889).
276. Phx. Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 92 N.W. 736 (Neb. 1902).
277. Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 11, at 130. Several state courts have addressed
the issue of arbitration; many have not found mandatory arbitration provisions to be violative of
open court rights. See, e.g., Firelock Inc. v. Dist. Court, 776 P.2d 1090, 1100 (Colo. 1989);
FRIESEN, supra note 136, at 6-76 to 6-83. A few have, however, found limits on judicial review of
arbitration awards to run afoul of constitutional remedy rights. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v Pinnacle Med., Inc., 753 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2000).
278. See, e.g., Editorial, 1996 Field of Amendments Contains Two Worthy of a Yes, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD (Neb.), May 7, 1996, at 10; Leslie Boellstorff, Amendments May Be ‘Innocent
Bystanders,’ OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Neb.), May 12, 1996, at 4B.
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other forms of dispute resolution which are entered into voluntarily and which
are not revocable other than upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.”279 (How the United States Supreme Court’s
broad interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act280 affects the state’s
judgments has been the subject of some Nebraska decisions,281 and the statefederal interaction is the topic of Professor Wolff’s essay in this Symposium.282)
Several other state courts have also concluded that open court/right to
remedies clauses generate judicially enforceable entitlements. The test in Texas,
for example, is that legislatures cannot “abrogate well-established common law
causes of action unless the reason” to do so “outweighs the litigants’
constitutional right of redress.”283 Missouri provides another example, with case
law developed based on its constitutional provision (set forth in 1820 and
amended in 1875 and in 1945), mandating that courts provide “certain remedy
afforded for every injury to person, property or character.”284
As then-Judge Wolff explained the state’s approach, a statute “may modify
or abolish a cause of action that had been recognized by common law or by
statute” as long as doing so is not “arbitrary or unreasonable.”285 Under that test,
279. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13 (amended 1996). See generally John M. Gradwohl, Arbitrability
Under Nebraska Contracts: Relatively Clarified at Last, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 207 (1997).
Montana’s remedy clause was amended in 1972, in response to a state court decision finding that a
third party had no liability to an independent contractor injured and compensated through workers’
compensation. See Aschraft v. Mont. Power Co., 480 P.2d 812 (Mont. 1971), superseded by
constitutional amendment, MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16 (amended 1972). In 1965, Utah ruled its
state’s arbitration violative of its open courts clause. See Barnhart v. Civil Serv. Emps. Ins. Co.,
398 P.2d 873 (Utah 1965). Thereafter, the legislature amended the Act to make it prospective, and
the Court upheld the provision. See Lindon City v. Eng’rs Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981).
See also Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1976) (invalidating
as violating jury rights, equal protection, and court access rights, the Ohio Medical Malpractice
Act’s mandate to use compulsory arbitration).
280. See, e.g., Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
281. See, e.g., Aramark Unif. & Career Apparel, Inc. v. Hunan, Inc., 757 N.W.2d 205 (Neb.
2008); Cornhusker Int’l Trucks, Inc. v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 876 (Neb. 2002).
282. See generally Wolff, supra note 38.
283. See, e.g., Cent. Appraisal Dist. of Rockwell Cnty. v. Lall, 924 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. 1996).
284. MO. CONST. art. I, § 14. Note that Missouri’s 1820 constitutional formulation was that
courts “ought to be open,” MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 7 (“That courts of justice ought to
be open to every person, and certain remedy afforded for every injury to person, property, or
character; and that right and justice ought to be administered without sale, denial, or delay . . . .”),
and that in 1875 the text shifted from “ought to be open” to “shall be open,” MO. CONST. of 1875,
art. II, § 10. In 1945, the wording shifted from the exhortative 1820 language, “ought to be
administered without sale, denial, or delay,” MO. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, para. 7, and 1875
language, “should be administered without sale, denial or delay,” MO. CONST. of 1875, art. II, § 10,
to the mandatory “shall be administered without sale, denial or delay,” MO. CONST. art. I, § 14
(ratified in 1945, current in 2012).
285. Kilmer v. Mun, 17 S.W.3d 545, 550 (Mo. 2000) (en banc).
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the court struck a statute conditioning a tort action against a dram shop on the
seller’s conviction for providing liquor to the intoxicated person who caused the
injury. The court held that the vagaries of prosecutorial decisions rendered the
constraint arbitrary.286 But many limits have been sustained; for example, the
court upheld legislation requiring that a person owing child support and seeking
modification first post a bond (sometimes involving thousands of dollars) for the
sums not yet paid.287
Return then to view the historical arc from the 1676 Charter of the English
Colony of West New Jersey (invoked at the outset—that “in all publick courts
of justice for tryals of causes, civil or criminal, any person or persons . . . may
freely come into, and attend”288) to the dozens of remedy provisions of state
constitutions, and the due process, petitioning, and other clauses of state and
federal constitutions. Over the course of three centuries, positive entitlements
to a particular, individualized, government service—protection of property and
person—became entrenched. As individuals of all races, genders, and classes
gained juridical personhood, those entitlements also served to generate subsidies
(both for courts and their users) to protect adjudication’s intelligibility and
legitimacy. Efforts to respond to inequality, such as insisting that states waive
fees to court in certain instances paralleled the end of poll taxes for voting, as
the democratic project came to be inclusive.
As also noted at the outset, courts were one of several venues in which
questions of equality emerged. Given that the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the
application of the Equal Protection Clause to the poor, as a category, the Court
nonetheless carved out access to courts as an arena in which equality concerns,
interacting with due process interpretations, had purchase. Closing courthouse
doors to impoverished segments of the population is a harm that would be felt
by and undermine the state’s ability to do its own work. The government, like
individuals, relies on decisions conforming to the “law of the land.” Thus, the
Court used due process ideology to delineate a discrete arena in which poverty
was to be ameliorated by the state. The result was to make courts a more
inclusive democratic venue. Paralleling the insistence that states waive fees for
those seeking divorce were injunctions that states not impose poll taxes for
voting. Litigating and voting are both personal rights and structural necessities,

286. Id. at 545–46, 552 & n.21. However, the Court also noted that the legislature, which had
created this kind of cause of action, could also abolish it altogether. Id. at 554. Moreover, the
legislature was not obliged to substitute an alternative. See Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832
S.W.2d 898, 906 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (rejecting the “‘reasonable substitute’ holdings” of the Texas
and Florida Supreme Courts as “arbitrarily and unnecessarily limit[ing] the legitimate lawmaking
role of the legislative branch” and holding that the “common law is in force in Missouri only to the
extent that it has not been subsequently changed by the legislature or judicial decision”).
287. Weigand v. Edwards, 296 S.W.3d 453 (Mo. 2009) (en banc).
288. Concessions and Agreements of West New Jersey, supra note 8, at ch. XXIII.
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and both are forms of political participation that help to anchor the stability of
democratic states.
IV. THE SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES OF CONSTITUTIONAL SUBSTANTIVE
ENTITLEMENTS: AN EXEMPLUM IUSTITIAE
Eight lessons can be drawn from this account of state and federal
commitments to courts. First, the United States, at both national and state levels,
is obliged as a matter of constitutional law to provide some forms of services to
individuals to obtain remedies in open court for some kind of harms. Second,
these commitments have been materialized and expanded over the course of
three centuries, and most of the credit for doing so—in terms of expanding the
kinds of harms legally cognizable as well as the resources to pursue them in
court—goes to legislatures.
Thus, and third, courts should be understood as institutions that have been
remarkably successful in attracting huge amounts of public funds and of private
investments. How much is hard to know. In many jurisdictions, court budgets
include funds for services such as probation and public defenders. Moreover,
some courts receive funding from local, as contrasted with state, sources. Thus,
while the National Center for State Courts has a database of court budgets, the
difficulties of delineating spending sources and the diverse services that budget
allocations cover make a full and accurate accounting of the billions of public
dollars difficult.289 Yet more opaque are the amount of moneys invested by
private litigants—investing their own resources to generate judge-made law as
well as into systemic changes, from rulemaking and legislation to contributions
aimed at getting specific individuals on (or off) the bench by way of appointment
or election. Calculating the sums spent on auxiliary institutions that courts have
spawned—the related industries of lawyers, administrators, notaries, probation,
forensic experts, and other information services—is likewise difficult.290
The utility of those investments raises yet other issues. Just as tracking how
much is spent in and around courts is difficult, so too is deciding whether to
commodify and how to identify and to measure the outputs of court—from the
participatory processes to the impact of the judgments rendered on the disputants
to their influence on or use by third parties. A few states have used econometrics
to approximate the utilities produced by their court systems—such as the ability

289. See COSCA Budget Survey Responses, supra note 226.
290. One estimate is that U.S. law firms earned fifty-one billion dollars in gross profits in 2003,
and that focus is far from the total output of the “Legal Services Industry” (LSI). See NEIL
RICKMAN & JAMES M. ANDERSON, INNOVATIONS IN THE PROVISION OF LEGAL SERVICES IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (RAND, 2011), available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP354.pdf.
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of businesses to know that they can collect debts and enforce contracts.291
Critics in turn claim that court-based activities harm productivity outside of
court and waste resources in court, resulting in a loss of revenues.
Fourth, the contemporary pressures on courts come in part from the
remarkable surge in criminal filings and in part from courts’ own successes as
attractive venues for civil litigants. In many respects, courts are only starting to
grapple with the challenges raised by economically disparate claimants in
criminal and civil cases. Given the fiscal retrenchment of government services
more broadly, the turn to a focus on budgets, lawyer-less litigants, and
alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution aim to respond to the complex and
ambitious project of applying twentieth-century egalitarian norms to eighteenthcentury statements of rights to remedies, drafted in an era when members of the
propertied classes were the prototype litigants and governments’ criminal justice
systems were nascent. One could thus characterize the last decades of new
programs and investments as a “progressive realisation” of these ambitious
social services—here borrowing again the terms used by the South African
Constitution.292
Fifth, one set of responses, the promotion of alterative dispute fora, produces
a new set of problems for courts, faced now with the divesture of work that was
once uniquely within their purview. Court-mandated use of private providers,
for example, enables such providers to attract cases otherwise eligible for
adjudication. If high-end users opt out on the civil side, the public court system
becomes the repository of the problems of the poor and its widespread legislative
support, predicated in part on the universal nature of judicial services, may
become more vulnerable. Court leaders now speak of the importance of making
the “business case” for why legislatures should fund courts.293 Evidence of the
need for concern comes from the federal system. In lieu of the twentieth-century
291. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 235, at 13–14; WASH. ECON. GRP., INC., THE
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF DELAYS IN CIVIL TRIALS IN FLORIDA’S COURTS DUE TO UNDERFUNDING OF COURT SYSTEM 7–10 (2009).
292. S. AFR. CONST., 1996 ch. 1 § 26(2).
293. See, e.g., JUSTICE FOR ALL, SAVING JUSTICE: WHERE NEXT FOR LEGAL AID? VIEWS
FROM THE RESPONSES TO THE MINISTRY OF JUSTICE GREEN PAPER CONSULTATION REFORM OF
LEGAL AID IN ENGLAND AND WALES 5 (2011), available at http://www.justice-forall.org.uk/dyn/1323258153870/Saving-justice.pdf (referencing the “business case” research by
Citizens Advice to estimate the cost-benefit ratio for key civil categories of legal aid advice); see
also Hon. Margaret H. Marshall, Remarks at the Kentucky Law Journal Symposium on State
Courts: Putting it All Together: Or What Can We Do Now (Sept. 24, 2011) (referring to Chief
Justice Minton as “the CEO of one of Massachusetts’ most successful, global companies”) (on file
with author); Hon. Tani Cantil-Sakauye, First Annual Address to the State Bar of California (Sept.
17, 2011) (“[A]nd we have done our part . . . with shrinking resources, trying to provide the same
level of service. . . . We have tried technological business models.”) (on file with author); Hon.
Sue Bell Cobb, State of the Judiciary Address, Alabama (Jan. 26, 2010) (“Courts must undertake
fundamental change such as . . . redesigning business processes . . . .”) (on file with author).
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spiral of more civil filings and more demands for the public services of judges,
a flattening demand curve appeared during the first decade of the twenty-first.294
Sixth, bringing courts into the framework of positive and negative state
duties undermines that delineation as it also suggests the need for other analytic
categories. The provision of courts makes plain that positive rights are not
“foreign” to the U.S. experience as is sometimes posited.295 In lieu of attention
focused either on individual positive entitlements or prohibitions on state
actions, theories of rights need to take account of the history of courts, which
demonstrates that some rights both impose obligations on states as they
recognize and enable individuals and entities to pursue their own interests and
to participate in public norm development. These communal rights expose and
mediate conflicts through the generation of state-based and state-funded
institutions.
Once the depth of the traditions of and normative utilities for stateprovisioning are acknowledged, the political and judicial questions that emerge
are about what forms of services ought to be provided and what forms of
subsidies are needed. One way to read the many decisions, through litigation
and legislation, on court access and substantive rights is as a massive and
sprawling multi-century debate, across and within jurisdictions, about how to
allocate, to ration, and to reconfigure services. At times, courts have found
aspects of these issues justiciable and become as adjudicators co-venturers in an
ongoing discursive exchange about their own availability. More often, chief
justices enter the discussion not by way of adjudication but through their
function as CEOs of their court systems to advocate in their own jurisdictions
for support. But as the preemption rule that emerged from the AT&T litigation
on mandatory arbitration illustrates, the U.S. Supreme Court has limited the
room provided to states and thereby cut off experimentation in sorting out how
courts are to attract resources, what sort of cases should be given what kinds of
process, and how to manage judicial services.296
Seventh, debates about the scope of government obligations to subsidize
court use, about protecting access rights, and about what constitutes “fair”
hearings are part of a larger and intense conflict in the United States (and
elsewhere) about regulation and privatization. When federal and state
constitutions are read to oblige redistributive efforts to facilitate use of courts,
public regulatory opportunities are enhanced. While T.H. Marshall foresaw in

294. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LONG RANGE PLAN
I-18 (2008), available at http://199.107.22.105/library/Implementa
tion_the_Long_Range_Plan.pdf; see also Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary, supra note 18, at
827–31.
295. To borrow from Moliere, we have been “speaking prose” all along. MOLIÈRE, LE
BOURGEOIS GENTILHOMME 41 (Curtis Hidden Page trans., G. P. Putnam’s Sons 1908) (1670).
296. See generally Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 11.
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS, at
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1949 the challenges entailed when social, political, and civil rights come
together to expand the relationship and obligations between citizenships and
their polities, he thought that “economic inequalities” would be difficult to
sustain in the face of the “enrichment of the status of citizenship,”297 and that
government support was the natural response. Instead, economic inequalities in
the United States have grown, dramatically. Courts are one arena in which the
state has persistently sought to mitigate those inequalities, and often done so
under the banner of due process, embroidered with equality concerns. Courts
serve to turn “everyone” into rights-holders by redistributing power and
affording each person status.
But as the refusal to accord detainees at Guantánamo Bay equal litigation
rights illustrates, the political commitment to that form of status can fray.
Barring some from full participatory rights in courts marks them as outsiders.298
Likewise, the practice of funding courts from general revenues is coming under
siege, as courts raise fees and impose new charges. A person seeking
modification of a child support order in Alabama has to pay a fee of $248,
without adjustments that would make this “tax on distress” (to borrow from
Bentham) progressive.299 Funds to support some of California’s efforts to create
“Civil Gideon” legal services come from increased fees for various court
services, such as enforcing judgments and certifying a copy of a document.300
In the federal system, the reauthorization of judgeships in bankruptcy came at
the price of increased fees for those using that system.301 England and Wales
have gone further and embraced “full-cost pricing,” such that, for a certain kind
of case, “a fee payable for a hearing” could be more than 1,000 pounds.302

297. T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 45.
298. Outside status is an interaction between identity and class. See Nancy Fraser, From
Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age, 212 NEW LEFT REV.
68, 70–74 (1995). Fraser argued that people “subject to both cultural injustice and economic
injustice need both recognition and redistribution.” Id. at 74. Courts in turn are mechanisms for
redistribution of both status and economic capacity.
299. See ALA. CODE § 12-19-71(a)(7) (2012).
300. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 68651 (West 2009); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 70626(e) (West 2009).
301. Temporary Bankruptcy Judgeships Extension Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-121, § 3(a),
126 Stat. 346, 348 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(3)) (increasing the fee for filing under
Chapter 11 from $1000 to $1167). As noted, waivers, under limited circumstances, are available.
See 28 U.S.C § 1930(f)(1); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 1821 TEMPORARY
BANKRUPTCY JUDGESHIPS EXTENSION ACT OF 2011 (2012),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/s1821.pdf.
302. See The Civil Proceedings Fees (Amendment) Order, 2011, S.I. 586 (L.2) (U.K.),
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2011/586/pdfs/uksi_20110586_en.pdf. The
current system interacts with what is called fee “remissions,” that provide for waivers for those
who genuinely cannot afford to pay fees. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, EXPLANATORY
MEMORANDUM TO THE CIVIL PROCEEDINGS FEES (AMENDMENT) ORDER 2011, at 11 (2011)
[hereinafter 2011 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM], available at http://www.legisla
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Figure 8: COURTROOM INTERIOR, JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY FEDERAL,
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, 1998
Copyright: Steve Rosenthal, 1998. Image provided by and reproduced with
permission of the photographer and courtesy of the court.

My eighth and final point flows from the others; courts have a distinctive
claim for public support as well as for public regulation because governments

tion.gov.uk/uksi/2011/587/pdfs/uksiem_20110587_en.pdf; HER MAJESTY’S COURTS SERV.
(HMCS), COURT FEES: DO YOU HAVE TO PAY THEM? (2011), available at http://www.men
said.com/documents/fl/ex160a.pdf. The government reported that, in 2009 and 2010, court fees
raised about £479 million and covered eighty-two percent of the full cost of running the civil and
family courts and probate service (which cost £619 million a year in total). The effort to recoup
“full-costs” aims to support a variety of court expenses, including facilities and judicial salaries,
through fees. See 2011 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE MEMORANDUM, supra, at 6; see also, HM
TREASURY, MANAGING PUBLIC MONEY, ch. 6 (2007), available at http://www.hm-treasury.
gov.uk/d/mpm_whole.pdf (explaining that “[t]he norm is to charge [publically provided services]
at full cost”); RUPERT M. JACKSON, REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION COSTS (2009), available at
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/8EB9F3F3-9C4A-4139-8A93-56F09672EB6A/0/
Jacksonfinalreport140110.pdf (broadly surveying the costs of civil litigation in England and
Wales). Criticism can be found in FRANCIS PLOWDEN, REVIEW OF COURT FEES IN CHILD CARE
PROCEEDINGS (2009), available at http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/1044/1/court-fees-child-care-proceed
ings.pdf (describing the increases in fees paid by local government authorities in child care
proceedings in England and Wales), and in Genn, What is Civil Justice For?, supra note 40.
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need the infrastructure that courts provide, and democracies need the
opportunities for the multi-party interactions that adjudication entails. Courts
offer links between individuals and government, and hence have a special claim
on resources. Diminution of opportunities to use open courts impoverishes the
status of individuals and diminishes the effectiveness of government. I opened
this Lecture with reflection on what didactic images of Justice and courthouses
can teach. By way of closing, it is appropriate to return to a few, final pictures.
Courtrooms are the signature feature of courts, and a carefully designed example
is shown in Figure 8. This picture comes from the 1998 federal courthouse in
Boston. As a judge central to that building project explained, “[t]he most
prominent geometric feature . . . is the repetition of encompassing circles” that
underscores that courtroom activities are a “shared community undertaking;”303
each side of the courtroom is marked by arches of equal size behind the judge,
the jury, and the public to make plain that all are “equally ennobled.”304
Such courtrooms are artifacts of the entitlement that “all courts shall be
open,” producing a government-sponsored occasion to impose, albeit fleetingly,
the dignity reflected in the status held by a juridical person, competent to sue or
be sued, able to prompt an answer from and entitled to be treated on a par with
one’s adversary—whether that be an individual, a corporation, or the
government itself. The odd etiquette of the courtroom disciplines both
disputants and the state, as all are required to respond respectfully to claims. The
public enactment documents how government officials treat individuals and
enables debate about compliance with those goals as well as about the content
of the governing legal norms.
No such options can be derived from the next image, my own cell phone
contract (figure 9), provided several years ago.305 The materials require waiver
of rights to court and to class actions, whether in court or in arbitration. Claims
may only be brought against the service provider individually and exclusively
through a private arbitration process—in this instance, run by the American
Arbitration Association—designated by that provider.306 As noted, in AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, a bare majority of the United State Supreme Court
held that federal arbitration law makes such provisions enforceable, despite state
court conclusions that such one-sided provisions are unconscionable.307
303. Douglas P. Woodlock, Communities and the Courthouses They Deserve. And Vice Versa.,
24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 271, 279–80 (2012).
304. Id. at 280.
305. Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1134–35 fig.12
(2006).
306. Id. This contract is typical of those provided. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra
note 11, at 119.
307. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Several other states had,
like California, found that kind of provision unenforceable. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers,
supra note 11, at 129 & n.309.
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The poor visual quality of this document contrasts with the intensely
communitarian and self-conscious design of the Boston courtroom. The fine
print of the cell phone document makes the point perfectly, for we, readers, are
not really invited to read it, or to think about it, or to try to negotiate it. Indeed,
its unreadability is economical, for the provision is a “take it or leave it” clause,
avoided only by not buying that phone service. Calling this document a
“contract” is thus a misnomer, for it is neither bargained for nor subject to
bargaining.308

308. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132, 143 (1970); Resnik,
Fairness in Numbers, supra note 11, at 118, 128.
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Rather, these provisions are the manifestation of the power of a sector of
providers, able (now that the Supreme Court has found enforceable such limits
on rights to remedies309) to insist that purchasers of cell phones individually use
the private “court” systems chosen by the sellers or, alternatively, hope for action
from their state attorney generals or the Federal Trade Commission. The other
option is to “lump it” and seek no redress.
The cell phone document encodes what is fundamentally wrong with the
form of an alternative it imposes. The provider obliges consumers to use
confidential dispute resolution services that obliterate the chance for an audience

309. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
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to learn about what transpired. Further, by precluding class actions, the system
has cut out ex ante mechanisms for redistributing resources.310 Gone are Jeremy
Bentham’s “auditors”311 and the potential for his imagined Tribunal of Public
Opinion to function, for no one can evaluate the exchanges between the
decision-makers and the disputants. Lost are opportunities to assess whether
procedures and decision-makers are fair, how resources affect outcomes,
whether similarly-situated litigants are treated comparably, and why one would
want to get into (or avoid) court. Instead, a private transaction has been
substituted and, unlike public adjudication, control over the meaning of the
claims made and the judgments rendered rests with the corporate provider of the
service.
The artistry of the photographer William Clift in Reflection, Old St. Louis
County Courthouse (Figure 10) provides the coda.312 The domed courthouse,
seen in the glass of the modern building in which it is mirrored, is where the trial
of Dred and Harriet Scott took place; their names stand now for the horrors of
slavery and the failures of law.313 Although a Missouri jury had, in the 1850s,
ordered the Scotts free, the state Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court
concluded that they were legally slaves.314 T.H. Marshall had insisted on access
to courts as central to civil rights.315 Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the
Supreme Court held that the Constitution put slaves (“beings of an inferior

310. The cell phone provider promised—in a unilateral provision that could be withdrawn—to
pay a $7500 minimum recovery and twice the amount of the claimant’s attorney’s fees to
consumers who win more than was offered at settlement. Id. at 1744. Further, the dispute
resolution service, the American Arbitration Association, caps fees at $125 for arbitrations of
$10,000 or less.
AM. ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY
PROCEDURES 8 (2011), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/govern
mentandconsumer/documents/document/mdaw/mda4/~edisp/adrstg_015806.pdf. But given that
many claims are less than that amount—the Concepcions alleged a thirty-dollar overcharge—few
will pursue the remedy absent aggregation of claims. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
311. 6 BENTHAM, supra note 10, at 356.
312. William Clift, Reflection, Old St. Louis County Courthouse, taken in 1976 in conjunction
with the Seagram Court House Project, is provided and reproduced with his permission. See COURT
HOUSE: A PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENT 31, 251 (Richard Pare ed., 1978).
313. See DONALD F. DOSCH, THE OLD COURTHOUSE: AMERICANS BUILD A FORUM ON THE
FRONTIER 103–06 (Dan Murphy ed., 1979). The building, opening in 1828, was used as both a
state and federal courthouse. St. Louis Old Courthouse, St. Louis, WORLDSITEGUIDES.COM,
http://www.worldsiteguides.com/north-america/us/st-louis/st-louis-old-courthouse/ (last visited
May 26, 2012). It was enlarged thereafter with wings that shifted the former federal style building
to that of a Greek Revival structure by the 1840s, and was remodeled again in the 1850s. Old
Courthouse Architecture, NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/jeff/planyourvisit/oldcourthouse-architecture.htm (last visited May 26, 2012); Setting the Stage, NAT’L PARK SERVICE,
http://www.nps.gov/nr/twhp/wwwlps/lessons/9stlouis/9setting.htm (last visited May 26, 2012).
314. DOSCH, supra note 313, at 106–07.
315. See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, supra note 77, at 8.
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order”) outside citizenship, lacking juridical voice even to challenge the state
holding.316

Figure 10: WILLIAM CLIFT, REFLECTION, OLD ST. LOUIS COUNTY
COURTHOUSE, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, 1976
Photographer: William Clift, provided and reproduced with the permission of the
photographer.

The Old St. Louis Courthouse was also the site of Virginia Minor’s litigation
seeking, in 1872, to vote as a citizen of the United States.317 In 1874, in Minor
v. Happersett, she argued that the Privileges and Immunities clause of the (then
recent) Fourteenth Amendment endowed her, as a woman, with new rights.318
The Supreme Court of the United States denied her equality. Minor was (unlike
the Scotts) recognized as a citizen of the United States but not entitled to vote,
an opportunity that, the Court held, depended on state law.319
316. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857). The Court also struck
provisions of the Missouri Compromise that declared it a free territory, id. at 452, and held that the
Fifth Amendment protected the rights of slaveholders in the “property” that was their slaves, id. at
450–51. See also DOSCH, supra note 313, at 107; LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED SCOTT: A LIFE
ON SLAVERY’S FRONTIER 317–18 (2009).
317. DOSCH, supra note 313, at 99.
318. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 165 (1874).
319. Id. at 165, 178; DOSCH, supra note 313, at 99–100.
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The Old Courthouse stands as a testament to injustices promulgated in the
name of constitutions, both state and federal. Its display underscores that I make
no claim that courts are intrinsically committed to the justice of equality. Polities
make their courts just, or not. But courts operating under democratic precepts
offer the potential to redistribute resources and power from government to
individual, from one side of a case to another, and from disputants and decisionmakers to the audience. Through participatory parity, public processes can teach
about practices of norm development and offer the opportunity for popular input
to produce changes in legal rights.
When issues are engaged in open court processes, we—those outside the
immediate dispute—have a role in understanding, legitimating, delegitimating,
and interpreting what law means, what justice entails, what the predicates of its
practices are, and whether the resulting violence is acceptable or intolerable.
Such “democratic iterations”320 provide dense sets of interactions that can, over
time, function as mechanisms to limit the scope of rulers’ powers and to change
normative precepts. Exemplary of those changes are the repudiations of Dred
Scott and of Minor v. Happersett—undone by the Civil War, constitutional
amendments thereafter, and political and social movements (of which the
litigations were a part) that embrace a profoundly different conception of
personhood and of justice. And of course, democratic engagement does not
inevitably yield results that could be termed progressive. Like other sites of
democratic ordering, popular will can be propelled in a variety of directions.
The authority of the audience and the potential for dispute resolution to be
redistributive are at stake as courts and legislatures debate the permissible
boundaries of the privatization of courts. Recall that Foucault mapped how,
when the “great spectacle of punishment ran the risk of being rejected by the
very people to whom it was addressed,” the state developed prisons to assert
coercion removed from public view.321 Adjudication is now following a parallel
path, putting at risk the modern phenomenon of “rights” of access to court for
“everyone,” newly empowered to seek accountings from previously impervious
actors. Public and private disciplinary powers—from the U.S. government at
Guantánamo Bay to cell phone providers mandating confidential arbitrations—
increasingly rely on practices that do not admit of a need to show their processes
in order to justify the exercise of authority.
William Clift’s late twentieth-century photograph of the Old St. Louis
Courthouse records that trajectory. “In the 1930s, the courthouse was
abandoned in favor of a new Civil Courts Building and then rescued for
renovation as a national monument—formally confirmed in 1940 under

320. See Seyla Benhabib, Democratic Iterations: The Local, the National, and the Global, in
ANOTHER COSMOPOLITANISM 45, 45 (Robert Post ed., 2006).
321. FOUCAULT, supra note 7, at 63, 74.
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President Franklin Roosevelt.”322 The building now functions as a museum,
which is what may be the twenty-first century fate of other monumental
courthouses. Moreover, what Clift shows is the Old Courthouse reflected in
another structure—known in the 1970s as the Equitable Life Building.323 The
third building, larger than and behind the reflected image of the courthouse, is
in turn the current regional headquarters of the American Arbitration
Association, one of the private providers of dispute resolution services.
Sandwiched between two office buildings, the Old Courthouse is subsumed by
the corporate structures that surround it.

322. See DOSCH, supra note 313, at 111.
323. Id. at 92–93. That building, designed by Hellmuth, Obata & Kassabaum and built in 1971,
was renovated in the 1990s and purchased by the Herzt Investment Group in 2007 from the AXA
Equitable Life Insurance Company. Id. at 93 n.339; see also Lisa R. Brown, Equitable Building
Under Contract, Millennium Center Sold, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., Jan. 5–11, 2007, at 45A.
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APPENDIX 1

STATE CONSTITUTIONS:
TEXTUAL COMMITMENTS TO RIGHTS TO REMEDIES

State

Declaration
/
Constitutio
n when first
enacted

Arkansas

Current
const.

Const. of
1819, art. I,
§ 14 (1st
Const.)

All courts shall
be open, and
every person,
for an injury
done him in his
lands, goods,
person, or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law,
and right and
justice
administered,
without sale,
denial, or
delay.

Const.
of 1901,
art. I, §
13
(current
through
2010)

Const. of
1912, art. II,
§ 11 (1st
Const.)

Justice in all
cases shall be
administered
openly, and
without
unnecessary
delay.
Every person is
entitled to a
certain remedy
in the laws for
all injuries or

Const.
of 1912,
art. II, §
11
(current
through
2011)
Const.
of 1874,
art. II, §
13
(current

Alabama

Arizona

Text

Const. of
1868, art. I,
§ 10 (3rd
Const.)

Current text

Date
Curren
t Text
Enacte
d

Same (That
all courts
shall be open;
and that every
person for
any injury
done him in
his lands,
goods, person
or reputation,
shall have a
remedy by
due process
of law; and
right and
justice shall
be
administered
without sale,
denial or
delay.)
Same

1819

Same (Every
person is
entitled to a
certain
remedy in the

1868

1912
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Const. of
1876, art. II,
§ 6 (1st
Const.)

Colorado

Connecticut

Const. of
1818, art. I,
§ 12 (1st
Const.)

wrongs which
he may receive
in his person,
property or
character; he
ought to obtain
justice freely
and without
purchase;
completely and
without denial;
promptly and
without delay;
conformably to
the laws.

through
2011)

That courts of
justice shall be
open to every
person, and a
speedy remedy
afforded for
every injury to
person,
property, or
character; and
that right and
justice should
be
administered
without sale,
denial, or
delay.
All courts shall
be open, and
every person,
for an injury
done to him in
his person,

Const.
of 1876,
art. II, §
6
(current
through
2010)

Const.
of 1965,
art. I, §
10
(current

laws for all
injuries or
wrongs he
may receive
in his person,
property or
character; he
ought to
obtain justice
freely, and
without
purchase;
completely
and without
denial;
promptly and
without
delay;
conformably
to the laws.)
Same

Same (All
courts shall
be open, and
every person,
for an injury
done to him
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1876

1818
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property, or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law,
and right and
justice
administered
without sale,
denial, or
delay.

through
2011)

Const. of
1792, art. I,
§ 9 (2nd
Const.)

All court[s]
shall be open;
and every man,
for an injury
done him in his
reputation,
person,
movable or
immovable
possessions,
shall have
remedy by the
due course of
law, and justice
administered
according to
the very right
of the cause
and the law of
the land,
without sale,
denial, or
unreasonable
delay or
expense; . . . .

Const.
of 1897,
art. I, §
9 (as
amende
d in
1977
and
1999,
current
through
2010)

Const. of
1839, art. I,

That all courts
shall be open,
and every

Const.
of 1968,
art. I, §

Delaware

Florida
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in his person,
property or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law, and right
and justice
administered
without sale,
denial or
delay.)
All courts
shall be open;
and every
person for an
injury done
him or her in
his or her
reputation,
person,
movable or
immovable
possessions,
shall have
remedy by
the due
course of law,
and justice
administered
according to
the very right
of the cause
and the law
of the land,
without sale,
denial, or
unreasonable
delay or
expense.
The courts
shall be open
to every

1999

1968
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§ 9 (1st
Const.)

Const. of
1877, art. I,
§ 1, ¶ 4 (7th
Const.)

Georgia

Const. of
1890, art. I,
§ 18 (1st
Const.)

Idaho

person, for an
injury done
him, in his
lands, goods,
person, or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law,
and right and
justice
administered,
without sale,
denial, or
delay.
No person shall
be deprived of
the right to
prosecute or
defend his own
cause in any of
the Courts of
this State, in
person, by
attorney, or
both.

21
(current
through
2010)

person for
redress of any
injury, and
justice shall
be
administered
without sale,
denial or
delay.

Const.
of 1983,
art. I, §
1, ¶ 12
(current
through
2011)

Courts of
justice shall be
open to every
person, and a
speedy remedy
afforded for
every injury of
person,
property or
character, and
right and
justice shall be
administered
without sale,

Const.
of 1890,
art. I, §
18
(current
through
2011)

No person
shall be
deprived of
the right to
prosecute or
defend, either
in person or
by an
attorney, that
person’s own
cause in any
of the courts
of this state.
Same
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1890
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Const. of
1818, art.
VIII, § 12
(1st Const.)

Illinois

Const. of
1816, art. I,
§ 11 (1st
Const.)

Indiana
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denial, delay,
or prejudice.
Every person
within this
State ought to
find a certain

remedy in the
laws for all
injuries or
wrongs which
he may receive
in his person,
property, or
character; he
ought to obtain
right and
justice freely,
and without
being obliged
to purchase it,
completely and
without denial,
promptly and
without delay,
conformably to
the laws.
[A]ll Courts
shall be open,
and every
person, for an
injury done
him, in his
lands, goods,
person, or
reputation shall
have remedy
by the due
course of law;
and right and
justice
administered

Const.
of 1970,
art. I, §
12

Every person
shall find a
certain
remedy in the

(current
through
2012)

laws for all
injuries and
wrongs which
he receives to
his person,
privacy,
property or
reputation.
He shall
obtain justice
by law,
freely,
completely,
and promptly.

Const.
of 1851,
art. 1, §
12 (as
amende
d in
1984,
current
through
2011)

All courts
shall be open;
and every
person, for
injury done to
him in his
person,
property, or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law. Justice
shall be
administered

1970

1984
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without denial
or delay.

Const. of
1859, Bill of
Rights, § 18
(1st Const.)

Kansas

Const. of
1792, art.
XII, § 13
(1st Const.)

Kentucky

Louisiana

Const. of
1864, tit.
VII, art. 110
(5th Const.)

All persons, for
injuries
suffered in
person,
reputation or
property, shall
have remedy
by due course
of law, and
justice
administered
without delay.
[A]ll courts
shall be open,
and every
person for an
injury done
him in his
lands, goods,
person, or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by the
due course of
law, and right
and justice
administered,
without sale,
denial, or
delay.
All courts shall
be open; and
every person,
for any injury

Const.
of 1859,
Bill of
Rights,
§ 18
(current
through
2011)

Const.
of 1891,
Bill of
Rights,
§ 14
(current
through
2011)

Const.
of 1974,
art. I, §
22

freely, and
without
purchase;
completely,
and without
denial;
speedily, and
without
delay.
Same

Same (All
courts shall
be open and
every person
for an injury
done him in
his lands,
goods, person
or reputation,
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law, and right
and justice
administered
without sale,
denial or
delay.)
All courts
shall be open,
and every
person shall
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1974
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done him, in
his lands,
goods, person,
or reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law,
and right and
justice
administered
without denial
or
unreasonable
delay.

(current
through
2012)

Const. of
1819, art. I,
§ 19 (1st
Const.)

Every person,
for an injury
done him in his
person,
reputation,
property, or
immunities,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law;
and right and
justice shall be
administered
freely and
without sale,
completely and
without denial,
promptly and
without delay.

Const.
of 1819,
art. I, §
19 (as
amende
d in
1988,
current
through
2011)

Const. of
1776, Decl.
of Rights,

That every
freeman, for
any injury done

Const.
of 1867,
Decl. of

Maine

Maryland
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have an
adequate
remedy by
due process
of law and
justice,
administered
without
denial,
partiality, or
unreasonable
delay, for
injury to him
in his person,
property,
reputation, or
other rights.
Every person,
for a[n] injury
inflicted on
the person or
the person’s
reputation,
property or
immunities,
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law; and right
and justice
shall be
administered
freely and
without sale,
completely
and without
denial,
promptly and
without
delay.
That every
man, for any
injury done to

1988

1864
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art. 17 (1st
Const.)

Const. of
1780, pt. I,
art. XI (1st
Const.)

Massachusett
s

him in his
person or
property, ought
to have
remedy, by the
course of the
law of the land,
and ought to
have justice
and [r]ight
freely without
sale, fully
without any
denial, and
speedily
without delay,
according to
the law [of] the
land.
Every subject
of the
commonwealth
ought to find a
certain remedy,
by having
recourse to the
laws, for all
injuries or
wrongs which
he may receive
in his person,
property, or
character. He
ought to obtain
right and
justice freely,
and without
being obliged
to purchase it;
completely,
and without
any denial;
promptly, and

Rights,
art. 19
(current
through
2011)
(same as
Const.
of 1864)

Const.
of 1780,
pt. I, art.
XI
(current
through
2011)

him in person
or property
ought to have
remedy by
the course of
the Law of
the Land, and
ought to have
justice and
right, freely
without sale,
fully without
any denial,
and speedily
without
delay,
according to
[the] Law of
the Land.
Same
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Const. of
1850, art.
VI, § 24
(2nd Const.)

Michigan

Const. of
1857, art. I,
§ 8 (1st
Const.)

Minnesota

Mississippi
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Const. of
1817, art. I,
§ 14 (1st
Const.)

without delay;
conformably to
the laws.
Any suitor in
any court of
this State shall
have the right
to prosecute or
defend his suit,
either in his
own proper
person, or by
an attorney or
agent of his
choice.
Every person is
entitled to a
certain remedy
in the laws for
all injuries or
wrongs which
he may receive
in his person,
property or
character; he
ought to obtain
justice freely
and without
purchase;
completely and
without denial,
promptly and
without delay,
conformable to
the laws.

[A]ll courts
shall be open,
and every
person, for an

Const.
of 1963,
art. I, §
13
(current
through
2010)

A suitor in
any court of
this state has
the right to
prosecute or
defend his
suit, either in
his own
proper person
or by an
attorney.

1963

Const.
of 1974,
art. I, §
8
(current
through
2011)

Every person
is entitled to a
certain
remedy in the
laws for all
injuries or
wrongs which
he may
receive to his
person,
property or
character, and
to obtain
justice freely
and without
purchase,
completely
and without
denial,
promptly and
without
delay,
conformable
to the laws.
Same (All
courts shall
be open; and
every person

1974

Const.
of 1890,
art. III,
§ 24

1817
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Const. of
1820, art.
XIII, § 7 (1st
Const.)

Missouri

Montana

Const. of
1889, art.

injury done
him, in his
lands, goods,
person, or
reputation,
shall have
remedy, by due
course of law,
and right and
justice
administered,
without sale,
denial, or
delay.

(current
through
2011)

That courts of
justice ought to
be open to
every person,
and certain
remedy
afforded for
every injury to
person,
property, or
character; and
that right and
justice ought to
be
administered
without sale,
denial, or
delay; and that
no private
property ought
to be taken or
applied to
public use
without just
compensation.
Courts of
justice shall be
open to every

Const.
of 1945,
art. I, §
14
(current
through
2011)
(same as
Const.
of 1875,
art. II, §
10)

Const.
of 1973,
art. II, §

for an injury
done him in
his lands,
goods, person
or reputation,
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law, and right
and justice
shall be
administered
without sale,
denial or
delay.)
That the
courts of
justice shall
be open to
every person,
and certain
remedy
afforded for
every injury
to person,
property or
character, and
that right and
justice shall
be
administered
without sale,
denial or
delay.

Courts of
justice shall
be open to

[Vol. 56:917
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1973
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III, § 6 (1st
Const.)

person, and a
speedy remedy
afforded for
every injury of
person,
property or
character; and
that right and
justice shall be
administered
without sale,
denial or delay.

16
(current
through
2010)

every person,
and speedy
remedy
afforded for
every injury
of person,
property, or
character. No
person shall
be deprived
of this full
legal redress
for injury
incurred in
employment
for which
another
person may
be liable
except as to
fellow
employees
and his
immediate
employer
who hired
him if such
immediate
employer
provides
coverage
under the
Workmen’s
Compensatio
n Laws of
this state.
Right and
justice shall
be
administered
without sale,
denial, or
delay.

1009

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1010

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

Const. of
1866, art. I,
§ 9 (1st
Const.)

Nebraska

All courts shall
be open, and
every person,
for an injury
done him in his
land, goods,
person or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law,
and justice
administered
without denial
or delay.

Const.
of 1875,
art. I, §
13 (as
amende
d 1996,
current
through
2011)

All courts
shall be open,
and every
person, for
any injury
done him or
her in his or
her lands,
goods,
person, or
reputation,
shall have a
remedy by
due course of
law and
justice
administered
without
denial or
delay, except
that the
Legislature
may provide
for the
enforcement
of mediation,
binding
arbitration
agreements,
and other
forms of
dispute
resolution
which are
entered into
voluntarily
and which are
not revocable
other than
upon such
grounds as
exist at law or
in equity for

[Vol. 56:917
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Const. of
1784, pt. I,
art. 14 (2nd
Const.)

New
Hampshire

Const. of
1868, art. I,
§ 35 (2nd
Const.)

North
Carolina
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Every subject
of this state is
entitled to a
certain remedy,
by having
recourse to the
laws, for all
injuries [h]e
may receive in
his person,
property or
character, to
obtain right
and justice
freely, without
being obliged
to purchase it;
completely,
and without
any denial;
promptly, and
without delay,
conformably to
the laws.
All courts shall
be open, and
every person,
for an injury
done him in his
lands, goods,
person, or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law,
and right and
justice
administered
without sale,

Const.
of 1784,
pt. I, art.
14
(current
through
2011)

Const.
of 1971,
art. I, §
18
(current
through
2011)

the
revocation of
any contract.
Same

All courts
shall be open;
every person
for an injury
done him in
his lands,
goods,
person, or
reputation
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law; and right
and justice
shall be
administered

1784

1971
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denial, or
delay.
Const. of
1889, art. I,
§ 22 (1st
Const.)

North Dakota

Const. of
1802, art.
VIII, § 7 (1st
Const.)

Ohio

All courts shall
be open, and
every man for
any injury done
him in his
lands, goods,
person or
reputation shall
have remedy
by due process
of law, and
right and
justice
administered
without sale,
denial or delay.
Suits may be
brought against
the state in
such manner,
in such courts,
and in such
cases, as the
legislative
assembly may,
by law, direct.
[A]ll courts
shall be open,
and every
person, for an
injury done
him in his
lands, goods,
person, or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by the
due course of
law, and right
and justice

Const.
of 1981,
art. I, §
9
(current
through
2011)

Const.
of 1851,
art. I, §
16 (as
amende
d in
1913,
current
through
2011)

without favor,
denial, or
delay.
Same

All courts
shall be open,
and every
person, for an
injury done
him in his
land, goods,
person, or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law, and shall
have justice

[Vol. 56:917
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administered
without denial
or delay.

Const. of
1907, art. II,
§ 6 (1st
Const.)

Oklahoma

Const. of
1857, art. I,
§ 10 (1st
Const.)
Oregon
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The courts of
justice of the
State shall be
open to every
person, and
speedy and
certain remedy
afforded for
every wrong
and for every
injury to
person,
property or
reputation; and
right and
justice shall be
administered
without sale,
denial, delay or
prejudice.
No court shall
be secret, but
justice shall be
administered,
openly and
without
purchase,
completely and
without delay,
and every man

Const.
of 1907,
art. II, §
6
(current
through
2011)

Oregon
Const.
of 1857,
art. I, §
10
(current
through
2010)

administered
without
denial or
delay. Suits
may be
brought
against the
state, in such
courts and in
such manner,
as may be
provided by
law.
Same

1907

Same

1857
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Const. of
1776, art. II,
§ 26 (1st
Const.)

Pennsylvania

Const. of
1843, art. I,
§ 5 (1st
Const.)

Rhode Island

shall have
remedy by due
course of law
for injury done
him in his
person,
property, or
reputation.
All courts shall
be open, and
justice shall be
impartially
administered
without
corruption or
unnecessary
delay . . . .

Every person
within this
state ought to
find a certain
remedy, by
having
recourse to the
laws, for all
injuries or
wrongs which
he may receive
in his person,
property, or
character. He
ought to obtain
right and
justice freely

Const.
of 1969,
art. I, §
11
(current
through
2012)
(same as
Const.
of 1790,
art. IX,
§ 11)

Const.
of 1986,
art. I, §
5
(current
through
2011)

All courts
shall be open;
and every
man for an
injury done
him in his
lands, goods,
person or
reputation
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law, and right
and justice
administered
without sale,
denial or
delay.
Every person
within this
state ought to
find a certain
remedy, by
having
recourse to
the laws, for
all injuries or
wrongs which
may be
received in
one’s person,
property, or
character.
Every person
ought to

[Vol. 56:917
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and without
purchase,
completely and
without denial;
promptly and
without delay;
conformably to
the laws.

Const. of
1868, art. I,
§ 15 (6th
Const.)

South
Carolina

Const. of
1889, art.
VI, § 20 (1st
Const.)

South Dakota
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All courts shall
be public, and
every person,
for any injury
that he may
receive in his
lands, goods,
person or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law
and justice
administered
without
unnecessary
delay.
All courts shall
be open, and
every man for
an injury done
him in his
property,
person or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law,
and right and
justice

Const.
of 1895,
art. I, §
9 (as
amende
d in
1971,
current
through
2011)

Const.
of 1889,
art. VI,
§ 20
(current
through
2011)

obtain right
and justice
freely, and
without
purchase,
completely
and without
denial;
promptly and
without
delay;
conformably
to the laws.
All cou[r]ts
shall be
public, and
every person
shall have
speedy
remedy
therein for
wrongs
sustained.

Same

1971

1889
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Const. of
1796, art.
XI, § 17 (1st
Const.)

Tennessee

Const. of
1845, art. I,
§ 11 (1st
Const.)
Texas

administered
without denial
or delay.
That all Courts
shall be open
and every man,
for an injury
done him in his
Lands, Goods,
person or
reputation shall
have remedy
by due course
of Law and
right and
Justice
administered
without Sale,
denial or delay.
Suits may be
brought against
the State in
such manner,
and in such
Courts as the
Legislature
may by law
direct,
provided the
right of
bringing Suit
be limited to
the Citizens of
this State.
All courts shall
be open; and
every person,
for an injury
done him in his
lands, goods,
person, or
reputation,
shall have

[Vol. 56:917

Const.
of 1870,
art. I, §
17
(current
through
2011)
(same as
Const.
of 1834,
art. I, §
17)

That all
courts shall
be open; and
every man,
for an injury
done him in
his lands,
goods, person
or reputation,
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law, and right
and justice
administered
without sale,
denial, or
delay. Suits
may be
brought
against the
State in such
manner and
in such courts
as the
Legislature
may by law
direct.

1834

Const.
of 1876,
art. I, §
13
(current
through
2011)

Same (All
courts shall
be open, and
every person
for an injury
done him in
his lands,
goods,
person, or

1845
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course of law.

Const. of
1895, art. I,
§ 11 (1st
Const.)

Utah

1017

CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENTS TO AND IN COURTS

All courts shall
be open, and
every person,
for an injury
done to him in
his person,
property or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law,
which shall be
administered
without denial
or unnecessary
delay; and no
person shall be
barred from
prosecuting or
defending
before any
tribunal in this
State, by
himself or
counsel, any
civil cause to
which he is a
party.

Const.
of 1895,
art. I, §
11
(current
through
2011)

reputation,
shall have
remedy by
due course of
law.)
Same

1895
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Const. of
1786, ch. I,
art. IV (2nd
Const.)

Vermont

Every person
within this
Commonwealt
h ought to find
a certain
remedy, by
having
recourse to the
laws, for all
injuries or
wrongs which
he may receive
in his person,
property or
character: he
ought to obtain
right and
justice freely,
and without
being obliged
to purchase
it— completely
and without
any denial,
promptly and
without delay;
conformably to
the laws.

Const.
of 1793,
ch. I,
art. IV
(as
amende
d in
1991,
current
through
2010)

Every person
within this
state ought to
find a certain
remedy, by
having
recourse to
the laws, for
all injuries or
wrongs which
one may
receive in
person,
property or
character;
every person
ought to
obtain right
and justice,
freely, and
without being
obliged to
purchase it;
completely
and without
any denial;
promptly and
without
delay;
co[n]formabl
y to the laws.

[Vol. 56:917
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Washington

Const. of
1889, art. I,
§ 10 (1st
Const.)

Const. of
1872, art.
III, § 17
(2nd Const.)

West Virginia

Const. of
1848, art. I,
§ 9 (1st
Const.)

Wisconsin

1019

CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENTS TO AND IN COURTS

Justice in all
cases shall be
administered
openly, and
without
unnecessary
delay.
The courts of
this State shall
be open, and
every person,
for an injury
done to him, in
his person,
property or
reputation,
shall have
remedy by due
course of law;
and justice
shall be
administered
without sale,
denial or delay.
Every person is
entitled to a
certain remedy
in the laws, for
all injuries or
wrongs which
he may receive
in his person,
property, or
character; he
ought to obtain
right and
justice freely,
and without
being obliged
to purchase it,
completely,
and without
denial,

Const.
of 1889,
art. I, §
10
(current
through
2011)
Const.
of 1872,
art. III,
§ 17
(current
through
2011)

Same

1889

Same

1872

Const.
of 1848,
art. I, §
9
(current
through
2012)

Same

1848
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Const. of
1889, art. I,
§ 8 (1st
Const.)

Wyoming

promptly, and
without delay,
conformably to
the laws.
All courts shall
be open and
every person
for an injury
done to person,
reputation or
property shall
have justice
administered
without sale,
denial or delay.
Suits may be
brought against
the State in
such manner
and in such
courts as the
legislature may
by law direct.

Const.
of 1889,
art. I, §
8
(current
through
2011)

Same

[Vol. 56:917

1889

With the exception of Georgia, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Oregon,
Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin, information comes from John Joseph
Wallis, NBER/MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, www.stateconsti
tutions.umd.edu (last visited May 14, 2012). Mistakes in that database have
been indicated by bracketing the incorrect language. For states not included in
Wallis’s database, information comes from: Georgia Constitution Web Page,
GEORGIAINFO, http://georgiainfo.galileo.usg.edu/gacontoc.htm (last visited
May 14, 2012); MASS. CONST. of 1780, available at http://www.nhinet.org/
ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm; MASS. CONST., available at http://www.malegislature.
gov/laws/constitution.; MO. CONST. of 1820, available at http://clio.mis
souristate.edu/ftmiller/localhistory/docs/moconst1820.htm;
MO.
CONST.,
available at http://www.sos.mo.gov/pubs/missouri_constitution.pdf.; NEB.
CONST. of 1866, available at http://ia700406.us.archive.org/28/items/constitu
tionofst00innebr/constitutionofst00innebr.pdf; Nebraska State Constitution [of
1875] Article I-13, NEB. LEGISLATURE, http://nebraskalegislature.gov/laws/
articles.php?article=I-13 (last visited May 14, 2012); see also ROBERT D.
MIEWALD & PETER J. LONGO, THE NEBRASKA STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE 44 (1993); OR. CONST. of 1857, available at http://blue
book.state.or.us/state/constitution/orig/const.htm; OR. CONST., available at

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENTS TO AND IN COURTS

1021

http://bluebook.state.or.us/state/constitution/const2010.pdf.; TENN. CONST.,
available at http://www.capitol.tn.gov/about/docs/TN-Constitution.pdf; TENN.
CONST. of 1796, available at http://www.tn.gov/tsla/founding_docs/33633_
Transcript.pdf.; VT. CONST. of 1777, available at http://vermont-archives.org/
govhistory/constitut/con77.htm; VT. CONST. of 1786, available at http://ver
mont-archives.org/govhistory/constitut/con86.htm; VT. CONST. of 1793,
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APPENDIX 2

STATE CONSTITUTIONS WITHOUT EXPRESS REMEDIES CLAUSES
AND WITH DUE PROCESS OR OPEN/PUBLIC COURTS PROVISIONS

State

Declaration/
Constitution
when first
enacted
Const. of
1959, art. I, §
1 (Inherent
rights) (1st
Const.)

Alaska

Const. of
1959, art. I, §
7 (Due
process)
(1st Const.)

Text

This
constitution is
dedicated to
the principles
that all persons
have a natural
right to life,
liberty, the
pursuit of
happiness, and
the enjoyment
of the rewards
of their own
industry; that
all persons are
equal and
entitled to
equal rights,
opportunities,
and protection
under the law;
and that all
persons have
corresponding
obligations to
the people and
to the State.
No person shall
be deprived of
life, liberty, or
property,
without due
process of law.
The right of all

Current text

Date
Current
Text
Enacted

Const. of
1959,
art. I, § 1
(current
through
2011)

Same

1959

Const. of
1959,
art. I, § 7
(current
through
2011)

Same

1959

Current
const.
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Const. of
1959, art. I, §
10 (Treason)
(1st Const.)

Const. of
1959, art. I, §
11 (Criminal
Prosecutions)
(1st Const.)

Const. of
1879, art. I, §
7 (Jury trial
right)
(2nd Const.)
California

persons to fair
and just
treatment in the
course of
legislative and
executive
investigations
shall not be
infringed.
No person shall
be convicted of
treason, unless
on the
testimony of
two witnesses
to the same
overt act, or on
confession in
open court.
(emphasis
added)
In all criminal
prosecutions,
the accused
shall have the
right to a
speedy and
public
trial . . . .
(emphasis
added)
A trial by jury
may be waived
in all criminal
cases, not
amounting to
felony, by the
consent of both
parties,
expressed in
open Court,
and in civil
actions by the

1023

Const. of
1959,
art. I, §
10
(current
through
2011)

Same

1959

Const. of
1959,
art. I, §
11
(current
through
2011)

Same

1959

Const. of
1879,
art. I, §
16 (as
amended
in 1998)
(current
through
2012)

A jury may be
waived in a
criminal
cause by the
consent of
both parties
expressed in
open court by
the defendant
and the
defendant’s
counsel. . . .

1998
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consent of the
parties,
signified in
such manner as
may be
prescribed by
law. In civil
actions, and
cases of
misdemeanor,
the jury may
consist of
twelve, or of
any number
less than
twelve upon
which the
parties may
agree in open
Court.
(emphasis
added)

Const. of
1849, art. I, §
8 (Due

No person
shall . . . be
deprived of

Const. of
1879,
art. I, §

[Vol. 56:917

In civil causes
the jury shall
consist of 12
persons or a
lesser number
agreed on by
the parties in
open court.
In civil causes
other than
causes within
the appellate
jurisdiction of
the court of
appeal the
Legislature
may provide
that the jury
shall consist
of eight
persons or a
lesser number
agreed on by
the parties in
open
court. . . . In
criminal
actions in
which a
misdemeanor
is charged,
the jury shall
consist of 12
persons or a
lesser number
agreed on by
the parties in
open court.
(emphasis
added)
A person may
not be
deprived of

1979
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process) (1st
Const.)

life, liberty, or
property
without due
process of
law . . . .

7, ¶ a (as
amended
in 1974
and
1979)
(current
through
2012)

life, liberty, or
property
without due
process of law
or denied
equal
protection of
the laws . . . .

Const. of
1849, art. I, §
10 (Right to
petition)
(1st Const.)

The people
shall have the
right freely to
assemble
together to
consult for the
common good,
to instruct their
representatives,
and to petition
the legislature
for redress of
grievances.

Const. of
1879,
art. I, §
3, ¶ a (as
amended
in 2004)
(current
through
2012)

Const. of
1879, art. I, §
13 (Speedy
public trial)
(2nd Const.)

In criminal
prosecutions,
in any Court
whatever, the
party accused
shall have the
right to a
speedy and
public
trial . . . .
(emphasis
added)
No person shall
be convicted of
treason, unless
on the evidence
of two
witnesses to
the same overt
act, or
confession in

Const. of
1879,
art. I, §
15 (as
amended
in 1974)
(current
through
2012)

The people
have the right
to instruct
their
representative
s, petition
government
for redress of
grievances,
and assemble
freely to
consult for the
common
good.
The defendant
in a criminal
cause has the
right to a
speedy public
trial . . . .
(emphasis
added)

Const. of
1849, art. I, §
20 (Treason)
(1st Const.)

Const. of
1879,
art. I, §
18 (as
amended
in 1974)
(current
through
2012)

A person may
not be
convicted of
treason except
on the
evidence of
two witnesses
to the same
overt act or
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1974

1974
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by confession
in open court.
(emphasis
added)

open court.
(emphasis
added)
Const. of
1959, art. I, §
4 (Due
Process)
(1st Const.)

No person shall
be deprived of
life, liberty or
property
without due
process of law,
no[r] be denied
the equal
protection of
the laws, nor
be denied the
enjoyment of
his civil rights
or be
discriminated
against in the
exercise
thereof because
of race,
religion, sex or
ancestry.

Const. of
1978,
art. I, § 5
(current
through
2011)

Const. of
1959, art. I, §
6 (Rights of
citizens)
(1st Const.)

No citizen shall
be
disfranchised,
or deprived of
any of the
rights or
privileges
secured to
other citizens,
unless by the
law of the land.
In all criminal
prosecutions,
the accused

Const. of
1978,
art. I, § 8
(current
through
2011)

Hawaii

Const. of
1959, art. I, §

Const. of
1978,
art. I, §

Same (No
person shall
be deprived of
life, liberty or
property
without due
process of
law, nor be
denied the
equal
protection of
the laws, nor
be denied the
enjoyment of
the person’s
civil rights or
be
discriminated
against in the
exercise
thereof
because of
race, religion,
sex or
ancestry.)
Same

1959

Same in
relevant part

1959

1959
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11 (Rights of
the accused)
(1st Const.)

Iowa

Const. of
1857, art. I, §
9 (Due
process)
(2nd Const.)

Const. of
1857, art. I, §
10 (Speedy
public trial)
(2nd Const.)

Const. of
1846, art. I, §
16 (Treason)
(1st Const)

shall enjoy the
right to a
speedy and
public trial by
an impartial
jury of the
district wherein
the crime shall
have been
committed . . . .
(emphasis
added)
[N]o person
shall be
deprived of
life, liberty, or
property,
without due
process of law.
In all criminal
prosecutions,
and in cases
involving the
life or liberty
of [a]n
individual, the
accused shall
have a right to
a speedy and
public trial by
an impartial
jury . . . .
(emphasis
added)
No person shall
be convicted of
treason unless
on the evidence
of two
witnesses to
the same overt
act, or
confession in

1027

14
(current
through
2011)

Const. of
1857,
art. I, § 9
(current
through
2010)

Same

1857

Const. of
1857,
art. I, §
10
(current
through
2010)

Same

1857

Const. of
1857,
art. I, §
16
(current
through
2010)

Same

1846
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open court.
(emphasis
added)

Nevada

Const. of
1864, art. I, §
8 (Due
process)
(1st Const.)

Const. of
1864, art. I, §
19 (Treason)
(1st Const.)

Const. of
1844, art. I, §
1 (Natural and
unalienable
rights) (2nd
Const.)

New Jersey

No person shall
be . . . deprived
of life, liberty,
or property,
without due
process of
law . . . .
And no person
shall be
convicted of
treason, unless
on the
testimony of
two witnesses
to the same
overt act, or on
confession in
open court.
(emphasis
added)
All men are by
nature free and
independent,
and have
certain natural
and inalienable
rights, among
which are those
of enjoying and
defending life
and liberty;
acquiring,
possessing and
protecting
property, and
of pursuing and
obtaining
safety and
happiness.

Const. of
1864,
art. I, §
8, cl. 5
(current
through
2010)
Const. of
1864,
art. I, §
19
(current
through
2010)

Same in
relevant part

1864

Same

1864

Const. of
1947,
art. I, § 1
(current
through
2011)

All persons
are by nature
free and
independent
and have
certain natural
and
unalienable
rights, among
which are
those of
enjoying and
defending life
and liberty, of
acquiring,
possessing,
and protecting
property, and
of pursuing
and obtaining

1947
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safety and
happiness.
Const. of
1844, art. I, §
8 (Speedy
public trial)
(2nd Const.)

Const. of
1844, art. I, §
14 (Treason)
(2nd Const.)

Const. of
1911, art. II, §
4 (Inalienable
rights) (1st
Const.)

New Mexico

In all criminal
prosecutions
the accused
shall have the
right to a
speedy and
public trial by
an impartial
jury . . . .
(emphasis
added)
No person shall
be convicted of
treason, unless
on the
testimony of
two witnesses
to the same
overt act, or on
confession in
open court.
(emphasis
added)
All persons are
born equally
free, and have
certain natural,
inherent, and
inalienable
rights, among
which are the
rights of
enjoying and
defending life
and liberty, of
acquiring,
possessing, and
protecting
property, and
of seeking and
obtaining

Const. of
1947,
art. I, §
10
(current
through
2011)

Same

1844

Const. of
1947,
art. I, §
17
(current
through
2011)

Same

1844

Const. of
1911,
art. II, §
4
(current
through
2011)

Same

1911
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safety and
happiness.
Const. of
1911, art. II, §
14 (Speedy
public trial)
(1st Const.)

Const. of
1911, art. II, §
16 (Treason)
(1st Const.)

Const. of
1911, art. XX,
§ 20 (Waiver
of indictment)
(1st Const.)

In all criminal
prosecutions
the accused
shall have the
right to . . . a
speedy public
trial by an
impartial jury
of the county
or district in
which the
offense is
alleged to have
been
committed.
(emphasis
added)
No person shall
be convicted of
treason unless
on the
testimony of
two witnesses
to the same
overt act, or on
confession in
open court.
(emphasis
added)
Any person
held by a
committing
magistrate to
await the
action of the
grand jury on a
charge of
felony or other
infamous
crime, may in
open court

Const. of
1911,
art. II, §
14 (as
amended
in 1924,
1980,
and
1994)
(current
through
2011)

Same in
relevant part

1911

Const. of
1911,
art. II, §
16
(current
through
2011)

Same

1911

Const. of
1911,
art. XX,
§ 20
(current
through
2011)

Same

1911
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Const. of
1777, art. XIII
(Rights and
privileges)
(1st Const.)

New York

with the
consent of the
court and the
district
attorney to be
entered upon
the record,
waive[]
indictment and
plead to an
information in
the form of an
indictment
filed by the
district
attorney . . . .
(emphasis
added)
And this
convention
doth further, in
the name and
by the
authority of the
good people of
this State,
ordain,
determine, and
declare, that no
member of this
State shall be
disfranchised,
or deprived of
any the rights
or privileges
secured to the
subjects of this
State by this
constitution,
unless by the

Const. of
1938,
art. I, § 1
(as
amended
in 1959)
(current
through
2011)

No member
of this state
shall be
disfranchised,
or deprived of
any of the
rights or
privileges
secured to any
citizen
thereof,
unless by the
law of the
land, or the
judgment of
his [or her]
peers, except
that the
legislature
may provide
that there
shall be no

1031
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law of the land,
or the
judgment of his
peers.

Const. of
1938, art. I, §
2 (Waiver of
jury trial)
(5th Const.)

A jury trial
may be waived
by the
defendant in all
criminal cases,
except those in
which the
crime charged
may be
punishable by
death, [by a]
written

Const. of
1938,
art. I, § 2
(current
through
2011)

[Vol. 56:917

primary
election held
to nominate
candidates for
public office
or to elect
persons to
party
positions for
any political
party or
parties in any
unit of
representation
of the state
from which
such
candidates or
persons are
nominated or
elected
whenever
there is no
contest or
contests for
such
nominations
or election as
may be
prescribed by
general [l]aw.
Same

1938
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Const. of
1938, art. I, §
6 (Waiver of
indictment)
(5th Const.)

instrument
signed by the
defendant in
person in open
court before
and with the
approval of a
judge or justice
of a court
having
jurisdiction to
try the offense.
(emphasis
added)
No person shall
be held to
answer for a
capital or
otherwise
infamous
crime . . .
unless on
indictment of a
grand jury, and
in any trial in
any court
whatever the
party accused
shall be
allowed to
appear and
defend in
person and
with counsel as
in civil actions
and shall be
informed of the
nature and
cause of the
accusation and

Const. of
1938,
art. I, § 6
(as
amended
in 1973)
(current
through

No person
shall be held
to answer for
a capital or
otherwise
infamous
crime . . .
unless on
indictment of
a grand jury,
except that a
person held
for the action
of a grand
jury upon a
charge for
such an
offense, other
than one
punishable by
death or life
imprisonment, with the
consent of the
district
attorney, may

1033
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be confronted
with the
witnesses
against him.

Const. of
1776, Bill of
Rights, § 8
(Speedy trial;
due process)
(1st Const.)

Virginia

Const. of
1902, art. I, §

[I]n all capital
or criminal
prosecutions a
man hath a
right . . . to a
speedy trial . . .
[N]o man
[shall] be
deprived of his
liberty, except
by the law of
the land or the
judgment of his
peers.

Const. of
1971,
art. I, § 8
(current
through
2011)

[N]o person
shall be
deprived of his

Const. of
1971,
art. I, §

[Vol. 56:917

waive
indictment by
a grand jury
and consent to
be prosecuted
on an
information
filed by the
district
attorney; such
waiver shall
be evidenced
by written
instrument
signed by the
defendant in
open court in
the presence
of his
counsel.
(emphasis
added)
Trial right:
[I]n criminal
prosecutions a
man hath a
right . . . to a
speedy and
public
trial . . . .
Due process:
He shall not
be deprived of
life or liberty,
except by the
law of the
land or the
judgment of
his peers . . . .
[N]o person
shall be
deprived of

Public
trial:
1971
Due
process:
1971

1971
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11 (Due
process)
(5th. Const.)

property
without due
process of
law . . . .

11
(current
through
2011)

1035

his life,
liberty, or
property
without due
process of
law . . . .

Historical information in this chart on Alaska, California (except for most recent
version), Hawaii, Iowa, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, and New York
comes from John Joseph Wallis, NBER/MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
PROJECT, www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu (last visited May 14, 2012).
Corrections to that database are indicated by bracketing incorrect language. For
California’s most recent constitution with dates of amendment, see CAL.
CONST., available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes. xhtml. For
Virginia, information comes from: VA. CONST. of 1776, available at
http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/va-1776.htm; VA. CONST. of 1902, available at
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/uva.x030202240; VA. CONST., available at
http://legis.state.va.us/Laws/search/Constitution.htm.
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APPENDIX 3

STATE CONSTITUTIONS: CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS
IN THE THIRTEEN ORIGINAL STATES

State

Declaration/
Constitution
when first
enacted
Const. of
1818, art. I, §
9 (2nd Const.)

Connecticut

Text

In all criminal
prosecutions,
the accused
shall have the
right to be
heard by
himself and by
counsel; to
demand the
nature and
cause of the
accusation; to
be confronted
by the
witnesses
against him; to
have
compulsory
process to
obtain witnesse
s in his favor;
and in all
prosecutions,
by indictment
or information,
a speedy public
trial by an
impartial jury.
He shall not be
compelled to
give evidence
against
himself, nor be
deprived of

Current
const.
Const. of
1965,
art. I, § 8
(as
amended
in 1996)
(current
through
2011)

Current text

Same, with
addition of
victims’
rights
paragraph in
1996 (In all
Criminal
prosecutions,
the accused
shall have a
right to be
heard by
himself and
by counsel; to
be informed
of the nature
and cause of
the
accusation; to
be confronted
by the
witnesses
against him;
to have
compulsory
process to
obtain
witnesses in
his behalf; to
be released on
bail upon
sufficient
security,
except in

Date
Current
Text
Enacted
Relevant
text:
1818

With
victims’
rights
paragrap
h: 1996
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life, liberty, or
property, but
by the course
of law. And no
person shall be
holden to
answer for any
crime, the
punishment of
which may be
death or
imprisonment
for life, unless
on a
presentment or
indictment of a
grand jury;
except in the
land or naval
forces, or in the
militia when in
actual service
in time of war
or public
danger.

capital
offenses,
where the
proof is
evident or the
presumption
great; and in
all
prosecutions
by
information,
to a speedy,
public trial by
an impartial
jury. No
person shall
be compelled
to give
evidence
against
himself, nor
be deprived of
life, liberty or
property
without due
process of
law, nor shall
excessive bail
be required
nor excessive
fines
imposed. No
person shall
be held to
answer for
any crime,
punishable by
death or life
imprisonment, unless
upon probable
cause shown
at a hearing in
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accordance
with
procedures
prescribed by
law, except in
the armed
forces, or in
the militia
when in
actual service
in time of war
or public
danger.)
Const. of
1792, art. I, §
7 (2nd Const.)

Delaware

In all criminal
prosecutions
the accused
hath a right to
be heard by
himself and his
counsel, to be
plainly and
fully informed
of the nature
and cause of
the accusation
against him, to
meet the
witnesses in
their
examination
face to face, to
have
compulsory
process in due
time, on
application by
himself, his
friends, or
counsel, for
obtaining
witnesses in his
favor, and a

Const. of
1897,
art. I, § 7
(as
amended
in 1999)
(current
through
2011)

In all criminal
prosecutions,
the accused
hath a right to
be heard by
himself or
herself and
his or her
counsel, to be
plainly and
fully
informed of
the nature and
cause of the
accusation
against him or
her, to meet
the witnesses
in their
examination
face to face,
to have
compulsory
process in due
time, on
application by
himself or
herself, his or
her friends or

1999
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speedy and
public trial by
an impartial
jury; he shall
not be
compelled to
give evidence
against
himself, nor
shall be
deprived of
life, liberty, or
property,
unless by the
judgment of his
peers or the
law of the land.

Const. of
1798, art. III,
§ 8 (3rd
Const.)

Georgia

Within five
years after the
adoption of this
constitution,
the body of our
laws, civil and
criminal, shall
be revised,
digested, and
arranged under
proper heads,
and
promulgated in
such manner as
the legislature
may direct; and
no person shall

1039

counsel, for
obtaining
witnesses in
his or her
favor, and a
speedy and
public trial by
an impartial
jury; he or she
shall not be
compelled to
give evidence
against
himself or
herself, nor
shall he or she
be deprived of
life, liberty or
property,
unless by the
judgment of
his or her
peers or by
the law of the
land.
Const. of
1983,
art. I, §
1, ¶ 14
(current
through
2011)

Every person
charged with
an offense
against the
laws of this
state shall
have the
privilege and
benefit of
counsel; shall
be furnished
with a copy of
the accusation
or indictment
and, on
demand, with
a list of the

1983
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be debarred
from
advocating or
defending his
cause before
any court or
tribunal, either
by himself or
counsel, or
both.

Const. of
1776, Decl. of
Rights, art. 19
(1st Const.)

Maryland
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[I]n all
criminal
prosecutions,
every man hath
a right to be
informed of the
accusation
against him; to
have a copy of
the indictment
or charge in
due time (if
required) to
prepare for his
defence; to be
allowed
counsel; to be
confronted
with the
witnesses
against him; to
have process

witnesses on
whose
testimony
such charge is
founded; shall
have
compulsory
process to
obtain the
testimony of
that person’s
own
witnesses;
and shall be
confronted
with the
witnesses
testifying
against such
person.
Const. of
1867,
Decl. of
Rights,
art. 21
(current
through
2011)

Same

1776
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for his
witnesses; to
examine the
witnesses, for
and against
him, on oath;
and to a speedy
trial by an
impartial jury,
without whose
unanimous
consent he
ought not to be
found guilty.
Const. of
1780, pt. I,
art. XII (1st
Const.)

Massachusetts

No subject
shall be held to
answer for any
crimes or []
offence until
the same is
fully and
plainly,
substantially
and formally,
described to
him; or be
compelled to
accuse, or
furnish
evidence
against
himself; and
every subject
shall have a
right to
produce all
proofs that may
be favorable to
him; to meet
the witnesses
against him
face to face,

Const. of
1780, pt.
I, art. XII
(current
through
2011)

Same

1780
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and to be fully
heard in his
defense by
himself, or his
council at his
election. And
no subject shall
be arrested,
imprisoned,
despoiled, or
deprived of his
property,
immunities, or
privileges, put
out of the
protection of
the law, exiled
or deprived of
his life, liberty,
or estate, but
by the
judgment of his
peers, or the
law of the land.
And the
legislature
shall not make
any law that
shall subject
any person to a
capital or
infamous
punishment,
excepting for
the government
of the army
and navy,
without trial by
jury.

[Vol. 56:917
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Const. of
1784, art. I, §
15 (2nd
Const.)

New
Hampshire

No subject
shall be held to
answer for any
crime, or
offence, until
the same is
fully and
plainly,
substantially
and formally,
described to
him; or be
compelled to
accuse or
furnish
evidence
against
himself. And
every subject
shall have a
right to
produce all
proofs that may
be favorable to
himself; to
meet the
witnesses
against him
face to face,
and to be fully
heard in his
defence by
himself, and
counsel. And
no subject shall
be arrested,
imprisoned,
despoiled or
deprived of his
property,
immunities, or
privileges, put
out of the

Const. of
1784,
art. I, §
15 (as
amended
in 1966
(counsel
at state
expense)
and 1984
(standard
of proof
for
commit
ment of
criminally
insane))
(current
through
2011)

No subject
shall be held
to answer for
any crime, or
offense, until
the same is
fully and
plainly,
substantially
and formally,
described to
him; or be
compelled to
accuse or
furnish
evidence
against
himself.
Every subject
shall have a
right to
produce all
proofs that
may be
favorable to
himself; to
meet the
witnesses
against him
face to face,
and to be
fully heard in
his defense,
by himself,
and counsel.
No subject
shall be
arrested,
imprisoned,
despoiled, or
deprived of
his property,
immunities,

1043

1984

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1044

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

protection of
the law, exiled
or deprived of
his life, liberty,
or estate, but
by the
judgment of his
peers or the
law of the land.
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or privileges,
put out of the
protection of
the law,
exiled or
deprived of
his life,
liberty, or
estate, but by
the judgment
of his peers,
or the law of
the land;
provided that,
in any
proceeding to
commit a
person
acquitted of a
criminal
charge by
reason of
insanity, due
process shall
require that
clear and
convincing
evidence that
the person is
potentially
dangerous to
himself or to
others and
that the
person suffers
from a mental
disorder must
be
established.
Every person
held to
answer in any
crime or
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offense
punishable by
deprivation of
liberty shall
have the right
to counsel at
the expense of
the state if
need is
shown; this
right he is at
liberty to
waive, but
only after the
matter has
been
thoroughly
explained by
the court.
Const. of
1776, art. 16
(1st Const.)

New Jersey

[A]ll criminals
shall be
admitted [] the
same privileges
of witnesses
and counsel, as
their
prosecutors are
or shall be
entitled to.

Const. of
1947,
art. I, §
10
(current
through
2011)
(same as
Const. of
1844,
art. I, §
8.)

In all criminal
prosecutions
the accused
shall have the
right to a
speedy and
public trial by
an impartial
jury; to be
informed [o]f
the nature and
cause of the
accusation; to
be confronted
with the
witnesses
against him;
to have
compulsory
process for
obtaining
witnesses in
his favor; and

1844
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to have the
assistance of
counsel in his
defense.
Const. of
1777, art. 34
(1st Const.)

New York

[I]n every trial
on
impeachment,
or indictment
for crimes or
misdemeanors,
the party
impeached or
indicted shall
be allowed
counsel, as in
civil actions.

Const. of
1938,
art. I, § 6
(as
amended
in 1949,
1959,
1973,
and
2001)
(current
through
2011)

No person
shall be held
to answer for
a capital or
otherwise
infamous
crime . . .
unless on
indictment of
a grand jury,
except that a
person held
for the action
of a grand
jury upon a
charge for
such an
offense, other
than one
punishable by
death or life
imprisonment, with the
consent of the
district
attorney, may
waive
indictment by
a grand jury
and consent to
be prosecuted
on an
information
filed by the
district
attorney; such
waiver shall
be evidenced

2001
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by written
instrument
signed by the
defendant in
open court in
the presence
of his [or her]
counsel. In
any trial in
any court
whatever the
party accused
shall be
allowed to
appear and
defend in
person and
with counsel
as in civil
actions and
shall be
informed of
the nature and
cause of the
accusation
and be
confronted
with the
witnesses
against him
[or her]. No
person shall
be subject to
be twice put
in jeopardy
for the same
offense; nor
shall he [or
she] be
compelled in
any criminal
case to be a
witness
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against
himself [or
herself] . . . .
No person
shall be
deprived of
life, liberty or
property
without due
process of
law.
Const. of
1868, art. I, §
11 (2nd
Const.)

North
Carolina

In all criminal
prosecutions
every man has
the right to be
informed of the
accusation
against him
and to confront
the accusers
and witnesses
with other
testimony, and
to have counsel
for his defence,
and not be
compelled to
give evidence
against
himself . . . .

Const. of
1971,
art. I §
23
(current
through
2011)
(same as
1946
amendm
ent to
Const. of
1868,
art. I, §
11)

In all criminal
prosecutions,
every person
charged with
a crime has
the right to be
informed of
the accusation
and [to]
confront the
accusers and
witnesses
with other
testimony,
and to have
counsel for
defense, and
not be
compelled to
give selfincriminating
evidence, or
to pay costs,
jail fees, or
necessary
witness fees
of the
defense,
unless found
guilty.
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Const. of
1790, art. IX,
§ 9 (2nd
Const.)

Pennsylvania

That in all
criminal
prosecutions
the accused
hath a right to
be heard by
himself and his
counsel, to
demand the
nature and
cause of the
accusation
against him, to
meet the
witnesses face
to face, to have
compulsory
process for
obtaining
witnesses in his
favor, and, in
prosecutions
by indictment
or information,
a speedy public
trial by an
impartial jury
of the vicinage;
that he cannot
be compelled
to give
evidence
against
himself, nor
can he be
deprived of his
life, liberty, or
property,
unless by the
judgment of his
peers or the
law of the land.

Const. of
1969,
art. I, § 9
(as
amended
in 1984
and
1995)
(current
through
2012)

In all criminal
prosecutions
the accused
hath a right to
be heard by
himself and
his counsel, to
demand the
nature and
cause of the
accusation
against him,
to be
confronted
with the
witnesses
against him,
to have
compulsory
process for
obtaining
witnesses in
his favor, and
in
prosecutions
by indictment
or
information, a
speedy public
trial by an
impartial jury
of the
vicinage; he
cannot be
compelled to
give evidence
against
himself, nor
can he be
deprived of
his life,
liberty or
property,
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unless by the
judgment of
his peers or
the law of the
land. The use
of a
suppressed
voluntary
admission or
voluntary
confession to
impeach the
credibility of
a person may
be permitted
and shall not
be construed
as compelling
a person to
give evidence
against
himself. . . .
Const. of
1843, art. I, §
10 (1st
Const.)

Rhode Island

In all criminal
prosecutions,
the accused
shall enjoy the
right to a
speedy and
public trial, by
an impartial
jury; to be
informed of the
nature and
cause of the
accusation, to
be confronted
with the
witnesses
against him, to
have
compulsory
process for

Const. of
1986,
art. I, §
10
(current
through
2011)

In all criminal
prosecutions,
accused
persons shall
enjoy the
right to a
speedy and
public trial,
by an
impartial jury;
to be
informed of
the nature and
cause of the
accusation, to
be confronted
with the
witnesses
against them,
to have
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obtaining them
in his favor, to
have the
assistance of
counsel in his
defence, and
shall be at
liberty to speak
for himself; nor
shall he be
deprived of
life, liberty, or
property,
unless by the
judgment of his
peers, or the
law of the land.

Const. of
1868, art. I, §
13 (6th
Const.)

South
Carolina

No person shall
be held to
answer for any
crime or
offence until
the same is
fully, fairly,
plainly,
substantially
and formally
described to
him; or be
compelled to
accuse or
furnish
evidence
against
himself; and
every person
shall have a
right to

1051

compulsory
process for
obtaining
them in their
favor, to have
the assistance
of counsel in
their defense,
and shall be at
liberty to
speak for
themselves;
nor shall they
be deprived of
life, liberty, or
property,
unless by the
judgment of
their peers, or
the law of the
land.
Const. of
1895,
art. I, §
14 (as
amended
in 1971)
(current
through
2011)

The right of
trial by jury
shall be
preserved
inviolate.
Any person
charged with
an offense
shall enjoy
the right to a
speedy and
public trial by
an impartial
jury; to be
fully
informed of
the nature and
cause of the
accusation; to
be confronted
with the

1971
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produce all
proofs that may
be favorable to
him, to meet
the witnesses
against him
face to face, to
have a speedy
and public trial
by a[n]
impartial jury,
and to be fully
heard in his
defence by
himself or by
his counsel, or
by both, as he
may elect.
Const. of
1776, Bill of
Rights § 8
(1st Const.)

Virginia

That in all
capital or
criminal
prosecutions a
man bath a
right to
demand the
cause and
nature of his
accusation, to
be confronted
with the
accusers and
witnesses, to
call for
evidence in his
favor, and to a
speedy trial by
an impartial
jury of twelve
men of his
vicinage,
without whose
unanimous
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witnesses
against him;
to have
compulsory
process for
obtaining
witnesses in
his favor, and
to be fully
heard in his
defense by
himself or by
his counsel or
by both.

Const. of
1971,
art. I, § 8
(current
through
2011)

That in
criminal
prosecutions a
man hath a
right to
demand the
cause and
nature of his
accusation, to
be confronted
with the
accusers and
witnesses, and
to call for
evidence in
his favor, and
he shall enjoy
the right to a
speedy and
public trial,
by an
impartial jury
of his
vicinage,
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consent he
cannot be
found guilty;
nor can he be
compelled to
give evidence
against
himself; that no
man be
deprived of his
liberty, except
by the law of
the land or the
judgment of his
peers.

without
whose
unanimous
consent he
cannot be
found guilty.
He shall not
be deprived of
life or liberty,
except by the
law of the
land or the
judgment of
his peers, nor
be compelled
in any
criminal
proceeding to
give evidence
against
himself, nor
be put twice
in jeopardy
for the same
offense.
Laws may be
enacted
providing for
the trial of
offenses not
felonious by a
court not of
record
without a
jury,
preserving the
right of the
accused to an
appeal to and
a trial by jury
in some court
of record
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having
original
criminal
jurisdiction.
Laws may
also provide
for juries
consisting of
less than
twelve, but
not less than
five, for the
trial of
offenses not
felonious, and
may classify
such cases,
and prescribe
the number of
jurors for
each class.
In criminal
cases, the
accused may
plead guilty.
If the accused
plead not
guilty, he
may, with his
consent and
the
concurrence
of the
Commonweal
th’s attorney
and of the
court entered
of record, be
tried by a
smaller
number of
jurors, or

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2012]

CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENTS TO AND IN COURTS

1055

waive a jury.
In case of
such waiver
or plea of
guilty, the
court shall try
the case.
....

Historical information in this chart on Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland,
New Hampshire (except for amendments), New Jersey, New York (except for
amendments), North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina
comes from John Joseph Wallis, NBER/MARYLAND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
PROJECT, www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu (last visited May 15, 2012). For
states not included in Wallis’s database, information comes from Georgia
http://georgiainfo.gali
Constitution
Web
Page,
GEORGIAINFO,
leo.usg.edu/gacontoc.htm (last visited May 15, 2012); MASS. CONST. of 1780,
available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/docs/ma-1780.htm; MASS. CONST.,
available at http://www.malegislature.gov/laws/constitution; SUSAN E.
MARSHALL, THE NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE
65 (2004); N.Y. CONST., available at http://www.dos.ny.gov/info/con
stitution.htm.; VA. CONST. of 1776, available at http://www.nhinet.org/ccs/
docs/va-1776.htm; VA. CONST., available at http://legis.state.va.us/Laws/
search/Constitution.htm.

